httpd/backport-make-ap_escape_quotes-work-correctly.patch
chengyechun b981a203d9 change default value of HeartbeatMaxServers
fix setting and comparison of IPs fileds
avoid voerflow in case of indecently large session
make ap_escape_quotes() work correctly
fix lua_request with cast first
Handle children killed pathologically
q
2022-12-14 10:54:40 +08:00

74 lines
2.5 KiB
Diff

From 229dc3a47e0858a0b6772fa878a60f09ee5293 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: ylavic <ylavic@apache.org>
Date: Tue May 24 08:55:16 2022
Subject: [PATCH] core:make ap_escape_quotes work correctly
Conflict:NA
Reference:https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/229dc3ac47e0858a0b67227fa878a60f09ee5293
---
server/util.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/server/util.c b/server/util.c
index 09ac0c5..1e006a3 100644
--- a/server/util.c
+++ b/server/util.c
@@ -2535,7 +2535,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_content_type_tolower(char *str)
*/
AP_DECLARE(char *) ap_escape_quotes(apr_pool_t *p, const char *instring)
{
- int newlen = 0;
+ apr_size_t size, extra = 0;
const char *inchr = instring;
char *outchr, *outstring;
@@ -2544,9 +2544,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(char *) ap_escape_quotes(apr_pool_t *p, const char *instring)
* string up by an extra byte each time we find an unescaped ".
*/
while (*inchr != '\0') {
- newlen++;
if (*inchr == '"') {
- newlen++;
+ extra++;
}
/*
* If we find a slosh, and it's not the last byte in the string,
@@ -2554,11 +2553,31 @@ AP_DECLARE(char *) ap_escape_quotes(apr_pool_t *p, const char *instring)
*/
if ((*inchr == '\\') && (inchr[1] != '\0')) {
inchr++;
- newlen++;
}
inchr++;
}
- outstring = apr_palloc(p, newlen + 1);
+ if (!extra) {
+ return apr_pstrdup(p, instring);
+ }
+
+ /* How large will the string become, once we escaped all the quotes?
+ * The tricky cases are
+ * - an `instring` that is already longer than `ptrdiff_t`
+ * can hold (which is an undefined case in C, as C defines ptrdiff_t as
+ * a signed difference between pointers into the same array and one index
+ * beyond).
+ * - an `instring` that, including the `extra` chars we want to add, becomes
+ * even larger than apr_size_t can handle.
+ * Since thsi function was nto designed to ever return NULL for failure, we
+ * can only trigger a hard assertion failure. It seems more a programming
+ * mistake (or failure to verify the input causing this) that leads to this
+ * situation.
+ */
+ ap_assert(inchr - instring > 0);
+ size = ((apr_size_t)(inchr - instring)) + 1;
+ ap_assert(size + extra > size);
+
+ outstring = apr_palloc(p, size + extra);
inchr = instring;
outchr = outstring;
/*
--
2.23.0