!39 [sync] PR-34: Fix CVE-2024-24577

From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @cherry530 Signed-off-by: @cherry530
Fix CVE-2024-24577
2024-02-08 06:17:46 +00:00 · 2024-02-08 11:30:45 +08:00 · 2023-12-19 01:56:01 +00:00 · 2023-12-14 20:06:32 +08:00 · 2022-10-17 08:48:17 +00:00 · 2022-10-13 20:32:56 +08:00
6 changed files with 583 additions and 65 deletions
--- a/0001-tests-don-t-run-buf-oom-on-32-bit-systems.patch
+++ b/0001-tests-don-t-run-buf-oom-on-32-bit-systems.patch
@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 415a8ae9c9b6ac18f0524b6af8e58408b426457d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Edward Thomson <ethomson@edwardthomson.com>
-Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2018 13:27:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] tests: don't run buf::oom on 32-bit systems
-
-On a 32-bit Linux systems, the value large enough to make malloc
-guarantee a failure is also large enough that valgrind considers it
-"fishy".  Skip this test on those systems entirely.
---
- tests/buf/oom.c | 14 +++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tests/buf/oom.c b/tests/buf/oom.c
-index 2741a8ddf2..ec3bad9979 100644
--- a/tests/buf/oom.c
-+++ b/tests/buf/oom.c
-@@ -11,12 +11,8 @@
-  */
- #if defined(GIT_ARCH_64) && defined(__linux__)
- # define TOOBIG 0x0fffffffffffffff
-#elif defined(__linux__)
-# define TOOBIG 0x0fffffff
- #elif defined(GIT_ARCH_64)
- # define TOOBIG 0xffffffffffffff00
-#else
-# define TOOBIG 0xffffff00
- #endif
- 
- /**
-@@ -25,13 +21,18 @@
-  * will fail.  And because the git_buf_grow() wrapper always
-  * sets mark_oom, the code in git_buf_try_grow() will free
-  * the internal buffer and set it to git_buf__oom.
- * 
-+ *
-  * We initialized the internal buffer to (the static variable)
-  * git_buf__initbuf.  The purpose of this test is to make sure
-  * that we don't try to free the static buffer.
-+ *
-+ * Skip this test entirely on 32-bit platforms; a buffer large enough
-+ * to guarantee malloc failures is so large that valgrind considers
-+ * it likely to be an error.
-  */
- void test_buf_oom__grow(void)
- {
-+#ifdef GIT_ARCH_64
- 	git_buf buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
- 
- 	git_buf_clear(&buf);
-@@ -40,6 +41,9 @@ void test_buf_oom__grow(void)
- 	cl_assert(git_buf_oom(&buf));
- 
- 	git_buf_free(&buf);
-+#else
-+    cl_skip();
-+#endif
- }
- 
- void test_buf_oom__grow_by(void)
--- a/CVE-2023-22742.patch
+++ b/CVE-2023-22742.patch
@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Carlos=20Mart=C3=ADn=20Nieto?= <carlosmn@github.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2022 12:54:29 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2023-22742
+Upstream(1.4.x): https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/pull/6449
+Origin: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/SUSE:SLE-15-SP4:Update/libgit2.28263
+
+---
+ src/transports/ssh.c | 417 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 files changed, 329 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ci/test.sh b/ci/test.sh
+index 2aed691..743dbdf 100755
+--- a/ci/test.sh
+++ b/ci/test.sh
+@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ if [ -z "$SKIP_SSH_TESTS" ]; then
+ 		echo "[localhost]:2222 $algorithm $key" >>"${HOME}/.ssh/known_hosts"
+ 	done <"${SSHD_DIR}/id_rsa.pub"
+ 
+	# Append the github.com keys for the tests that don't override checks.
+	# We ask for ssh-rsa to test that the selection based off of known_hosts
+	# is working.
+	ssh-keyscan -t ssh-rsa github.com >>"${HOME}/.ssh/known_hosts"
+
+ 	# Get the fingerprint for localhost and remove the colons so we can
+ 	# parse it as a hex number. Older versions have a different output
+ 	# format.
+diff --git a/src/transports/ssh.c b/src/transports/ssh.c
+index 1b00be7..86cfcc9 100644
+--- a/src/transports/ssh.c
+++ b/src/transports/ssh.c
+@@ -475,15 +475,118 @@ static int request_creds(git_credential **out, ssh_subtransport *t, const char *
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+#define KNOWN_HOSTS_FILE ".ssh/known_hosts"
+
+/*
+ * Load the known_hosts file.
+ *
+ * Returns success but leaves the output NULL if we couldn't find the file.
+ */
+static int load_known_hosts(LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOSTS **hosts, LIBSSH2_SESSION *session)
+{
+	char *path = NULL;
+	const char *home;
+	LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOSTS *known_hosts = NULL;
+	int error;
+
+	GIT_ASSERT_ARG(hosts);
+
+	home = getenv ("HOME");
+	if (!home)
+		return -1;
+	path = (char *) malloc (strlen (home) + strlen (KNOWN_HOSTS_FILE) + 2);
+	sprintf (path, "%s/%s", home, KNOWN_HOSTS_FILE);
+
+	if ((known_hosts = libssh2_knownhost_init(session)) == NULL) {
+		ssh_error(session, "error initializing known hosts");
+		error = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to read the file and consider not finding it as not trusting the
+	 * host rather than an error.
+	 */
+	error = libssh2_knownhost_readfile(known_hosts, path, LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_FILE_OPENSSH);
+	if (error == LIBSSH2_ERROR_FILE)
+		error = 0;
+	if (error < 0)
+		ssh_error(session, "error reading known_hosts");
+
+out:
+	*hosts = known_hosts;
+	free (path);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const char *hostkey_type_to_string(int type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_SSHRSA:
+		return "ssh-rsa";
+	case LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_SSHDSS:
+		return "ssh-dss";
+#ifdef LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_256
+	case LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_256:
+		return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256";
+	case LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_384:
+		return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384";
+	case LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_521:
+		return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521";
+#endif
+#ifdef LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ED25519
+	case LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ED25519:
+		return "ssh-ed25519";
+#endif
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We figure out what kind of key we want to ask the remote for by trying to
+ * look it up with a nonsense key and using that mismatch to figure out what key
+ * we do have stored for the host.
+ *
+ * Returns the string to pass to libssh2_session_method_pref or NULL if we were
+ * unable to find anything or an error happened.
+ */
+static const char *find_hostkey_preference(LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOSTS *known_hosts, const char *hostname, int port)
+{
+	struct libssh2_knownhost *host = NULL;
+	/* Specify no key type so we don't filter on that */
+	int type = LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_TYPE_PLAIN | LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEYENC_RAW;
+	const char key = '\0';
+	int error;
+
+	/*
+	 * In case of mismatch, we can find the type of key from known_hosts in
+	 * the returned host's information as it means that an entry was found
+	 * but our nonsense key obviously didn't match.
+	 */
+	error = libssh2_knownhost_checkp(known_hosts, hostname, port, &key, 1, type, &host);
+	if (error == LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_CHECK_MISMATCH)
+		return hostkey_type_to_string(host->typemask & LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_MASK);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+ static int _git_ssh_session_create(
+ 	LIBSSH2_SESSION **session,
+	LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOSTS **hosts,
+	const char *hostname,
+	int port,
+ 	git_stream *io)
+ {
+ 	int rc = 0;
+ 	LIBSSH2_SESSION *s;
+	LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOSTS *known_hosts;
+ 	git_socket_stream *socket = GIT_CONTAINER_OF(io, git_socket_stream, parent);
+	const char *keytype = NULL;
+ 
+ 	GIT_ASSERT_ARG(session);
+	GIT_ASSERT_ARG(hosts);
+ 
+ 	s = libssh2_session_init();
+ 	if (!s) {
+@@ -491,21 +594,228 @@ static int _git_ssh_session_create(
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+	if ((rc = load_known_hosts(&known_hosts, s)) < 0) {
+		ssh_error(s, "error loading known_hosts");
+		libssh2_session_free(s);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((keytype = find_hostkey_preference(known_hosts, hostname, port)) != NULL) {
+		do {
+			rc = libssh2_session_method_pref(s, LIBSSH2_METHOD_HOSTKEY, keytype);
+		} while (LIBSSH2_ERROR_EAGAIN == rc || LIBSSH2_ERROR_TIMEOUT == rc);
+		if (rc != LIBSSH2_ERROR_NONE) {
+			ssh_error(s, "failed to set hostkey preference");
+			goto on_error;
+		}
+	}
+
+
+ 	do {
+ 		rc = libssh2_session_handshake(s, socket->s);
+ 	} while (LIBSSH2_ERROR_EAGAIN == rc || LIBSSH2_ERROR_TIMEOUT == rc);
+ 
+ 	if (rc != LIBSSH2_ERROR_NONE) {
+ 		ssh_error(s, "failed to start SSH session");
+-		libssh2_session_free(s);
+-		return -1;
+		goto on_error;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	libssh2_session_set_blocking(s, 1);
+ 
+ 	*session = s;
+	*hosts = known_hosts;
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+
+on_error:
+	libssh2_knownhost_free(known_hosts);
+	libssh2_session_free(s);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns the typemask argument to pass to libssh2_knownhost_check{,p} based on
+ * the type of key that libssh2_session_hostkey returns.
+ */
+static int fingerprint_type_mask(int keytype)
+{
+	int mask = LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_TYPE_PLAIN | LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEYENC_RAW;
+	return mask;
+
+	switch (keytype) {
+	case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_RSA:
+		mask |= LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_SSHRSA;
+		break;
+	case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_DSS:
+		mask |= LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_SSHDSS;
+		break;
+#ifdef LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_256
+	case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_256:
+		mask |= LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_256;
+		break;
+	case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_384:
+		mask |= LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_384;
+		break;
+	case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_521:
+		mask |= LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_521;
+		break;
+#endif
+#ifdef LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ED25519
+	case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ED25519:
+		mask |= LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ED25519;
+		break;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	return mask;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the host against the user's known_hosts file.
+ *
+ * Returns 1/0 for valid/''not-valid or <0 for an error
+ */
+static int check_against_known_hosts(
+	LIBSSH2_SESSION *session,
+	LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOSTS *known_hosts,
+	const char *hostname,
+	int port,
+	const char *key,
+	size_t key_len,
+	int key_type)
+{
+	int check, typemask, ret = 0;
+	struct libssh2_knownhost *host = NULL;
+
+	if (known_hosts == NULL)
+		return 0;
+ 
+	typemask = fingerprint_type_mask(key_type);
+	check = libssh2_knownhost_checkp(known_hosts, hostname, port, key, key_len, typemask, &host);
+	if (check == LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_CHECK_FAILURE) {
+		ssh_error(session, "error checking for known host");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ret = check == LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_CHECK_MATCH ? 1 : 0;
+
+out:
+	libssh2_knownhost_free(known_hosts);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform the check for the session's certificate against known hosts if
+ * possible and then ask the user if they have a callback.
+ *
+ * Returns 1/0 for valid/not-valid or <0 for an error
+ */
+static int check_certificate(
+	LIBSSH2_SESSION *session,
+	LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOSTS *known_hosts,
+	git_transport_certificate_check_cb check_cb,
+	void *check_cb_payload,
+	const char *host,
+	int port)
+{
+	git_cert_hostkey cert = {{ 0 }};
+	const char *key;
+	size_t cert_len;
+	int cert_type, cert_valid = 0, error = 0;
+
+	if ((key = libssh2_session_hostkey(session, &cert_len, &cert_type)) == NULL) {
+		ssh_error(session, "failed to retrieve hostkey");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((cert_valid = check_against_known_hosts(session, known_hosts, host, port, key, cert_len, cert_type)) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	cert.parent.cert_type = GIT_CERT_HOSTKEY_LIBSSH2;
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		cert.type |= GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW;
+		cert.hostkey = key;
+		cert.hostkey_len = cert_len;
+		switch (cert_type) {
+		case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_RSA:
+			cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_RSA;
+			break;
+		case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_DSS:
+			cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_DSS;
+			break;
+
+#ifdef LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_256
+		case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_256:
+			cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_KEY_ECDSA_256;
+			break;
+		case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_384:
+			cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_KEY_ECDSA_384;
+			break;
+		case LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_521:
+			cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_KEY_ECDSA_521;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ED25519
+		case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ED25519:
+			cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_KEY_ED25519;
+			break;
+#endif
+		default:
+			cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_SHA256
+	key = libssh2_hostkey_hash(session, LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_SHA256);
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		cert.type |= GIT_CERT_SSH_SHA256;
+		memcpy(&cert.hash_sha256, key, 32);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	key = libssh2_hostkey_hash(session, LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_SHA1);
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		cert.type |= GIT_CERT_SSH_SHA1;
+		memcpy(&cert.hash_sha1, key, 20);
+	}
+
+	key = libssh2_hostkey_hash(session, LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_MD5);
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		cert.type |= GIT_CERT_SSH_MD5;
+		memcpy(&cert.hash_md5, key, 16);
+	}
+
+	if (cert.type == 0) {
+		git_error_set(GIT_ERROR_SSH, "unable to get the host key");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	git_error_clear();
+	error = 0;
+	if (!cert_valid) {
+		git_error_set(GIT_ERROR_SSH, "invalid or unknown remote ssh hostkey");
+		error = GIT_ECERTIFICATE;
+	}
+
+	if (check_cb != NULL) {
+		git_cert_hostkey *cert_ptr = &cert;
+		git_error_state previous_error = {0};
+
+		git_error_state_capture(&previous_error, error);
+		error = check_cb((git_cert *) cert_ptr, cert_valid, host, check_cb_payload);
+		if (error == GIT_PASSTHROUGH) {
+			error = git_error_state_restore(&previous_error);
+		} else if (error < 0 && !git_error_last()) {
+			git_error_set(GIT_ERROR_NET, "user canceled hostkey check");
+		}
+
+		git_error_state_free(&previous_error);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+ }
+ 
+ #define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT "22"
+@@ -517,12 +827,13 @@ static int _git_ssh_setup_conn(
+ 	git_smart_subtransport_stream **stream)
+ {
+ 	git_net_url urldata = GIT_NET_URL_INIT;
+-	int auth_methods, error = 0;
+	int auth_methods, error = 0, port;
+ 	size_t i;
+ 	ssh_stream *s;
+ 	git_credential *cred = NULL;
+ 	LIBSSH2_SESSION *session=NULL;
+ 	LIBSSH2_CHANNEL *channel=NULL;
+	LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOSTS *known_hosts = NULL;
+ 
+ 	t->current_stream = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -557,93 +868,21 @@ post_extract:
+ 	    (error = git_stream_connect(s->io)) < 0)
+ 		goto done;
+ 
+-	if ((error = _git_ssh_session_create(&session, s->io)) < 0)
+-		goto done;
+-
+-	if (t->owner->certificate_check_cb != NULL) {
+-		git_cert_hostkey cert = {{ 0 }}, *cert_ptr;
+-		const char *key;
+-		size_t cert_len;
+-		int cert_type;
+-
+-		cert.parent.cert_type = GIT_CERT_HOSTKEY_LIBSSH2;
+-
+-		key = libssh2_session_hostkey(session, &cert_len, &cert_type);
+-		if (key != NULL) {
+-			cert.type |= GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW;
+-			cert.hostkey = key;
+-			cert.hostkey_len = cert_len;
+-			switch (cert_type) {
+-				case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_RSA:
+-					cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_RSA;
+-					break;
+-				case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_DSS:
+-					cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_DSS;
+-					break;
+-					
+-#ifdef LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_256
+-				case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_256:
+-					cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_KEY_ECDSA_256;
+-					break;
+-				case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ECDSA_384:
+-					cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_KEY_ECDSA_384;
+-					break;
+-				case LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEY_ECDSA_521:
+-					cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_KEY_ECDSA_521;
+-					break;
+-#endif
+-					
+-#ifdef LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ED25519
+-				case LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_TYPE_ED25519:
+-					cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_KEY_ED25519;
+-					break;
+-#endif
+-				default:
+-					cert.raw_type = GIT_CERT_SSH_RAW_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+-			}
+-		}
+-
+-#ifdef LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_SHA256
+-		key = libssh2_hostkey_hash(session, LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_SHA256);
+-		if (key != NULL) {
+-			cert.type |= GIT_CERT_SSH_SHA256;
+-			memcpy(&cert.hash_sha256, key, 32);
+-		}
+-#endif
+-
+-		key = libssh2_hostkey_hash(session, LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_SHA1);
+-		if (key != NULL) {
+-			cert.type |= GIT_CERT_SSH_SHA1;
+-			memcpy(&cert.hash_sha1, key, 20);
+-		}
+-
+-		key = libssh2_hostkey_hash(session, LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_MD5);
+-		if (key != NULL) {
+-			cert.type |= GIT_CERT_SSH_MD5;
+-			memcpy(&cert.hash_md5, key, 16);
+-		}
+-
+-		if (cert.type == 0) {
+-			git_error_set(GIT_ERROR_SSH, "unable to get the host key");
+-			error = -1;
+-			goto done;
+-		}
+-
+-		/* We don't currently trust any hostkeys */
+-		git_error_clear();
+-
+-		cert_ptr = &cert;
+-
+-		error = t->owner->certificate_check_cb((git_cert *) cert_ptr, 0, urldata.host, t->owner->message_cb_payload);
+-
+-		if (error < 0 && error != GIT_PASSTHROUGH) {
+-			if (!git_error_last())
+-				git_error_set(GIT_ERROR_NET, "user cancelled hostkey check");
+	/*
+	 * Try to parse the port as a number, if we can't then fall back to
+	 * default. It would be nice if we could get the port that was resolved
+	 * as part of the stream connection, but that's not something that's
+	 * exposed.
+	 */
+	if (git__strntol32(&port, urldata.port, strlen(urldata.port), NULL, 10) < 0)
+		port = -1;
+ 
+-			goto done;
+-		}
+-	}
+	if ((error = _git_ssh_session_create(&session, &known_hosts, urldata.host, port, s->io)) < 0)
+		goto done;
+ 
+	if ((error = check_certificate(session, known_hosts, t->owner->certificate_check_cb, t->owner->message_cb_payload, urldata.host, urldata.port)) < 0)
+		goto done;
+ 
+ 	/* we need the username to ask for auth methods */
+ 	if (!urldata.username) {
+ 		if ((error = request_creds(&cred, t, NULL, GIT_CREDENTIAL_USERNAME)) < 0)
+@@ -714,6 +953,8 @@ done:
+ 	if (error < 0) {
+ 		ssh_stream_free(*stream);
+ 
+		if (known_hosts)
+			libssh2_knownhost_free(known_hosts);
+ 		if (session)
+ 			libssh2_session_free(session);
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/CVE-2024-24577.patch
+++ b/CVE-2024-24577.patch
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From eb4c1716cd92bf56f2770653a915d5fc01eab8f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Edward Thomson <ethomson@edwardthomson.com>
+Date: Sat, 16 Dec 2023 11:19:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] index: correct index has_dir_name check
+
+`has_dir_name` is used to check for directory/file collisions,
+and attempts to determine whether the index contains a file with
+a directory name that is a proper subset of the new index entry
+that we're trying to add.
+
+To determine directory name, the function would walk the path string
+backwards to identify a `/`, stopping at the end of the string. However,
+the function assumed that the strings did not start with a `/`. If the
+paths contain only a single `/` at the beginning of the string, then the
+function would continue the loop, erroneously, when they should have
+stopped at the first character.
+
+Correct the order of the tests to terminate properly.
+
+Credit to Michael Rodler (@f0rki) and Amazon AWS Security.
+---
+ src/index.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/index.c b/src/index.c
+index d4532c005d0..9306b96dba5 100644
+--- a/src/index.c
+++ b/src/index.c
+@@ -1148,10 +1148,13 @@ static int has_dir_name(git_index *index,
+ 		size_t len, pos;
+ 
+ 		for (;;) {
+-			if (*--slash == '/')
+-				break;
+			slash--;
+
+ 			if (slash <= entry->path)
+ 				return 0;
+
+			if (*slash == '/')
+				break;
+ 		}
+ 		len = slash - name;
+ 
--- a/libgit2.spec
+++ b/libgit2.spec
@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
 Name:           libgit2
-Version:        0.27.8
+Version:        1.3.2
 Release:        3
 Summary:        portable, pure C implementation of the Git core methods
 License:        GPLv2 with exceptions
 URL:            https://libgit2.org
 Source0:        https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/archive/v%{version}.tar.gz
-
-Patch0001:      0001-tests-don-t-run-buf-oom-on-32-bit-systems.patch
+Patch1:         CVE-2023-22742.patch
+# https://github.com/libgit2/libgit2/commit/eb4c1716cd92bf56f2770653a915d5fc01eab8f3
+Patch2:         CVE-2024-24577.patch

 BuildRequires:  gcc cmake >= 2.8.11 ninja-build http-parser-devel libcurl-devel
 BuildRequires:  libssh2-devel openssl-devel python3 zlib-devel
+BuildRequires:  pcre2-devel
 Provides:       bundled(libxdiff)

 %description
@ -26,12 +28,14 @@ This package contains libraries and headers for developing applications that use

 %prep
 %autosetup -n %{name}-%{version} -p1
-rm -rfv examples/network/.gitignore deps
-sed -i '/ADD_TEST(online/s/^/#/' tests/CMakeLists.txt
+find examples -name ".gitignore" -delete -print
+sed -i '/-sonline/s/^/#/' tests/CMakeLists.txt
+rm -vr deps

 %build
 %cmake . -B%{_target_platform} -GNinja -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo \
-  -DSHA1_BACKEND=OpenSSL -DUSE_HTTPS=OpenSSL %{nil}
+  -DREGEX_BACKEND=pcre2 -DUSE_SHA1=HTTPS -DUSE_HTTP_PARSER=system \
+  -DUSE_NTLMCLIENT=OFF -DUSE_HTTPS=OpenSSL %{nil}
 %ninja_build -C %{_target_platform}

 %install
@ -55,6 +59,21 @@ sed -i '/ADD_TEST(online/s/^/#/' tests/CMakeLists.txt
 %{_includedir}/git2*

 %changelog
+* Wed Feb 07 2024 yaoxin <yao_xin001@hoperun.com> - 1.3.2-3
+- Fix CVE-2024-24577
+
+* Thu Dec 14 2023 wangkai <13474090681@163.com> - 1.3.2-2
+- Fix CVE-2023-22742
+
+* Mon Jul 25 2022 xu_ping <xuping33@h-partners.com> - 1.3.2-1
+- Upgrade 1.3.2
+
+* Fri May 13 2022 liyanan <liyanan32@h-partners.com> - 0.27.8-5
+- Remove error-prone, redundant test
+
+* Fri Jul 23 2021 guoxiaoqi<guoxiaoqi2@huawei.com> - 0.27.8-4
+- fix CVE-2020-12278 and CVE-2020-12279
+
 * Thu Jan 16 2020 yangjian<yangjian79@huawei.com> - 0.27.8-3
 - Change the Source to valid address

--- a/v0.27.8.tar.gz
+++ b/v0.27.8.tar.gz
--- a/v1.3.2.tar.gz
+++ b/v1.3.2.tar.gz
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
openeuler-ci-bot	d667e4003c	!39 [sync] PR-34: Fix CVE-2024-24577 From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @cherry530 Signed-off-by: @cherry530	2024-02-08 06:17:46 +00:00
starlet-dx	cc8ac6ab85	Fix CVE-2024-24577 (cherry picked from commit 3aeb651be344300e7f88ac5285860eec5fe4e659)	2024-02-08 11:30:45 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	dc5458b9ff	!25 Fix CVE-2023-22742 From: @wk333 Reviewed-by: @caodongxia Signed-off-by: @caodongxia	2023-12-19 01:56:01 +00:00
wk333	7ad29bc3a3	Fix CVE-2023-22742	2023-12-14 20:06:32 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	02f779e8ca	!23 [sync] PR-21: upgrade 1.3.2 From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @caodongxia Signed-off-by: @caodongxia	2022-10-17 08:48:17 +00:00
cherry530	f42615efc1	Upgrade 1.3.2 Signed-off-by: cherry530 <xuping33@huawei.com> (cherry picked from commit 494e4dc0bcf8b82aec787f3bd260baa286851476)	2022-10-13 20:32:56 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	f41b0483a1	!18 [sync] PR-16: Remove error-prone, redundant test From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @licihua Signed-off-by: @licihua	2022-05-24 06:24:38 +00:00
lyn1001	dc2e1e141a	Remove error-prone, redundant test (cherry picked from commit 43ca2c7183abdcc6d7c3e608f36e64c222e6a274)	2022-05-24 11:28:31 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	5a4d6437ff	!8 fix CVE-2020-12278 and CVE-2020-12279 From: @angela7 Reviewed-by: @overweight Signed-off-by: @overweight	2021-07-23 06:26:51 +00:00
guoxiaoqi	5ba2ba495e	fix CVE-2020-12278 and CVE-2020-12279	2021-07-23 09:56:56 +08:00