!37 [sync] PR-36: fix CVE-2021-40346

From: @openeuler-sync-bot
Reviewed-by: @ruebb
Signed-off-by: @ruebb

CVE-2021-40346.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From 86f4f281efb933900ebcc4fdaef95f566382d907 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Thu, 26 Aug 2021 16:23:37 +0200
+Subject: BUG/MAJOR: htx: fix missing header name length check in
+ htx_add_header/trailer
+
+Shachar Menashe for JFrog Security reported that htx_add_header() and
+htx_add_trailer() were missing a length check on the header name. While
+this does not allow to overwrite any memory area, it results in bits of
+the header name length to slip into the header value length and may
+result in forging certain header names on the input. The sad thing here
+is that a FIXME comment was present suggesting to add the required length
+checks :-(
+
+The injected headers are visible to the HTTP internals and to the config
+rules, so haproxy will generally stay synchronized with the server. But
+there is one exception which is the content-length header field, because
+it is already deduplicated on the input, but before being indexed. As
+such, injecting a content-length header after the deduplication stage
+may be abused to present a different, shorter one on the other side and
+help build a request smuggling attack, or even maybe a response splitting
+attack.
+
+As a mitigation measure, it is sufficient to verify that no more than
+one such header is present in any message, which is normally the case
+thanks to the duplicate checks:
+
+   http-request  deny if { req.hdr_cnt(content-length) gt 1 }
+   http-response deny if { res.hdr_cnt(content-length) gt 1 }
+
+This must be backported to all HTX-enabled versions, hence as far as 2.0.
+In 2.3 and earlier, the functions are in src/htx.c instead.
+
+Many thanks to Shachar for his work and his responsible report!
+
+[wt: code is in src/htx.c in 2.3 and older]
+Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+---
+ src/htx.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/htx.c
++++ b/src/htx.c
+@@ -859,7 +859,9 @@ struct htx_blk *htx_add_header(struct ht
+ {
+ 	struct htx_blk *blk;
+ 
+-	/* FIXME: check name.len (< 256B) and value.len (< 1MB) */
++	if (name.len > 255 || value.len > 1048575)
++		return NULL;
++
+ 	blk = htx_add_blk(htx, HTX_BLK_HDR, name.len + value.len);
+ 	if (!blk)
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -878,7 +880,9 @@ struct htx_blk *htx_add_trailer(struct h
+ {
+ 	struct htx_blk *blk;
+ 
+-	/* FIXME: check name.len (< 256B) and value.len (< 1MB) */
++	if (name.len > 255 || value.len > 1048575)
++		return NULL;
++
+ 	blk = htx_add_blk(htx, HTX_BLK_TLR, name.len + value.len);
+ 	if (!blk)
+ 		return NULL;

haproxy.spec

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 
 Name:             haproxy
 Version:          2.2.16
-Release:          1
+Release:          2
 Summary:          The Reliable, High Performance TCP/HTTP Load Balancer
 
 License:          GPLv2+
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ Source2:          %{name}.cfg
 Source3:          %{name}.logrotate
 Source4:          %{name}.sysconfig
 
+Patch0001:        CVE-2021-40346.patch
+
 BuildRequires:    gcc lua-devel pcre-devel zlib-devel openssl-devel systemd-devel systemd-units libatomic
 Requires(pre):    shadow-utils
 Requires(post):   systemd
@@ -120,6 +122,9 @@ exit 0
 %{_mandir}/man1/*
 
 %changelog
+* Sat Sep 18 yaoxin <yaoxin30@huawei.com> - 2.2.16-2
+- Fix CVE-2021-40346
+
 * Mon Aug 30 yaoxin <yaoxin30@huawei.com> - 2.2.16-1
 - Upgrade 2.2.16 to fix CVE-2021-39240