!8 fix CVE-2020-12278 and CVE-2020-12279
From: @angela7 Reviewed-by: @overweight Signed-off-by: @overweight
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CVE-2020-12278.patch
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44
CVE-2020-12278.patch
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From e1832eb20a7089f6383cfce474f213157f5300cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 16:33:18 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data
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Streams
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We just safe-guarded `.git` against NTFS Alternate Data Stream-related
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attack vectors, and now it is time to do the same for `.gitmodules`.
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Note: In the added regression test, we refrain from verifying all kinds
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of variations between short names and NTFS Alternate Data Streams: as
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the new code disallows _all_ Alternate Data Streams of `.gitmodules`, it
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is enough to test one in order to know that all of them are guarded
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against.
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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---
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src/path.c | 2 +-
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tests/path/dotgit.c | 1 +
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2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/src/path.c b/src/path.c
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index 7844da67227..b3a8fc32f83 100644
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--- a/src/path.c
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+++ b/src/path.c
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@@ -1646,7 +1646,7 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) only_spaces_and_dots(const char *path)
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const char *c = path;
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for (;; c++) {
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- if (*c == '\0')
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+ if (*c == '\0' || *c == ':')
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return true;
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if (*c != ' ' && *c != '.')
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return false;
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diff --git a/tests/path/dotgit.c b/tests/path/dotgit.c
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index 30996694512..ceb7330d248 100644
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--- a/tests/path/dotgit.c
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+++ b/tests/path/dotgit.c
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@@ -116,4 +116,5 @@ void test_path_dotgit__dotgit_modules_symlink(void)
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cl_assert_equal_b(true, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", 0, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_HFS|GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
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cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_HFS));
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cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
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+ cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules . .::$DATA", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
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}
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57
CVE-2020-12279.patch
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57
CVE-2020-12279.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
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From 64c612cc3e25eff5fb02c59ef5a66ba7a14751e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 15:25:02 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Protect against 8.3 "short name" attacks also on Linux/macOS
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The Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) is getting increasingly popular,
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in particular because it makes it _so_ easy to run Linux software on
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Windows' files, via the auto-mounted Windows drives (`C:\` is mapped to
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`/mnt/c/`, no need to set that up manually).
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Unfortunately, files/directories on the Windows drives can be accessed
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via their _short names_, if that feature is enabled (which it is on the
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`C:` drive by default).
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Which means that we have to safeguard even our Linux users against the
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short name attacks.
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Further, while the default options of CIFS/SMB-mounts seem to disallow
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accessing files on network shares via their short names on Linux/macOS,
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it _is_ possible to do so with the right options.
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So let's just safe-guard against short name attacks _everywhere_.
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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---
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src/checkout.c | 2 +-
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tests/checkout/nasty.c | 3 +--
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2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/checkout.c b/src/checkout.c
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index 5cfa7280baa..5b20ede466b 100644
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--- a/src/checkout.c
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+++ b/src/checkout.c
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@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ static int checkout_verify_paths(
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int action,
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git_diff_delta *delta)
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{
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- unsigned int flags = GIT_PATH_REJECT_WORKDIR_DEFAULTS;
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+ unsigned int flags = GIT_PATH_REJECT_WORKDIR_DEFAULTS | GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS;
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if (action & CHECKOUT_ACTION__REMOVE) {
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if (!git_path_isvalid(repo, delta->old_file.path, delta->old_file.mode, flags)) {
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diff --git a/tests/checkout/nasty.c b/tests/checkout/nasty.c
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index 3897878cef1..a0ac738a812 100644
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--- a/tests/checkout/nasty.c
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+++ b/tests/checkout/nasty.c
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@@ -206,9 +206,8 @@ void test_checkout_nasty__dot_git_dot(void)
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*/
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void test_checkout_nasty__git_tilde1(void)
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{
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-#ifdef GIT_WIN32
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test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/git_tilde1", ".git/foobar");
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-#endif
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+ test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/git_tilde1", "git~1/foobar");
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}
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/* A tree that contains an entry "git~2", when we have forced the short
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@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
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Name: libgit2
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Version: 0.27.8
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Release: 3
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Release: 4
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Summary: portable, pure C implementation of the Git core methods
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License: GPLv2 with exceptions
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URL: https://libgit2.org
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Source0: https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/archive/v%{version}.tar.gz
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Patch0001: 0001-tests-don-t-run-buf-oom-on-32-bit-systems.patch
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Patch0002: CVE-2020-12278.patch
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Patch0003: CVE-2020-12279.patch
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BuildRequires: gcc cmake >= 2.8.11 ninja-build http-parser-devel libcurl-devel
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BuildRequires: libssh2-devel openssl-devel python3 zlib-devel
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@ -55,6 +57,9 @@ sed -i '/ADD_TEST(online/s/^/#/' tests/CMakeLists.txt
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%{_includedir}/git2*
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%changelog
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* Fri Jul 23 2021 guoxiaoqi<guoxiaoqi2@huawei.com> - 0.27.8-4
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- fix CVE-2020-12278 and CVE-2020-12279
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* Thu Jan 16 2020 yangjian<yangjian79@huawei.com> - 0.27.8-3
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- Change the Source to valid address
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