From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 13:10:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c: do not validate kernels
 twice
 
On codebases that have shim-lock-verifier built into the grub core
(like 2.06 upstream), shim-lock-verifier is in enforcing mode when
booted with secureboot. It means that grub_cmd_linux() command
attempts to perform shim validate upon opening linux kernel image,
including kernel measurement. And the verifier correctly returns file
open error when shim validate protocol is not present or shim fails to
validate the kernel.
 
This makes the call to grub_linuxefi_secure_validate() redundant, but
also harmful. As validating the kernel image twice, extends the PCRs
with the same measurement twice. Which breaks existing sealing
policies when upgrading from grub2.04+rhboot+sb+linuxefi to
grub2.06+rhboot+sb+linuxefi builds. It is also incorrect to measure
the kernel twice.
 
This patch must not be ported to older editions of grub code bases
that do not have verifiers framework, or it is not builtin, or
shim-lock-verifier is an optional module.
 
This patch is tested to ensure that unsigned kernels are not possible
to boot in secureboot mode when shim rejects kernel, or shim protocol
is missing, and that the measurements become stable once again. The
above also ensures that CVE-2020-15705 is not reintroduced.
 
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
---
 grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 13 -------------
 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)
 
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
index 3cf0f9b330b..941df6400b9 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
 #include <grub/cpu/efi/memory.h>
 #include <grub/tpm.h>
 #include <grub/safemath.h>
-#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
 
 GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
 
@@ -278,7 +277,6 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
   grub_ssize_t start, filelen;
   void *kernel = NULL;
   int setup_header_end_offset;
-  int rc;
 
   grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
 
@@ -308,17 +306,6 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
       goto fail;
     }
 
-  if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
-    {
-      rc = grub_linuxefi_secure_validate (kernel, filelen);
-      if (rc <= 0)
-	{
-	  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND,
-		      N_("%s has invalid signature"), argv[0]);
-	  goto fail;
-	}
-    }
-
   lh = (struct linux_i386_kernel_header *)kernel;
   grub_dprintf ("linux", "original lh is at %p\n", kernel);

