git/backport-CVE-2022-41903-utf8-fix-checking-for-glyph-width-in-strbuf_utf8_rep.patch
fly_fzc d11f2884e5 Fix CVE-2022-23521 CVE-2022-41903
(cherry picked from commit df506cf2f7ba0d39fd1e45649c252bfd23fadd6e)
2023-01-28 10:25:57 +08:00

96 lines
3.1 KiB
Diff

From 81c2d4c3a5ba0e6ab8c348708441fed170e63a82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:47:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] utf8: fix checking for glyph width in `strbuf_utf8_replace()`
In `strbuf_utf8_replace()`, we call `utf8_width()` to compute the width
of the current glyph. If the glyph is a control character though it can
be that `utf8_width()` returns `-1`, but because we assign this value to
a `size_t` the conversion will cause us to underflow. This bug can
easily be triggered with the following command:
$ git log --pretty='format:xxx%<|(1,trunc)%x10'
>From all I can see though this seems to be a benign underflow that has
no security-related consequences.
Fix the bug by using an `int` instead. When we see a control character,
we now copy it into the target buffer but don't advance the current
width of the string.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
---
t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh | 7 +++++++
utf8.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
index aac9e4ce6c..5c5b56596e 100755
--- a/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
+++ b/t/t4205-log-pretty-formats.sh
@@ -905,6 +905,13 @@ test_expect_success 'log --pretty with padding and preceding control chars' '
test_cmp expect actual
'
+test_expect_success 'log --pretty truncation with control chars' '
+ test_commit "$(printf "\20\20\20\20xxxx")" file contents commit-with-control-chars &&
+ printf "\20\20\20\20x.." >expect &&
+ git log -1 --pretty="format:%<(3,trunc)%s" commit-with-control-chars >actual &&
+ test_cmp expect actual
+'
+
test_expect_success EXPENSIVE,SIZE_T_IS_64BIT 'log --pretty with huge commit message' '
# We only assert that this command does not crash. This needs to be
# executed with the address sanitizer to demonstrate failure.
diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
index 30c7787cfa..077daf4b20 100644
--- a/utf8.c
+++ b/utf8.c
@@ -377,6 +377,7 @@ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
dst = sb_dst.buf;
while (src < end) {
+ int glyph_width;
char *old;
size_t n;
@@ -390,21 +391,29 @@ void strbuf_utf8_replace(struct strbuf *sb_src, int pos, int width,
break;
old = src;
- n = utf8_width((const char**)&src, NULL);
- if (!src) /* broken utf-8, do nothing */
+ glyph_width = utf8_width((const char**)&src, NULL);
+ if (!src) /* broken utf-8, do nothing */
goto out;
- if (n && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
+
+ /*
+ * In case we see a control character we copy it into the
+ * buffer, but don't add it to the width.
+ */
+ if (glyph_width < 0)
+ glyph_width = 0;
+
+ if (glyph_width && w >= pos && w < pos + width) {
if (subst) {
memcpy(dst, subst, subst_len);
dst += subst_len;
subst = NULL;
}
- w += n;
+ w += glyph_width;
continue;
}
memcpy(dst, old, src - old);
dst += src - old;
- w += n;
+ w += glyph_width;
}
strbuf_setlen(&sb_dst, dst - sb_dst.buf);
strbuf_swap(sb_src, &sb_dst);
--
2.27.0