haproxy/CVE-2018-20103.patch
daidai_is_here f012431c42 init package
2020-02-14 10:50:02 +08:00

86 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff

From 58df5aea0a0c926b2238f65908f5e9f83d1cca25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Remi Gacogne <remi.gacogne@powerdns.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 17:52:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG: dns: Prevent stack-exhaustion via recursion loop in
dns_read_name
When a compressed pointer is encountered, dns_read_name() will call
itself with the pointed-to offset in the packet.
With a specially crafted packet, it was possible to trigger an
infinite-loop recursion by making the pointer points to itself.
While it would be possible to handle that particular case differently
by making sure that the target is different from the current offset,
it would still be possible to craft a packet with a very long chain
of valid pointers, always pointing backwards. To prevent a stack
exhaustion in that case, this patch restricts the number of recursive
calls to 100, which should be more than enough.
To be backported to 1.8, probably also 1.7.
---
src/dns.c | 15 +++++++++------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Index: haproxy-1.8.13/src/dns.c
===================================================================
--- haproxy-1.8.13.orig/src/dns.c
+++ haproxy-1.8.13/src/dns.c
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ static inline unsigned short dns_respons
*/
int dns_read_name(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *bufend,
unsigned char *name, char *destination, int dest_len,
- int *offset)
+ int *offset, unsigned int depth)
{
int nb_bytes = 0, n = 0;
int label_len;
@@ -405,8 +405,11 @@ int dns_read_name(unsigned char *buffer,
if ((buffer + reader[1]) > reader)
goto err;
+ if (depth++ > 100)
+ goto err;
+
n = dns_read_name(buffer, bufend, buffer + reader[1],
- dest, dest_len - nb_bytes, offset);
+ dest, dest_len - nb_bytes, offset, depth);
if (n == 0)
goto err;
@@ -692,7 +695,7 @@ static int dns_validate_dns_response(uns
* one query per response and the first one can't be compressed
* (using the 0x0c format) */
offset = 0;
- len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, dns_query->name, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset);
+ len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, dns_query->name, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0)
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
@@ -729,7 +732,7 @@ static int dns_validate_dns_response(uns
return (DNS_RESP_INVALID);
offset = 0;
- len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset);
+ len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
@@ -831,7 +834,7 @@ static int dns_validate_dns_response(uns
}
offset = 0;
- len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset);
+ len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;
@@ -861,7 +864,7 @@ static int dns_validate_dns_response(uns
dns_answer_record->port = read_n16(reader);
reader += sizeof(uint16_t);
offset = 0;
- len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset);
+ len = dns_read_name(resp, bufend, reader, tmpname, DNS_MAX_NAME_SIZE, &offset, 0);
if (len == 0) {
pool_free(dns_answer_item_pool, dns_answer_record);
return DNS_RESP_INVALID;