!88 同步上游社区补丁

From: @hongjinghao Reviewed-by: @dillon_chen Signed-off-by: @dillon_chen
sync patches from dbus community
2024-06-18 09:13:14 +00:00 · 2024-06-18 14:14:30 +08:00 · 2024-06-18 02:51:00 +00:00 · 2024-06-18 10:15:07 +08:00 · 2024-02-21 09:25:49 +00:00 · 2024-02-21 16:32:58 +08:00
14 changed files with 1482 additions and 1 deletions
--- a/backport-CVE-2022-42010.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2022-42010.patch
@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From 9d07424e9011e3bbe535e83043d335f3093d2916 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 15:10:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dbus-marshal-validate: Check brackets in signature nest
+ correctly
+
+In debug builds with assertions enabled, a signature with incorrectly
+nested `()` and `{}`, for example `a{i(u}` or `(a{ii)}`, could result
+in an assertion failure.
+
+In production builds without assertions enabled, a signature with
+incorrectly nested `()` and `{}` could potentially result in a crash
+or incorrect message parsing, although we do not have a concrete example
+of either of these failure modes.
+
+Thanks: Evgeny Vereshchagin
+Resolves: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/418
+Resolves: CVE-2022-42010
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c b/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+index 4d492f3f..ae68414d 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+ 
+   int element_count;
+   DBusList *element_count_stack;
+  char opened_brackets[DBUS_MAXIMUM_TYPE_RECURSION_DEPTH * 2 + 1] = { '\0' };
+  char last_bracket;
+ 
+   result = DBUS_VALID;
+   element_count_stack = NULL;
+@@ -93,6 +95,10 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+ 
+   while (p != end)
+     {
+      _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 0);
+      _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
+      _dbus_assert (opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth] == '\0');
+
+       switch (*p)
+         {
+         case DBUS_TYPE_BYTE:
+@@ -136,6 +142,10 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+               goto out;
+             }
+ 
+          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 1);
+          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
+          _dbus_assert (opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1] == '\0');
+          opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1] = DBUS_STRUCT_BEGIN_CHAR;
+           break;
+ 
+         case DBUS_STRUCT_END_CHAR:
+@@ -151,9 +161,20 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+               goto out;
+             }
+ 
+          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 1);
+          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
+          last_bracket = opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1];
+
+          if (last_bracket != DBUS_STRUCT_BEGIN_CHAR)
+            {
+              result = DBUS_INVALID_STRUCT_ENDED_BUT_NOT_STARTED;
+              goto out;
+            }
+
+           _dbus_list_pop_last (&element_count_stack);
+ 
+           struct_depth -= 1;
+          opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth] = '\0';
+           break;
+ 
+         case DBUS_DICT_ENTRY_BEGIN_CHAR:
+@@ -178,6 +199,10 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+               goto out;
+             }
+ 
+          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 1);
+          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
+          _dbus_assert (opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1] == '\0');
+          opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1] = DBUS_DICT_ENTRY_BEGIN_CHAR;
+           break;
+ 
+         case DBUS_DICT_ENTRY_END_CHAR:
+@@ -186,8 +211,19 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+               result = DBUS_INVALID_DICT_ENTRY_ENDED_BUT_NOT_STARTED;
+               goto out;
+             }
+-            
+
+          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 1);
+          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
+          last_bracket = opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1];
+
+          if (last_bracket != DBUS_DICT_ENTRY_BEGIN_CHAR)
+            {
+              result = DBUS_INVALID_DICT_ENTRY_ENDED_BUT_NOT_STARTED;
+              goto out;
+            }
+
+           dict_entry_depth -= 1;
+          opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth] = '\0';
+ 
+           element_count = 
+             _DBUS_POINTER_TO_INT (_dbus_list_pop_last (&element_count_stack));
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2022-42011.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2022-42011.patch
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 079bbf16186e87fb0157adf8951f19864bc2ed69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2022 13:14:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dbus-marshal-validate: Validate length of arrays of
+ fixed-length items
+
+This fast-path previously did not check that the array was made up
+of an integer number of items. This could lead to assertion failures
+and out-of-bounds accesses during subsequent message processing (which
+assumes that the message has already been validated), particularly after
+the addition of _dbus_header_remove_unknown_fields(), which makes it
+more likely that dbus-daemon will apply non-trivial edits to messages.
+
+Thanks: Evgeny Vereshchagin
+Fixes: e61f13cf "Bug 18064 - more efficient validation for fixed-size type arrays"
+Resolves: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/413
+Resolves: CVE-2022-42011
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c b/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+index ae68414d..7d0d6cf7 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+@@ -503,13 +503,24 @@ validate_body_helper (DBusTypeReader       *reader,
+                  */ 
+                 if (dbus_type_is_fixed (array_elem_type))
+                   {
+                    /* Note that fixed-size types all have sizes equal to
+                     * their alignments, so this is really the item size. */
+                    alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
+                    _dbus_assert (alignment == 1 || alignment == 2 ||
+                                  alignment == 4 || alignment == 8);
+
+                    /* Because the alignment is a power of 2, this is
+                     * equivalent to: (claimed_len % alignment) != 0,
+                     * but avoids slower integer division */
+                    if ((claimed_len & (alignment - 1)) != 0)
+                      return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_INCORRECT;
+
+                     /* bools need to be handled differently, because they can
+                      * have an invalid value
+                      */
+                     if (array_elem_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN)
+                       {
+                         dbus_uint32_t v;
+-                        alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
+ 
+                         while (p < array_end)
+                           {
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2022-42012.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2022-42012.patch
@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 236f16e444e88a984cf12b09225e0f8efa6c5b44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 13:46:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dbus-marshal-byteswap: Byte-swap Unix fd indexes if needed
+
+When a D-Bus message includes attached file descriptors, the body of the
+message contains unsigned 32-bit indexes pointing into an out-of-band
+array of file descriptors. Some D-Bus APIs like GLib's GDBus refer to
+these indexes as "handles" for the associated fds (not to be confused
+with a Windows HANDLE, which is a kernel object).
+
+The assertion message removed by this commit is arguably correct up to
+a point: fd-passing is only reasonable on a local machine, and no known
+operating system allows processes of differing endianness even on a
+multi-endian ARM or PowerPC CPU, so it makes little sense for the sender
+to specify a byte-order that differs from the byte-order of the recipient.
+
+However, this doesn't account for the fact that a malicious sender
+doesn't have to restrict itself to only doing things that make sense.
+On a system with untrusted local users, a message sender could crash
+the system dbus-daemon (a denial of service) by sending a message in
+the opposite endianness that contains handles to file descriptors.
+
+Before this commit, if assertions are enabled, attempting to byteswap
+a fd index would cleanly crash the message recipient with an assertion
+failure. If assertions are disabled, attempting to byteswap a fd index
+would silently do nothing without advancing the pointer p, causing the
+message's type and the pointer into its contents to go out of sync, which
+can result in a subsequent crash (the crash demonstrated by fuzzing was
+a use-after-free, but other failure modes might be possible).
+
+In principle we could resolve this by rejecting wrong-endianness messages
+from a local sender, but it's actually simpler and less code to treat
+wrong-endianness messages as valid and byteswap them.
+
+Thanks: Evgeny Vereshchagin
+Fixes: ba7daa60 "unix-fd: add basic marshalling code for unix fds"
+Resolves: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/417
+Resolves: CVE-2022-42012
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c | 6 +-----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c b/dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c
+index e9de6f02..9dd1246f 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ byteswap_body_helper (DBusTypeReader       *reader,
+         case DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
+         case DBUS_TYPE_INT32:
+         case DBUS_TYPE_UINT32:
+        case DBUS_TYPE_UNIX_FD:
+           {
+             p = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, 4);
+             *((dbus_uint32_t*)p) = DBUS_UINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (*((dbus_uint32_t*)p));
+@@ -192,11 +193,6 @@ byteswap_body_helper (DBusTypeReader       *reader,
+           }
+           break;
+ 
+-        case DBUS_TYPE_UNIX_FD:
+-          /* fds can only be passed on a local machine, so byte order must always match */
+-          _dbus_assert_not_reached("attempted to byteswap unix fds which makes no sense");
+-          break;
+-
+         default:
+           _dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid typecode in supposedly-validated signature");
+           break;
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2023-34969.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2023-34969.patch
@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+From 37a4dc5835731a1f7a81f1b67c45b8dfb556dd1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: hongjinghao <q1204531485@163.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 18:17:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] bus: Assign a serial number for messages from the driver
+
+Normally, it's enough to rely on a message being given a serial number
+by the DBusConnection just before it is actually sent. However, in the
+rare case where the policy blocks the driver from sending a message
+(due to a deny rule or the outgoing message quota being full), we need
+to get a valid serial number sooner, so that we can copy it into the
+DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_REPLY_SERIAL field (which is mandatory) in the error
+message sent to monitors. Otherwise, the dbus-daemon will crash with
+an assertion failure if at least one Monitoring client is attached,
+because zero is not a valid serial number to copy.
+
+This fixes a denial-of-service vulnerability: if a privileged user is
+monitoring the well-known system bus using a Monitoring client like
+dbus-monitor or `busctl monitor`, then an unprivileged user can cause
+denial-of-service by triggering this crash. A mitigation for this
+vulnerability is to avoid attaching Monitoring clients to the system
+bus when they are not needed. If there are no Monitoring clients, then
+the vulnerable code is not reached.
+
+Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Resolves: dbus/dbus#457
+(cherry picked from commit b159849e031000d1dbc1ab876b5fc78a3ce9b534)
+---
+ bus/connection.c                | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h |  2 ++
+ dbus/dbus-connection.c          | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/connection.c b/bus/connection.c
+index b3583433..215f0230 100644
+--- a/bus/connection.c
+++ b/bus/connection.c
+@@ -2350,6 +2350,21 @@ bus_transaction_send_from_driver (BusTransaction *transaction,
+   if (!dbus_message_set_sender (message, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+  /* Make sure the message has a non-zero serial number, otherwise
+   * bus_transaction_capture_error_reply() will not be able to mock up
+   * a corresponding reply for it. Normally this would be delayed until
+   * the first time we actually send the message out from a
+   * connection, when the transaction is committed, but that's too late
+   * in this case.
+   */
+  if (dbus_message_get_serial (message) == 0)
+    {
+      dbus_uint32_t next_serial;
+
+      next_serial = _dbus_connection_get_next_client_serial (connection);
+      dbus_message_set_serial (message, next_serial);
+    }
+
+   if (bus_connection_is_active (connection))
+     {
+       if (!dbus_message_set_destination (message,
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h b/dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h
+index 48357321..ba79b192 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h
+++ b/dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h
+@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ DBUS_PRIVATE_EXPORT
+ DBusConnection *  _dbus_connection_ref_unlocked                (DBusConnection     *connection);
+ DBUS_PRIVATE_EXPORT
+ void              _dbus_connection_unref_unlocked              (DBusConnection     *connection);
+DBUS_PRIVATE_EXPORT
+dbus_uint32_t     _dbus_connection_get_next_client_serial      (DBusConnection *connection);
+ void              _dbus_connection_queue_received_message_link (DBusConnection     *connection,
+                                                                 DBusList           *link);
+ dbus_bool_t       _dbus_connection_has_messages_to_send_unlocked (DBusConnection     *connection);
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-connection.c b/dbus/dbus-connection.c
+index c525b6dc..09cef278 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-connection.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-connection.c
+@@ -1456,7 +1456,16 @@ _dbus_connection_unref_unlocked (DBusConnection *connection)
+     _dbus_connection_last_unref (connection);
+ }
+ 
+-static dbus_uint32_t
+/**
+ * Allocate and return the next non-zero serial number for outgoing messages.
+ *
+ * This method is only valid to call from single-threaded code, such as
+ * the dbus-daemon, or with the connection lock held.
+ *
+ * @param connection the connection
+ * @returns A suitable serial number for the next message to be sent on the connection.
+ */
+dbus_uint32_t
+ _dbus_connection_get_next_client_serial (DBusConnection *connection)
+ {
+   dbus_uint32_t serial;
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-Do-not-crash-when-reloading-configuration.patch
+++ b/backport-Do-not-crash-when-reloading-configuration.patch
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From c3b1e4daa5b0ed5729f0f12bc6a3ba50a391f7f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: hongjinghao <hongjinghao@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 15:15:53 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Do not crash when reloading configuration with > 128 dirs
+
+When `dbus-daemon` sets more than 128 directories for `XDG_DATA_DIRS`,
+none of the elements in `new_dirs` will be `NULL`, which resulted in
+these loops reading out-of-bounds (undefined behaviour). In practice
+this led to a crash.
+
+To avoid this, make sure to stop iteration at the end of the array.
+
+[smcv: Expanded commit message]
+Resolves: dbus/dbus#481
+---
+ bus/dir-watch-inotify.c | 4 ++--
+ bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c  | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/dir-watch-inotify.c b/bus/dir-watch-inotify.c
+index 77b2d5a92..4f269777f 100644
+--- a/bus/dir-watch-inotify.c
+++ b/bus/dir-watch-inotify.c
+@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ _set_watched_dirs_internal (BusContext *context,
+   /* Look for directories in both the old and new sets, if
+    * we find one, move its data into the new set.
+    */
+-  for (i = 0; new_dirs[i]; i++)
+  for (i = 0; i < MAX_DIRS_TO_WATCH && new_dirs[i]; i++)
+     {
+       for (j = 0; j < num_wds; j++)
+         {
+@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ _set_watched_dirs_internal (BusContext *context,
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-  for (i = 0; new_dirs[i]; i++)
+  for (i = 0; i < MAX_DIRS_TO_WATCH && new_dirs[i]; i++)
+     {
+       if (new_wds[i] == -1)
+         {
+diff --git a/bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c b/bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c
+index b419606e3..07b505c99 100644
+--- a/bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c
+++ b/bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ bus_set_watched_dirs (BusContext *context, DBusList **directories)
+   /* Look for directories in both the old and new sets, if
+    * we find one, move its data into the new set.
+    */
+-  for (i = 0; new_dirs[i]; i++)
+  for (i = 0; i < MAX_DIRS_TO_WATCH && new_dirs[i]; i++)
+     {
+       for (j = 0; j < num_fds; j++)
+         {
+@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ bus_set_watched_dirs (BusContext *context, DBusList **directories)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-  for (i = 0; new_dirs[i]; i++)
+  for (i = 0; i < MAX_DIRS_TO_WATCH && new_dirs[i]; i++)
+     {
+       if (new_fds[i] == -1)
+         {
+-- 
+GitLab
+
--- a/backport-Stop-using-selinux_set_mapping-function.patch
+++ b/backport-Stop-using-selinux_set_mapping-function.patch
@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+From 6072f8b24153d844a3033108a17bcd0c1a967816 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@bigon.be>
+Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 11:15:23 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Stop using selinux_set_mapping() function
+
+Currently, if the "dbus" security class or the associated AV doesn't
+exist, dbus-daemon fails to initialize and exits immediately. Also the
+security classes or access vector cannot be reordered in the policy.
+This can be a problem for people developing their own policy or trying
+to access a machine where, for some reasons, there is not policy defined
+at all.
+
+The code here copy the behaviour of the selinux_check_access() function.
+We cannot use this function here as it doesn't allow us to define the
+AVC entry reference.
+
+See the discussion at https://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=152163374332372&w=2
+
+Resolves: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/issues/198
+
+Conflict:function bus_selinux_full_init (void) is modified to adapt to the context.
+Reference:https://github.com/freedesktop/dbus/commit/6072f8b24153d844a3033108a17bcd0c1a967816
+---
+ bus/selinux.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/selinux.c b/bus/selinux.c
+index a005b84f..7e63348c 100644
+--- a/bus/selinux.c
+++ b/bus/selinux.c
+@@ -232,24 +232,6 @@ bus_selinux_pre_init (void)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * Private Flask definitions; the order of these constants must
+- * exactly match that of the structure array below!
+- */
+-/* security dbus class constants */
+-#define SECCLASS_DBUS       1
+-
+-/* dbus's per access vector constants */
+-#define DBUS__ACQUIRE_SVC   1
+-#define DBUS__SEND_MSG      2
+-
+-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+-static struct security_class_mapping dbus_map[] = {
+-  { "dbus", { "acquire_svc", "send_msg", NULL } },
+-  { NULL }
+-};
+-#endif /* HAVE_SELINUX */
+-
+ /**
+  * Establish dynamic object class and permission mapping and
+  * initialize the user space access vector cache (AVC) for D-Bus and set up
+@@ -350,13 +350,6 @@ bus_selinux_full_init (void)
+ 
+   _dbus_verbose ("SELinux is enabled in this kernel.\n");
+ 
+-  if (selinux_set_mapping (dbus_map) < 0)
+-    {
+-      _dbus_warn ("Failed to set up security class mapping (selinux_set_mapping():%s).",
+-                   strerror (errno));
+-      return FALSE; 
+-    }
+-
+   avc_entry_ref_init (&aeref);
+   if (avc_init ("avc", &mem_cb, &log_cb, &thread_cb, &lock_cb) < 0)
+     {
+@@ -392,19 +367,53 @@ error:
+ static dbus_bool_t
+ bus_selinux_check (BusSELinuxID        *sender_sid,
+                    BusSELinuxID        *override_sid,
+-                   security_class_t     target_class,
+-                   access_vector_t      requested,
+-		   DBusString          *auxdata)
+                   const char          *target_class,
+                   const char          *requested,
+                   DBusString          *auxdata)
+ {
+  int saved_errno;
+  security_class_t security_class;
+  access_vector_t requested_access;
+
+   if (!selinux_enabled)
+     return TRUE;
+ 
+  security_class = string_to_security_class (target_class);
+  if (security_class == 0)
+    {
+      saved_errno = errno;
+      log_callback (SELINUX_ERROR, "Unknown class %s", target_class);
+      if (security_deny_unknown () == 0)
+        {
+          return TRUE;
+	}
+
+      _dbus_verbose ("Unknown class %s\n", target_class);
+      errno = saved_errno;
+      return FALSE;
+    }
+
+  requested_access = string_to_av_perm (security_class, requested);
+  if (requested_access == 0)
+    {
+      saved_errno = errno;
+      log_callback (SELINUX_ERROR, "Unknown permission %s for class %s", requested, target_class);
+      if (security_deny_unknown () == 0)
+        {
+          return TRUE;
+	}
+
+      _dbus_verbose ("Unknown permission %s for class %s\n", requested, target_class);
+      errno = saved_errno;
+      return FALSE;
+    }
+
+   /* Make the security check.  AVC checks enforcing mode here as well. */
+   if (avc_has_perm (SELINUX_SID_FROM_BUS (sender_sid),
+                     override_sid ?
+                     SELINUX_SID_FROM_BUS (override_sid) :
+                     bus_sid,
+-                    target_class, requested, &aeref, auxdata) < 0)
+                    security_class, requested_access, &aeref, auxdata) < 0)
+     {
+     switch (errno)
+       {
+@@ -471,8 +480,8 @@ bus_selinux_allows_acquire_service (DBusConnection     *connection,
+   
+   ret = bus_selinux_check (connection_sid,
+ 			   service_sid,
+-			   SECCLASS_DBUS,
+-			   DBUS__ACQUIRE_SVC,
+			   "dbus",
+			   "acquire_svc",
+ 			   &auxdata);
+ 
+   _dbus_string_free (&auxdata);
+@@ -600,8 +609,8 @@ bus_selinux_allows_send (DBusConnection     *sender,
+ 
+   ret = bus_selinux_check (sender_sid, 
+ 			   recipient_sid,
+-			   SECCLASS_DBUS, 
+-			   DBUS__SEND_MSG,
+			   "dbus",
+			   "send_msg",
+ 			   &auxdata);
+ 
+   _dbus_string_free (&auxdata);
+-- 
+2.23.0
+
--- a/backport-bus-Don-t-crash-if-bus_context_create_client_policy-.patch
+++ b/backport-bus-Don-t-crash-if-bus_context_create_client_policy-.patch
@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 678e73bfd034f2d32dde5ffd1c6b63c456989541 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Benie <pjb1008>
+Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2023 11:51:00 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] bus: Don't crash if bus_context_create_client_policy() fails
+
+If policy creation fails, we can't usefully leave a NULL policy in the
+BusConnectionData. If we did, the next attempt to reload policy would
+crash with a NULL dereference when we tried to unref it, or with
+an assertion failure.
+
+One situation in which we can legitimately fail to create a client policy
+is an out-of-memory condition. Another is if we are unable to look up a
+connection's supplementary groups with SO_PEERGROUPS, and also unable to
+look up the connection's uid's groups in the system user database, for
+example because it belongs to a user account that has been deleted (which
+is sysadmin error, but can happen, particularly in automated test systems)
+or because a service required by a Name Service Switch plugin has failed.
+
+Keeping the last known policy is consistent with what happens to all
+the connections that are after this one in iteration order: after we
+early-return, all of those connections retain their previous policies
+(which doesn't seem ideal either, but that's how this has always worked).
+
+[smcv: Add commit message]
+Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Resolves: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/343
+
+(cherry picked from commit 63522f2887878e6b9e40c9bb6742484679631ea9)
+---
+ bus/connection.c | 14 +++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/connection.c b/bus/connection.c
+index 215f0230..7a482e2b 100644
+--- a/bus/connection.c
+++ b/bus/connection.c
+@@ -1636,22 +1636,26 @@ bus_connections_reload_policy (BusConnections *connections,
+        link;
+        link = _dbus_list_get_next_link (&(connections->completed), link))
+     {
+      BusClientPolicy *policy;
+
+       connection = link->data;
+       d = BUS_CONNECTION_DATA (connection);
+       _dbus_assert (d != NULL);
+       _dbus_assert (d->policy != NULL);
+ 
+-      bus_client_policy_unref (d->policy);
+-      d->policy = bus_context_create_client_policy (connections->context,
+-                                                    connection,
+-                                                    error);
+-      if (d->policy == NULL)
+      policy = bus_context_create_client_policy (connections->context,
+                                                 connection,
+                                                 error);
+      if (policy == NULL)
+         {
+           _dbus_verbose ("Failed to create security policy for connection %p\n",
+                       connection);
+           _DBUS_ASSERT_ERROR_IS_SET (error);
+           return FALSE;
+         }
+
+      bus_client_policy_unref (d->policy);
+      d->policy = policy;
+     }
+ 
+   return TRUE;
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-bus-When-failing-to-reload-client-policy-continue-it.patch
+++ b/backport-bus-When-failing-to-reload-client-policy-continue-it.patch
@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From b14c778eb5156f649610804bc4ce3a762aa2b58b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 19:52:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] bus: When failing to reload client policy, continue iteration
+
+If we have a large number of connections to the bus, and we fail to
+reload the policy for one of them (perhaps because its uid no longer
+exists in the system user database), previously we would crash, which
+is obviously unintended. After the previous commit, we would stop
+iteration through the list of client connections, which doesn't seem
+great either: one bad connection shouldn't prevent us from reloading
+the rest of our state.
+
+Instead, let's distinguish between new connections (where we want
+failure to establish a security policy to be fatal), and pre-existing
+connections (where the current security policy is presumably good
+enough to keep using if we have nothing better). If we're unable to
+reload the policy for a pre-existing connection, log a warning and
+carry on iterating.
+
+Helps: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/343
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ bus/bus.c        | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ bus/bus.h        |  1 +
+ bus/connection.c |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/bus.c b/bus/bus.c
+index 2ad8e789..f5100739 100644
+--- a/bus/bus.c
+++ b/bus/bus.c
+@@ -1285,11 +1285,42 @@ bus_context_get_policy (BusContext *context)
+ BusClientPolicy*
+ bus_context_create_client_policy (BusContext      *context,
+                                   DBusConnection  *connection,
+                                  BusClientPolicy *previous,
+                                   DBusError       *error)
+ {
+  BusClientPolicy *client;
+  DBusError local_error = DBUS_ERROR_INIT;
+  const char *conn;
+  const char *loginfo;
+
+   _DBUS_ASSERT_ERROR_IS_CLEAR (error);
+-  return bus_policy_create_client_policy (context->policy, connection,
+-                                          error);
+
+  client = bus_policy_create_client_policy (context->policy, connection,
+                                            &local_error);
+
+  /* On success, use new policy */
+  if (client != NULL)
+    return client;
+
+  /* On failure while setting up a new connection, fail */
+  if (previous == NULL)
+    {
+      dbus_move_error (&local_error, error);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  /* On failure while reloading, keep the previous policy */
+  conn = bus_connection_get_name (connection);
+  loginfo = bus_connection_get_loginfo (connection);
+
+  if (conn == NULL)
+    conn = "(inactive)";
+
+  bus_context_log (context, DBUS_SYSTEM_LOG_WARNING,
+                   "Unable to reload policy for connection \"%s\" (%s), "
+                   "keeping current policy: %s",
+                   conn, loginfo, local_error.message);
+  return bus_client_policy_ref (previous);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/bus/bus.h b/bus/bus.h
+index 2e0de825..6ebea2c8 100644
+--- a/bus/bus.h
+++ b/bus/bus.h
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ BusPolicy*        bus_context_get_policy                         (BusContext
+ 
+ BusClientPolicy*  bus_context_create_client_policy               (BusContext       *context,
+                                                                   DBusConnection   *connection,
+                                                                  BusClientPolicy  *previous,
+                                                                   DBusError        *error);
+ int               bus_context_get_activation_timeout             (BusContext       *context);
+ int               bus_context_get_auth_timeout                   (BusContext       *context);
+diff --git a/bus/connection.c b/bus/connection.c
+index 8a8ce5f4..b7439296 100644
+--- a/bus/connection.c
+++ b/bus/connection.c
+@@ -1560,6 +1560,7 @@ bus_connection_complete (DBusConnection   *connection,
+ 
+   d->policy = bus_context_create_client_policy (d->connections->context,
+                                                 connection,
+                                                NULL,
+                                                 error);
+ 
+   /* we may have a NULL policy on OOM or error getting list of
+@@ -1645,6 +1646,7 @@ bus_connections_reload_policy (BusConnections *connections,
+ 
+       policy = bus_context_create_client_policy (connections->context,
+                                                  connection,
+                                                 d->policy,
+                                                  error);
+       if (policy == NULL)
+         {
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-bus-dir-watch-Do-not-crash-with-128-dirs.patch
+++ b/backport-bus-dir-watch-Do-not-crash-with-128-dirs.patch
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From b551b3e9737958216a1a9d359150a4110a9d0549 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Tojnar <jtojnar@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 11:07:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] bus/dir-watch: Do not crash with > 128 dirs
+
+Without this running, dbus-daemon with long XDG_DATA_DIRS
+will crash on out-of-bounds write:
+
+	$ XDG_DATA_DIRS=$(seq  -f "/foo/%g" -s ':' 129) dbus-daemon --session
+	*** stack smashing detected ***: terminated
+---
+ bus/dir-watch-inotify.c | 7 ++++++-
+ bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c  | 7 ++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/dir-watch-inotify.c b/bus/dir-watch-inotify.c
+index b52a24c0f..9beadb0ec 100644
+--- a/bus/dir-watch-inotify.c
+++ b/bus/dir-watch-inotify.c
+@@ -108,12 +108,17 @@ _set_watched_dirs_internal (DBusList **directories)
+ 
+   i = 0;
+   link = _dbus_list_get_first_link (directories);
+-  while (link != NULL)
+  while (link != NULL && i < MAX_DIRS_TO_WATCH)
+     {
+       new_dirs[i++] = (char *)link->data;
+       link = _dbus_list_get_next_link (directories, link);
+     }
+ 
+  if (link != NULL)
+    {
+      _dbus_warn ("Too many directories to watch them all, only watching first %d.", MAX_DIRS_TO_WATCH);
+    }
+
+   /* Look for directories in both the old and new sets, if
+    * we find one, move its data into the new set.
+    */
+diff --git a/bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c b/bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c
+index 183db241c..15519fcb5 100644
+--- a/bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c
+++ b/bus/dir-watch-kqueue.c
+@@ -218,12 +218,17 @@ bus_set_watched_dirs (BusContext *context, DBusList **directories)
+ 
+   i = 0;
+   link = _dbus_list_get_first_link (directories);
+-  while (link != NULL)
+  while (link != NULL && i < MAX_DIRS_TO_WATCH)
+     {
+       new_dirs[i++] = (char *)link->data;
+       link = _dbus_list_get_next_link (directories, link);
+     }
+ 
+  if (link != NULL)
+    {
+      _dbus_warn ("Too many directories to watch them all, only watching first %d.", MAX_DIRS_TO_WATCH);
+    }
+
+   /* Look for directories in both the old and new sets, if
+    * we find one, move its data into the new set.
+    */
+-- 
+GitLab
+
--- a/backport-monitor-test-Log-the-messages-that-we-monitored.patch
+++ b/backport-monitor-test-Log-the-messages-that-we-monitored.patch
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 3a1b1e9a4010e581e2e940e61d37c4f617eb5eff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 17:56:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] monitor test: Log the messages that we monitored
+
+This is helpful while debugging test failures.
+
+Helps: dbus/dbus#457
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8ee5d3e04420975107c27073b50f8758871a998b)
+---
+ test/monitor.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/monitor.c b/test/monitor.c
+index df5a7180..182110f8 100644
+--- a/test/monitor.c
+++ b/test/monitor.c
+@@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ _log_message (DBusMessage *m,
+       not_null (dbus_message_get_signature (m)));
+   g_test_message ("\terror name: %s",
+       not_null (dbus_message_get_error_name (m)));
+  g_test_message ("\tserial number: %u",
+      dbus_message_get_serial (m));
+  g_test_message ("\tin reply to: %u",
+      dbus_message_get_reply_serial (m));
+ 
+   if (strcmp ("s", dbus_message_get_signature (m)) == 0)
+     {
+@@ -339,6 +343,9 @@ monitor_filter (DBusConnection *connection,
+ {
+   Fixture *f = user_data;
+ 
+  g_test_message ("Monitor received message:");
+  log_message (message);
+
+   g_assert_cmpstr (dbus_message_get_interface (message), !=,
+       "com.example.Tedious");
+ 
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-monitor-test-Reproduce-dbus-dbus-457.patch
+++ b/backport-monitor-test-Reproduce-dbus-dbus-457.patch
@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+From 2c699f6ba9c162878c69d0728298c1ab7308db72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 18:51:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] monitor test: Reproduce dbus/dbus#457
+
+The exact failure mode reported in dbus/dbus#457 is quite difficult
+to achieve in a reliable way in a unit test, because we'd have to send
+enough messages to a client to fill up its queue, then stop that client
+from draining its queue, while still triggering a message that gets a
+reply from the bus driver. However, we can trigger the same crash in a
+slightly different way by not allowing the client to receive a
+particular message. I chose NameAcquired.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 986611ad0f7f67a3693e5672cd66bc608c00b228)
+---
+ .../valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in     |  3 +
+ test/monitor.c                                | 77 ++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/data/valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in b/test/data/valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in
+index d145613c..58b3cc6a 100644
+--- a/test/data/valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in
+++ b/test/data/valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in
+@@ -24,5 +24,8 @@
+     <allow send_interface="com.example.CannotUnicast2" send_broadcast="true"/>
+ 
+     <deny receive_interface="com.example.CannotReceive"/>
+
+    <!-- Used to reproduce dbus#457 -->
+    <deny receive_interface="org.freedesktop.DBus" receive_member="NameAcquired"/>
+   </policy>
+ </busconfig>
+diff --git a/test/monitor.c b/test/monitor.c
+index 182110f8..42e0734d 100644
+--- a/test/monitor.c
+++ b/test/monitor.c
+@@ -155,6 +155,21 @@ static Config side_effects_config = {
+     TRUE
+ };
+ 
+static dbus_bool_t
+config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (const Config *config)
+{
+  if (config == NULL)
+    return FALSE;
+
+  if (config->config_file == NULL)
+    return FALSE;
+
+  if (strcmp (config->config_file, forbidding_config.config_file) == 0)
+    return TRUE;
+
+  return FALSE;
+}
+
+ static inline const char *
+ not_null2 (const char *x,
+     const char *fallback)
+@@ -253,9 +268,6 @@ do { \
+ 
+ #define assert_name_acquired(m) \
+ do { \
+-  DBusError _e = DBUS_ERROR_INIT; \
+-  const char *_s; \
+-    \
+   g_assert_cmpstr (dbus_message_type_to_string (dbus_message_get_type (m)), \
+       ==, dbus_message_type_to_string (DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL)); \
+   g_assert_cmpstr (dbus_message_get_sender (m), ==, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS); \
+@@ -265,7 +277,14 @@ do { \
+   g_assert_cmpstr (dbus_message_get_signature (m), ==, "s"); \
+   g_assert_cmpint (dbus_message_get_serial (m), !=, 0); \
+   g_assert_cmpint (dbus_message_get_reply_serial (m), ==, 0); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define assert_unique_name_acquired(m) \
+do { \
+  DBusError _e = DBUS_ERROR_INIT; \
+  const char *_s; \
+     \
+  assert_name_acquired (m); \
+   dbus_message_get_args (m, &_e, \
+         DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &_s, \
+         DBUS_TYPE_INVALID); \
+@@ -333,6 +352,21 @@ do { \
+   g_assert_cmpint (dbus_message_get_reply_serial (m), !=, 0); \
+ } while (0)
+ 
+/* forbidding.conf does not allow receiving NameAcquired, so if we are in
+ * that configuration, then dbus-daemon synthesizes an error reply to itself
+ * and sends that to monitors */
+#define expect_name_acquired_error(queue, in_reply_to) \
+do { \
+  DBusMessage *message; \
+  \
+  message = g_queue_pop_head (queue); \
+  assert_error_reply (message, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS, \
+                      DBUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED); \
+  g_assert_cmpint (dbus_message_get_reply_serial (message), ==, \
+                   dbus_message_get_serial (in_reply_to)); \
+  dbus_message_unref (message); \
+} while (0)
+
+ /* This is called after processing pending replies to our own method
+  * calls, but before anything else.
+  */
+@@ -797,6 +831,11 @@ test_become_monitor (Fixture *f,
+   test_assert_no_error (&f->e);
+   g_assert_cmpint (ret, ==, DBUS_REQUEST_NAME_REPLY_PRIMARY_OWNER);
+ 
+  /* If the policy forbids receiving NameAcquired, then we'll never
+   * receive it, so behave as though we had */
+  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (f->config))
+    got_unique = got_a = got_b = got_c = TRUE;
+
+   while (!got_unique || !got_a || !got_b || !got_c)
+     {
+       if (g_queue_is_empty (&f->monitored))
+@@ -1448,6 +1487,7 @@ test_dbus_daemon (Fixture *f,
+ {
+   DBusMessage *m;
+   int res;
+  size_t n_expected;
+ 
+   if (f->address == NULL)
+     return;
+@@ -1463,7 +1503,12 @@ test_dbus_daemon (Fixture *f,
+   test_assert_no_error (&f->e);
+   g_assert_cmpint (res, ==, DBUS_RELEASE_NAME_REPLY_RELEASED);
+ 
+-  while (g_queue_get_length (&f->monitored) < 8)
+  n_expected = 8;
+
+  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (context))
+    n_expected += 1;
+
+  while (g_queue_get_length (&f->monitored) < n_expected)
+     test_main_context_iterate (f->ctx, TRUE);
+ 
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+@@ -1476,10 +1521,12 @@ test_dbus_daemon (Fixture *f,
+       "NameOwnerChanged", "sss", NULL);
+   dbus_message_unref (m);
+ 
+-  /* FIXME: should we get this? */
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+-  assert_signal (m, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS, DBUS_PATH_DBUS, DBUS_INTERFACE_DBUS,
+-      "NameAcquired", "s", f->sender_name);
+  assert_name_acquired (m);
+
+  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (f->config))
+    expect_name_acquired_error (&f->monitored, m);
+
+   dbus_message_unref (m);
+ 
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+@@ -1701,8 +1748,14 @@ static void
+ expect_new_connection (Fixture *f)
+ {
+   DBusMessage *m;
+  size_t n_expected;
+ 
+-  while (g_queue_get_length (&f->monitored) < 4)
+  n_expected = 4;
+
+  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (f->config))
+    n_expected += 1;
+
+  while (g_queue_get_length (&f->monitored) < n_expected)
+     test_main_context_iterate (f->ctx, TRUE);
+ 
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+@@ -1719,7 +1772,11 @@ expect_new_connection (Fixture *f)
+   dbus_message_unref (m);
+ 
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+-  assert_name_acquired (m);
+  assert_unique_name_acquired (m);
+
+  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (f->config))
+    expect_name_acquired_error (&f->monitored, m);
+
+   dbus_message_unref (m);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2044,6 +2101,8 @@ main (int argc,
+       setup, test_method_call, teardown);
+   g_test_add ("/monitor/forbidden-method", Fixture, &forbidding_config,
+       setup, test_forbidden_method_call, teardown);
+  g_test_add ("/monitor/forbidden-reply", Fixture, &forbidding_config,
+      setup, test_dbus_daemon, teardown);
+   g_test_add ("/monitor/dbus-daemon", Fixture, NULL,
+       setup, test_dbus_daemon, teardown);
+   g_test_add ("/monitor/selective", Fixture, &selective_config,
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-test-Add-a-targeted-test-for-_dbus_unix_groups_from_.patch
+++ b/backport-test-Add-a-targeted-test-for-_dbus_unix_groups_from_.patch
@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From 5337c629e945dec1b53884aa16daceb0500dea9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 16:54:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] test: Add a targeted test for _dbus_unix_groups_from_uid()
+
+Helps: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/343
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ test/Makefile.am        |   4 ++
+ test/internals/userdb.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 147 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 test/internals/userdb.c
+
+diff --git a/test/Makefile.am b/test/Makefile.am
+index 3bbf7f73..ffba702a 100644
+--- a/test/Makefile.am
+++ b/test/Makefile.am
+@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ test_server_oom_LDADD = libdbus-testutils.la $(GLIB_LIBS)
+ test_syslog_SOURCES = internals/syslog.c
+ test_syslog_LDADD = libdbus-testutils.la $(GLIB_LIBS)
+ 
+test_userdb_SOURCES = internals/userdb.c
+test_userdb_LDADD =  libdbus-testutils.la $(GLIB_LIBS)
+
+ test_variant_SOURCES = internals/variant.c
+ test_variant_LDADD = libdbus-testutils.la $(GLIB_LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -181,6 +184,7 @@ installable_tests += \
+ 	test-syntax \
+ 	test-syslog \
+ 	test-uid-permissions \
+	test-userdb \
+ 	test-variant \
+ 	$(NULL)
+ 
+diff --git a/test/internals/userdb.c b/test/internals/userdb.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..905791b3
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/internals/userdb.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright © 2023 Collabora Ltd.
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <glib.h>
+
+#include <dbus/dbus.h>
+#include "dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h"
+#include "test-utils-glib.h"
+
+#ifdef DBUS_UNIX
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.h"
+#include "dbus/dbus-userdb.h"
+#endif
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  int dummy;
+} Fixture;
+
+static void
+setup (Fixture *f G_GNUC_UNUSED,
+       gconstpointer context G_GNUC_UNUSED)
+{
+}
+
+static void
+test_groups_from_uid (Fixture *f,
+                      gconstpointer context G_GNUC_UNUSED)
+{
+  DBusError error = DBUS_ERROR_INIT;
+  dbus_gid_t *gids = NULL;
+  int n_gids = -1;
+  dbus_bool_t ret;
+#ifdef DBUS_UNIX
+  int i;
+#endif
+
+  /* We assume that uid 0 (root) is available on all Unix systems,
+   * so this should succeed */
+  ret = _dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (0, &gids, &n_gids, &error);
+
+#ifdef DBUS_UNIX
+  test_assert_no_error (&error);
+  g_assert_true (ret);
+  g_assert_cmpint (n_gids, >=, 0);
+
+  g_test_message ("Groups of uid 0:");
+
+  for (i = 0; i < n_gids; i++)
+    {
+      g_test_message ("[%d]: %ld", i, (long) gids[i]);
+      g_assert_cmpint (gids[i], >=, 0);
+    }
+#else
+  g_assert_cmpstr (error.name, ==, DBUS_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+  g_assert_false (ret);
+  g_test_message ("Getting Unix groups on Windows failed as expected: %s: %s",
+                  error.name, error.message);
+  g_assert_null (gids);
+  g_assert_cmpint (n_gids, <=, 0);
+#endif
+
+  dbus_free (gids);
+  dbus_error_free (&error);
+
+#ifdef DBUS_UNIX
+  /* Assume that the current uid is something sensible */
+  ret = _dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (geteuid (), &gids, &n_gids, &error);
+  test_assert_no_error (&error);
+  g_assert_true (ret);
+  g_assert_cmpint (n_gids, >=, 0);
+
+  g_test_message ("Groups of uid %ld:", (long) geteuid ());
+
+  for (i = 0; i < n_gids; i++)
+    {
+      g_test_message ("[%d]: %ld", i, (long) gids[i]);
+      g_assert_cmpint (gids[i], >=, 0);
+    }
+
+  g_test_message ("Total: %i groups", n_gids);
+
+  dbus_free (gids);
+  dbus_error_free (&error);
+
+  errno = 0;
+
+  /* arbitrarily chosen, probably isn't a valid uid */
+  if (getpwuid (31337) == NULL)
+    {
+      g_test_message ("uid 31337 doesn't exist: %s",
+                      errno == 0 ? "(no errno)" : g_strerror (errno));
+      ret = _dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (31337, &gids, &n_gids, &error);
+      g_assert_nonnull (error.name);
+      g_assert_nonnull (error.message);
+      g_assert_false (ret);
+      g_test_message ("Getting groups from non-uid failed as expected: %s: %s",
+                      error.name, error.message);
+      /* The Unix implementation always clears gids/n_gids,
+       * even on failure, and even if they were uninitialized */
+      g_assert_null (gids);
+      g_assert_cmpint (n_gids, ==, 0);
+
+      dbus_free (gids);
+      dbus_error_free (&error);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      g_test_skip ("against our expectations, uid 31337 exists on this system");
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+teardown (Fixture *f G_GNUC_UNUSED,
+          gconstpointer context G_GNUC_UNUSED)
+{
+}
+
+int
+main (int argc,
+      char **argv)
+{
+  int ret;
+
+  test_init (&argc, &argv);
+
+  g_test_add ("/userdb/groups_from_uid",
+              Fixture, NULL, setup, test_groups_from_uid, teardown);
+
+  ret = g_test_run ();
+  dbus_shutdown ();
+  return ret;
+}
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-userdb-Add-proper-error-reporting-when-getting-group.patch
+++ b/backport-userdb-Add-proper-error-reporting-when-getting-group.patch
@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+From fc757d494089b7e1e4e37b7eaaa798cd7e9ad391 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 16:06:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] userdb: Add proper error reporting when getting groups from a
+ uid
+
+Previously, if dbus_connection_get_unix_user() succeeded but
+_dbus_unix_groups_from_uid() failed, then bus_connection_get_unix_groups()
+would incorrectly fail without setting the error indicator, resulting
+in "(null)" being logged, which is rather unhelpful.
+
+This also lets us distinguish between ENOMEM and other errors, such as
+the uid not existing in the system's user database.
+
+Fixes: 145fb99b (untitled refactoring commit, 2006-12-12)
+Helps: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/343
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ bus/connection.c              |  2 +-
+ bus/policy.c                  |  2 +-
+ dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c |  6 ++++--
+ dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c  | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h           |  3 ++-
+ dbus/dbus-userdb-util.c       | 19 ++++++++++++-------
+ dbus/dbus-userdb.h            |  3 ++-
+ 7 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/connection.c b/bus/connection.c
+index 7a482e2b..8a8ce5f4 100644
+--- a/bus/connection.c
+++ b/bus/connection.c
+@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ bus_connection_get_unix_groups  (DBusConnection   *connection,
+ 
+   if (dbus_connection_get_unix_user (connection, &uid))
+     {
+-      if (!_dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (uid, groups, n_groups))
+      if (!_dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (uid, groups, n_groups, error))
+         {
+           _dbus_verbose ("Did not get any groups for UID %lu\n",
+                          uid);
+diff --git a/bus/policy.c b/bus/policy.c
+index a37be804..6c22a103 100644
+--- a/bus/policy.c
+++ b/bus/policy.c
+@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ bus_policy_allow_unix_user (BusPolicy        *policy,
+   int n_group_ids;
+ 
+   /* On OOM or error we always reject the user */
+-  if (!_dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (uid, &group_ids, &n_group_ids))
+  if (!_dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (uid, &group_ids, &n_group_ids, NULL))
+     {
+       _dbus_verbose ("Did not get any groups for UID %lu\n",
+                      uid);
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c
+index bed6fd3e..961b3eff 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c
+@@ -987,14 +987,16 @@ _dbus_parse_unix_group_from_config (const DBusString  *groupname,
+  * @param uid the UID
+  * @param group_ids return location for array of group IDs
+  * @param n_group_ids return location for length of returned array
+ * @param error error location
+  * @returns #TRUE if the UID existed and we got some credentials
+  */
+ dbus_bool_t
+ _dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (dbus_uid_t            uid,
+                             dbus_gid_t          **group_ids,
+-                            int                  *n_group_ids)
+                            int                  *n_group_ids,
+                            DBusError            *error)
+ {
+-  return _dbus_groups_from_uid (uid, group_ids, n_group_ids);
+  return _dbus_groups_from_uid (uid, group_ids, n_group_ids, error);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c
+index 8c8fbed8..42b1acd2 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c
+@@ -647,6 +647,13 @@ dbus_bool_t _dbus_windows_user_is_process_owner (const char *windows_sid)
+   unix emulation functions - should be removed sometime in the future
+  =====================================================================*/
+ 
+static void
+set_unix_uid_unsupported (DBusError *error)
+{
+  dbus_set_error (error, DBUS_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+                  "UNIX user IDs not supported on Windows");
+}
+
+ /**
+  * Checks to see if the UNIX user ID is at the console.
+  * Should always fail on Windows (set the error to
+@@ -660,8 +667,7 @@ dbus_bool_t
+ _dbus_unix_user_is_at_console (dbus_uid_t         uid,
+                                DBusError         *error)
+ {
+-  dbus_set_error (error, DBUS_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+-                  "UNIX user IDs not supported on Windows\n");
+  set_unix_uid_unsupported (error);
+   return FALSE;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -705,13 +711,16 @@ _dbus_parse_unix_user_from_config (const DBusString  *username,
+  * @param uid the UID
+  * @param group_ids return location for array of group IDs
+  * @param n_group_ids return location for length of returned array
+ * @param error error location
+  * @returns #TRUE if the UID existed and we got some credentials
+  */
+ dbus_bool_t
+ _dbus_unix_groups_from_uid (dbus_uid_t            uid,
+                             dbus_gid_t          **group_ids,
+-                            int                  *n_group_ids)
+                            int                  *n_group_ids,
+                            DBusError            *error)
+ {
+  set_unix_uid_unsupported (error);
+   return FALSE;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h
+index 24fbec6a..93d85d28 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h
+++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h
+@@ -278,7 +278,8 @@ dbus_bool_t _dbus_parse_unix_group_from_config  (const DBusString  *groupname,
+                                                  dbus_gid_t        *gid_p);
+ dbus_bool_t _dbus_unix_groups_from_uid          (dbus_uid_t         uid,
+                                                  dbus_gid_t       **group_ids,
+-                                                 int               *n_group_ids);
+                                                 int               *n_group_ids,
+                                                 DBusError         *error);
+ dbus_bool_t _dbus_unix_user_is_at_console       (dbus_uid_t         uid,
+                                                  DBusError         *error);
+ dbus_bool_t _dbus_unix_user_is_process_owner    (dbus_uid_t         uid);
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-userdb-util.c b/dbus/dbus-userdb-util.c
+index 170d233e..44c898ee 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-userdb-util.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-userdb-util.c
+@@ -406,31 +406,35 @@ _dbus_user_database_get_gid (DBusUserDatabase     *db,
+  * @param uid the UID
+  * @param group_ids return location for array of group IDs
+  * @param n_group_ids return location for length of returned array
+ * @param error error to fill in on failure
+  * @returns #TRUE if the UID existed and we got some credentials
+  */
+ dbus_bool_t
+ _dbus_groups_from_uid (dbus_uid_t         uid,
+                        dbus_gid_t       **group_ids,
+-                       int               *n_group_ids)
+                       int               *n_group_ids,
+                       DBusError         *error)
+ {
+   DBusUserDatabase *db;
+   const DBusUserInfo *info;
+   *group_ids = NULL;
+   *n_group_ids = 0;
+ 
+-  /* FIXME: this can't distinguish ENOMEM from other errors */
+   if (!_dbus_user_database_lock_system ())
+-    return FALSE;
+    {
+      _DBUS_SET_OOM (error);
+      return FALSE;
+    }
+ 
+   db = _dbus_user_database_get_system ();
+   if (db == NULL)
+     {
+      _DBUS_SET_OOM (error);
+       _dbus_user_database_unlock_system ();
+       return FALSE;
+     }
+ 
+-  if (!_dbus_user_database_get_uid (db, uid,
+-                                    &info, NULL))
+  if (!_dbus_user_database_get_uid (db, uid, &info, error))
+     {
+       _dbus_user_database_unlock_system ();
+       return FALSE;
+@@ -443,6 +447,7 @@ _dbus_groups_from_uid (dbus_uid_t         uid,
+       *group_ids = dbus_new (dbus_gid_t, info->n_group_ids);
+       if (*group_ids == NULL)
+         {
+          _DBUS_SET_OOM (error);
+ 	  _dbus_user_database_unlock_system ();
+           return FALSE;
+         }
+@@ -473,7 +478,7 @@ _dbus_userdb_test (const char *test_data_dir)
+   dbus_uid_t uid;
+   unsigned long *group_ids;
+   int n_group_ids, i;
+-  DBusError error;
+  DBusError error = DBUS_ERROR_INIT;
+ 
+   if (!_dbus_username_from_current_process (&username))
+     _dbus_assert_not_reached ("didn't get username");
+@@ -484,7 +489,7 @@ _dbus_userdb_test (const char *test_data_dir)
+   if (!_dbus_get_user_id (username, &uid))
+     _dbus_assert_not_reached ("didn't get uid");
+ 
+-  if (!_dbus_groups_from_uid (uid, &group_ids, &n_group_ids))
+  if (!_dbus_groups_from_uid (uid, &group_ids, &n_group_ids, &error))
+     _dbus_assert_not_reached ("didn't get groups");
+ 
+   printf ("    Current user: %s homedir: %s gids:",
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-userdb.h b/dbus/dbus-userdb.h
+index b38e3d18..b161b395 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-userdb.h
+++ b/dbus/dbus-userdb.h
+@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ dbus_bool_t _dbus_credentials_from_uid          (dbus_uid_t         user_id,
+                                                  DBusCredentials   *credentials);
+ dbus_bool_t _dbus_groups_from_uid		(dbus_uid_t            uid,
+                                                  dbus_gid_t          **group_ids,
+-                                                 int                  *n_group_ids);
+                                                 int                  *n_group_ids,
+                                                 DBusError            *error);
+ DBUS_PRIVATE_EXPORT
+ dbus_bool_t _dbus_is_console_user               (dbus_uid_t         uid,
+                                                  DBusError         *error);
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/dbus.spec
+++ b/dbus.spec
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Name:     dbus
 Epoch:    1
 Version:  1.12.20
-Release:  6
+Release:  11
 Summary:  System Message Bus
 License:  AFLv3.0 or GPLv2+
 URL:      http://www.freedesktop.org/Software/dbus/
@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ Patch6001:  backport-bus-Also-tell-systemd-when-we-re-reloading.patch
 Patch6002:  backport-bus-Also-tell-systemd-before-we-shut-down.patch
 Patch6003:  backport-bus-Don-t-pass-systemd-environment-variables-to-acti.patch
 Patch6004:  backport-bus-Clear-INVOCATION_ID-when-carrying-out-traditiona.patch
+Patch6005:  backport-Stop-using-selinux_set_mapping-function.patch
+Patch6006:  backport-CVE-2022-42010.patch
+Patch6007:  backport-CVE-2022-42011.patch
+Patch6008:  backport-CVE-2022-42012.patch
+Patch6009:  backport-bus-dir-watch-Do-not-crash-with-128-dirs.patch	
+Patch6010:  backport-Do-not-crash-when-reloading-configuration.patch
+Patch6011:  backport-CVE-2023-34969.patch
+Patch6012:  backport-monitor-test-Log-the-messages-that-we-monitored.patch
+Patch6013:  backport-monitor-test-Reproduce-dbus-dbus-457.patch
+Patch6014:  backport-test-Add-a-targeted-test-for-_dbus_unix_groups_from_.patch
+Patch6015:  backport-userdb-Add-proper-error-reporting-when-getting-group.patch
+Patch6016:  backport-bus-Don-t-crash-if-bus_context_create_client_policy-.patch
+Patch6017:  backport-bus-When-failing-to-reload-client-policy-continue-it.patch

 BuildRequires:  systemd-devel expat-devel libselinux-devel audit-libs-devel doxygen xmlto cmake
 BuildRequires:  autoconf-archive libtool libX11-devel libcap-ng-devel libxslt
@ -96,6 +109,7 @@ Man pages and other related documents for D-Bus.
 %autosetup -n %{name}-%{version} -p1

 %build
+aclocal
 %configure \
 --disable-static \
 --enable-inotify \
@ -228,6 +242,22 @@ fi
 %exclude %{_pkgdocdir}/README

 %changelog
+* Tue Jun 18 2024 hongjinghao <hongjinghao@huawei.com> - 1:1.12.20-11
+- Sync patches from dbus community
+
+* Tue Jun 18 2024 hongjinghao <hongjinghao@huawei.com> - 1:1.12.20-10
+- fix CVE-2023-34969
+
+* Wed Feb 21 2024 hongjinghao <hongjinghao@huawei.com> - 1:1.12.20-9
+- add backport-bus-dir-watch-Do-not-crash-with-128-dirs.patch	
+backport-Do-not-crash-when-reloading-configuration.patch
+
+* Mon Oct 17 2022 hongjinghao <hongjinghao@huawei.com> - 1:1.12.20-8
+- fix CVE-2022-42010,CVE-2022-42011,CVE-2022-42012
+
+* Tue Sep 20 2022 hongjinghao <hongjinghao@huawei.com> - 1:1.12.20-7
+- Stop using selinux set_mapping function.
+
 * Sat Jan 29 2022 licunlong <licunlong1@huawei.com> - 1:1.12.20-6
 - Tell systemd when dbus is ready/shutting down/reloading config.
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
openeuler-ci-bot	2023052193	!88 同步上游社区补丁 From: @hongjinghao Reviewed-by: @dillon_chen Signed-off-by: @dillon_chen	2024-06-18 09:13:14 +00:00
hongjinghao	fb37e8c245	sync patches from dbus community	2024-06-18 14:14:30 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	f0f19b210e	!87 fix CVE-2023-34969 From: @hongjinghao Reviewed-by: @dillon_chen Signed-off-by: @dillon_chen	2024-06-18 02:51:00 +00:00
hongjinghao	15d47613ca	fix CVE-2023-34969	2024-06-18 10:15:07 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	591a09b3db	!83 当XDG_DATA_DIRS设置大于128个目录时，避免dbus-daemon crash From: @hongjinghao Reviewed-by: @licunlong Signed-off-by: @licunlong	2024-02-21 09:25:49 +00:00
hongjinghao	ccf9658000	Do not crash with > 128 dirs	2024-02-21 16:32:58 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	dddf1b004f	!55 fix CVE-2022-42010,CVE-2022-42011,CVE-2022-42012 From: @hongjinghao Reviewed-by: @licunlong Signed-off-by: @licunlong	2022-10-17 08:50:35 +00:00
hongjinghao	10bea11beb	fix CVE-2022-42010,CVE-2022-42011,CVE-2022-42012	2022-10-17 16:25:44 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	119eb59641	!51 [sync] PR-50: Stop using selinux set_mapping function From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @licunlong Signed-off-by: @licunlong	2022-09-20 13:02:12 +00:00
hongjinghao	c18fc45b7e	Stop using selinux set_mapping function (cherry picked from commit c8b5ed1b2764bf6f273f42b4d05fca204853f123)	2022-09-20 15:43:47 +08:00