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xiaoweiwei 2020-03-12 15:55:27 +08:00
parent aa549cd7a2
commit f55a106793
21 changed files with 1367 additions and 1 deletions
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50
CVE-2018-19935.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 3329e30a0c631753980757045ddfcc7b356a34a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 17:50:56 +0800
Subject: Fix #77020: null pointer dereference in imap_mail
If an empty $message is passed to imap_mail(), we must not set message
to NULL, since _php_imap_mail() is not supposed to handle NULL pointers
(opposed to pointers to NUL).
---
ext/imap/php_imap.c | 1 -
ext/imap/tests/bug77020.phpt | 15 +++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 php-7.2.10/ext/imap/tests/bug77020.phpt
diff --git a/ext/imap/php_imap.c b/ext/imap/php_imap.c
index e1adcf22..56126a0c 100644
--- a/ext/imap/php_imap.c
+++ b/ext/imap/php_imap.c
@@ -4106,7 +4106,6 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(imap_mail)
if (!ZSTR_LEN(message)) {
/* this is not really an error, so it is allowed. */
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "No message string in mail command");
- message = NULL;
}
if (_php_imap_mail(ZSTR_VAL(to), ZSTR_VAL(subject), ZSTR_VAL(message), headers?ZSTR_VAL(headers):NULL, cc?ZSTR_VAL(cc):NULL,
diff --git a/ext/imap/tests/bug77020.phpt b/ext/imap/tests/bug77020.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..76386a09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/imap/tests/bug77020.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+ --TEST--
+Bug #77020 (null pointer dereference in imap_mail)
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php
+if (!extension_loaded('imap')) die('skip imap extension not available');
+?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+imap_mail('1', 1, NULL);
+?>
+===DONE===
+--EXPECTF--
+Warning: imap_mail(): No message string in mail command in %s on line %d
+%s
+===DONE===
--
2.19.1

55
CVE-2019-11034.patch Normal file
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From f3aefc6d071b807ddacae0a0bc49f09c38e18490 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 22:54:46 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #77753 - Heap-buffer-overflow in php_ifd_get32s
---
ext/exif/exif.c | 4 ++++
ext/exif/tests/bug77753.phpt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
ext/exif/tests/bug77753.tiff | Bin 0 -> 873 bytes
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug77753.phpt
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug77753.tiff
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index fe89b85..0b5bb5a 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -2802,6 +2802,10 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char * valu
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Illegal IFD size: 2 + 0x%04X*12 = 0x%04X > 0x%04X", NumDirEntries, 2+NumDirEntries*12, value_len);
return FALSE;
}
+ if ((dir_start - value_ptr) > value_len - (2+NumDirEntries*12)) {
+ exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Illegal IFD size: 0x%04X > 0x%04X", (dir_start - value_ptr) + (2+NumDirEntries*12), value_len);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
for (de=0;de<NumDirEntries;de++) {
if (!exif_process_IFD_TAG(ImageInfo, dir_start + 2 + 12 * de,
diff --git a/ext/exif/tests/bug77753.phpt b/ext/exif/tests/bug77753.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d987a5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/exif/tests/bug77753.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug #77753 (Heap-buffer-overflow in php_ifd_get32s)
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php if (!extension_loaded('exif')) print 'skip exif extension not available';?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+var_dump(exif_read_data(__DIR__."/bug77753.tiff"));
+?>
+DONE
+--EXPECTF--
+%A
+Warning: exif_read_data(bug77753.tiff): Illegal IFD size: 0x006A > 0x0065 in %sbug77753.php on line %d
+
+Warning: exif_read_data(bug77753.tiff): Invalid TIFF file in %sbug77753.php on line %d
+bool(false)
+DONE
\ No newline at end of file
--
2.1.4

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CVE-2019-11035.patch Normal file
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From 887a7b571407f7a49a5e7cf1e612d21ef83fedb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 00:12:26 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fixed bug #77831 - Heap-buffer-overflow in exif_iif_add_value
in EXIF
---
NEWS | 1 +
ext/exif/exif.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
ext/exif/tests/bug77831.phpt | 13 +++++++++++++
ext/exif/tests/bug77831.tiff | Bin 0 -> 49 bytes
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug77831.phpt
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug77831.tiff
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index 0b5bb5a..408bf03 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -1654,10 +1654,10 @@ static int exif_file_sections_free(image_info_type *ImageInfo)
/* {{{ exif_iif_add_value
Add a value to image_info
*/
-static void exif_iif_add_value(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, int tag, int format, int length, void* value, int motorola_intel)
+static void exif_iif_add_value(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, int tag, int format, int length, void* value, size_t value_len, int motorola_intel)
{
size_t idex;
- void *vptr;
+ void *vptr, *vptr_end;
image_info_value *info_value;
image_info_data *info_data;
image_info_data *list;
@@ -1679,8 +1679,12 @@ static void exif_iif_add_value(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, c
switch (format) {
case TAG_FMT_STRING:
+ if (length > value_len) {
+ exif_error_docref("exif_iif_add_value" EXIFERR_CC, image_info, E_WARNING, "length > value_len: %d > %zu", length, value_len);
+ value = NULL;
+ }
if (value) {
- length = php_strnlen(value, length);
+ length = (int)php_strnlen(value, length);
info_value->s = estrndup(value, length);
info_data->length = length;
} else {
@@ -1702,6 +1706,10 @@ static void exif_iif_add_value(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, c
if (!length)
break;
case TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED:
+ if (length > value_len) {
+ exif_error_docref("exif_iif_add_value" EXIFERR_CC, image_info, E_WARNING, "length > value_len: %d > %zu", length, value_len);
+ value = NULL;
+ }
if (value) {
if (tag == TAG_MAKER_NOTE) {
length = (int) php_strnlen(value, length);
@@ -1732,7 +1740,12 @@ static void exif_iif_add_value(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, c
} else {
info_value = &info_data->value;
}
+ vptr_end = value+value_len;
for (idex=0,vptr=value; idex<(size_t)length; idex++,vptr=(char *) vptr + php_tiff_bytes_per_format[format]) {
+ if (vptr_end - vptr < php_tiff_bytes_per_format[format]) {
+ exif_error_docref("exif_iif_add_value" EXIFERR_CC, image_info, E_WARNING, "Value too short");
+ break;
+ }
if (length>1) {
info_value = &info_data->value.list[idex];
}
@@ -1768,7 +1781,7 @@ static void exif_iif_add_value(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, c
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Found value of type single");
#endif
info_value->f = *(float *)value;
-
+ break;
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Found value of type double");
@@ -1786,9 +1799,9 @@ static void exif_iif_add_value(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, c
/* {{{ exif_iif_add_tag
Add a tag from IFD to image_info
*/
-static void exif_iif_add_tag(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, int tag, int format, size_t length, void* value)
+static void exif_iif_add_tag(image_info_type *image_info, int section_index, char *name, int tag, int format, size_t length, void* value, size_t value_len)
{
- exif_iif_add_value(image_info, section_index, name, tag, format, (int)length, value, image_info->motorola_intel);
+ exif_iif_add_value(image_info, section_index, name, tag, format, (int)length, value, value_len, image_info->motorola_intel);
}
/* }}} */
@@ -2209,7 +2222,7 @@ static void add_assoc_image_info(zval *value, int sub_array, image_info_type *im
*/
static void exif_process_COM (image_info_type *image_info, char *value, size_t length)
{
- exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_STRING, length-2, value+2);
+ exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_STRING, length-2, value+2, length-2);
}
/* }}} */
@@ -2224,17 +2237,17 @@ static void exif_process_CME (image_info_type *image_info, char *value, size_t l
if (length>3) {
switch(value[2]) {
case 0:
- exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, length, value);
+ exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, length, value), length;
break;
case 1:
- exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_STRING, length, value);
+ exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_STRING, length, value, length);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Undefined JPEG2000 comment encoding");
break;
}
} else {
- exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, 0, NULL);
+ exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, 0, NULL, 0);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "JPEG2000 comment section too small");
}
}
@@ -2827,7 +2840,7 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char * valu
static int exif_process_IFD_TAG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_entry, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement, int section_index, int ReadNextIFD, tag_table_type tag_table)
{
size_t length;
- int tag, format, components;
+ unsigned int tag, format, components;
char *value_ptr, tagname[64], cbuf[32], *outside=NULL;
size_t byte_count, offset_val, fpos, fgot;
int64_t byte_count_signed;
@@ -3138,7 +3151,7 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_TAG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_entry, cha
}
}
}
- exif_iif_add_tag(ImageInfo, section_index, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, sizeof(tagname), tag_table), tag, format, components, value_ptr);
+ exif_iif_add_tag(ImageInfo, section_index, exif_get_tagname(tag, tagname, sizeof(tagname), tag_table), tag, format, components, value_ptr, byte_count);
EFREE_IF(outside);
return TRUE;
}
@@ -3296,10 +3309,10 @@ static void exif_process_APP12(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *buffer, size_t
size_t l1, l2=0;
if ((l1 = php_strnlen(buffer+2, length-2)) > 0) {
- exif_iif_add_tag(ImageInfo, SECTION_APP12, "Company", TAG_NONE, TAG_FMT_STRING, l1, buffer+2);
+ exif_iif_add_tag(ImageInfo, SECTION_APP12, "Company", TAG_NONE, TAG_FMT_STRING, l1, buffer+2, l1);
if (length > 2+l1+1) {
l2 = php_strnlen(buffer+2+l1+1, length-2-l1-1);
- exif_iif_add_tag(ImageInfo, SECTION_APP12, "Info", TAG_NONE, TAG_FMT_STRING, l2, buffer+2+l1+1);
+ exif_iif_add_tag(ImageInfo, SECTION_APP12, "Info", TAG_NONE, TAG_FMT_STRING, l2, buffer+2+l1+1, l2);
}
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
@@ -4100,7 +4113,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(exif_read_data)
if (ImageInfo.Thumbnail.size) {
if (read_thumbnail) {
/* not exif_iif_add_str : this is a buffer */
- exif_iif_add_tag(&ImageInfo, SECTION_THUMBNAIL, "THUMBNAIL", TAG_NONE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.size, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.data);
+ exif_iif_add_tag(&ImageInfo, SECTION_THUMBNAIL, "THUMBNAIL", TAG_NONE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.size, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.data, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.size);
}
if (!ImageInfo.Thumbnail.width || !ImageInfo.Thumbnail.height) {
/* try to evaluate if thumbnail data is present */
diff --git a/ext/exif/tests/bug77831.phpt b/ext/exif/tests/bug77831.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d868d47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/exif/tests/bug77831.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug #77831 (Heap-buffer-overflow in exif_iif_add_value in EXIF)
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php if (!extension_loaded('exif')) print 'skip exif extension not available';?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+var_dump(exif_read_data(__DIR__."/bug77831.tiff"));
+?>
+DONE
+--EXPECTF--
+%A
+bool(false)
+DONE
\ No newline at end of file
--
2.1.4

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From f80ad18afae2230c2c1802c7d829100af646874e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 23:38:12 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #77950 - Heap-buffer-overflow in _estrndup via
exif_process_IFD_TAG
I do not completely understand what is going on there, but I am pretty
sure dir_entry <= offset_base if not a normal situation, so we better not
to rely on such dir_entry.
---
ext/exif/exif.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index a763f6c..d174def 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -2891,7 +2891,7 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_TAG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *dir_entry, cha
offset_base is ImageInfo->file.list[sn].data-dir_offset
dir_entry - offset_base is dir_offset+2+i*12
*/
- if (byte_count > IFDlength || offset_val > IFDlength-byte_count || value_ptr < dir_entry || offset_val < (size_t)(dir_entry-offset_base)) {
+ if (byte_count > IFDlength || offset_val > IFDlength-byte_count || value_ptr < dir_entry || offset_val < (size_t)(dir_entry-offset_base) || dir_entry <= offset_base) {
/* It is important to check for IMAGE_FILETYPE_TIFF
* JPEG does not use absolute pointers instead its pointers are
* relative to the start of the TIFF header in APP1 section. */

45
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From dea2989ab8ba87a6180af497b2efaf0527e985c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Sun, 7 Jul 2019 17:01:01 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #78222 (heap-buffer-overflow on exif_scan_thumbnail)
---
ext/exif/exif.c | 2 +-
ext/exif/tests/bug78222.phpt | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug78222.phpt
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index 605b37923f..cd7975a9f5 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -3498,7 +3498,7 @@ static int exif_scan_thumbnail(image_info_type *ImageInfo)
size_t length=2, pos=0;
jpeg_sof_info sof_info;
- if (!data) {
+ if (!data || ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size < 4) {
return FALSE; /* nothing to do here */
}
if (memcmp(data, "\xFF\xD8\xFF", 3)) {
diff --git a/ext/exif/tests/bug78222.phpt b/ext/exif/tests/bug78222.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e4ead33e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/exif/tests/bug78222.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug #78222 (heap-buffer-overflow on exif_scan_thumbnail)
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php if (!extension_loaded('exif')) print 'skip exif extension not available';?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+exif_read_data(__DIR__."/bug78222.jpg", 'THUMBNAIL', FALSE, TRUE);
+?>
+DONE
+--EXPECTF--
+DONE
\ No newline at end of file
--
2.21.0

51
CVE-2019-11042.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From 99b7ef940e04cd273d03c5fa93bf182db2d7ce8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Sun, 7 Jul 2019 17:39:59 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #78256 (heap-buffer-overflow on
exif_process_user_comment)
---
ext/exif/exif.c | 4 ++--
ext/exif/tests/bug78256.phpt | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug78256.phpt
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index 77a11300..a80f2c2a 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -3040,11 +3040,11 @@ static int exif_process_user_comment(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char **pszInfoP
/* First try to detect BOM: ZERO WIDTH NOBREAK SPACE (FEFF 16)
* since we have no encoding support for the BOM yet we skip that.
*/
- if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "\xFE\xFF", 2)) {
+ if (ByteCount >=2 && !memcmp(szValuePtr, "\xFE\xFF", 2)) {
decode = "UCS-2BE";
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+2;
ByteCount -= 2;
- } else if (!memcmp(szValuePtr, "\xFF\xFE", 2)) {
+ } else if (ByteCount >=2 && !memcmp(szValuePtr, "\xFF\xFE", 2)) {
decode = "UCS-2LE";
szValuePtr = szValuePtr+2;
ByteCount -= 2;
diff --git a/ext/exif/tests/bug78256.phpt b/ext/exif/tests/bug78256.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..37a3f1d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/exif/tests/bug78256.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug #78256 (heap-buffer-overflow on exif_process_user_comment)
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php if (!extension_loaded('exif')) print 'skip exif extension not available';?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+@exif_read_data(__DIR__."/bug78256.jpg", 'COMMENT', FALSE, TRUE);
+?>
+DONE
+--EXPECTF--
+DONE
\ No newline at end of file
--
2.21.0

131
CVE-2019-11043.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
From ab061f95ca966731b1c84cf5b7b20155c0a1c06a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Zelenka <bukka@php.net>
Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2019 15:56:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #78599 (env_path_info underflow can lead to RCE)
(CVE-2019-11043)
---
sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_main.c | 4 +-
.../tests/bug78599-path-info-underflow.phpt | 61 +++++++++++++++++++
sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc | 11 +++-
3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 sapi/fpm/tests/bug78599-path-info-underflow.phpt
diff --git a/sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_main.c b/sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_main.c
index 24a7e5d56ac6..50f92981f1fb 100644
--- a/sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_main.c
+++ b/sapi/fpm/fpm/fpm_main.c
@@ -1209,8 +1209,8 @@ static void init_request_info(void)
path_info = script_path_translated + ptlen;
tflag = (slen != 0 && (!orig_path_info || strcmp(orig_path_info, path_info) != 0));
} else {
- path_info = env_path_info ? env_path_info + pilen - slen : NULL;
- tflag = (orig_path_info != path_info);
+ path_info = (env_path_info && pilen > slen) ? env_path_info + pilen - slen : NULL;
+ tflag = path_info && (orig_path_info != path_info);
}
if (tflag) {
diff --git a/sapi/fpm/tests/bug78599-path-info-underflow.phpt b/sapi/fpm/tests/bug78599-path-info-underflow.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..edd4e0d49699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sapi/fpm/tests/bug78599-path-info-underflow.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+--TEST--
+FPM: bug78599 - env_path_info underflow - CVE-2019-11043
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php include "skipif.inc"; ?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+
+require_once "tester.inc";
+
+$cfg = <<<EOT
+[global]
+error_log = {{FILE:LOG}}
+[unconfined]
+listen = {{ADDR}}
+pm = dynamic
+pm.max_children = 5
+pm.start_servers = 1
+pm.min_spare_servers = 1
+pm.max_spare_servers = 3
+EOT;
+
+$code = <<<EOT
+<?php
+echo "Test Start\n";
+var_dump(\$_SERVER["PATH_INFO"]);
+echo "Test End\n";
+EOT;
+
+$tester = new FPM\Tester($cfg, $code);
+$tester->start();
+$tester->expectLogStartNotices();
+$uri = $tester->makeSourceFile();
+$tester
+ ->request(
+ '',
+ [
+ 'SCRIPT_FILENAME' => $uri . "/" . str_repeat('A', 35),
+ 'PATH_INFO' => '',
+ 'HTTP_HUI' => str_repeat('PTEST', 1000),
+ ],
+ $uri
+ )
+ ->expectBody(
+ [
+ 'Test Start',
+ 'string(0) ""',
+ 'Test End'
+ ]
+ );
+$tester->terminate();
+$tester->close();
+
+?>
+Done
+--EXPECT--
+Done
+--CLEAN--
+<?php
+require_once "tester.inc";
+FPM\Tester::clean();
+?>
diff --git a/sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc b/sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc
index 70c03ad70f1c..3b6702866cc1 100644
--- a/sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc
+++ b/sapi/fpm/tests/tester.inc
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ class Tester
return new Response(null, true);
}
if (is_null($uri)) {
- $uri = $this->makeFile('src.php', $this->code);
+ $uri = $this->makeSourceFile();
}
$params = array_merge(
@@ -538,7 +538,6 @@ class Tester
],
$headers
);
-
try {
$this->response = new Response(
$this->getClient($address, $connKeepAlive)->request_data($params, false)
@@ -944,6 +943,14 @@ class Tester
return $filePath;
}
+ /**
+ * @return string
+ */
+ public function makeSourceFile()
+ {
+ return $this->makeFile('src.php', $this->code);
+ }
+
/**
* @param string|null $msg
*/

72
CVE-2019-11045.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From a5a15965da23c8e97657278fc8dfbf1dfb20c016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Christoph M. Becker" <cmbecker69@gmx.de>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2019 16:56:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix #78863: DirectoryIterator class silently truncates after
a null byte
Since the constructor of DirectoryIterator and friends is supposed to
accepts paths (i.e. strings without NUL bytes), we must not accept
arbitrary strings.
---
ext/spl/spl_directory.c | 4 ++--
ext/spl/tests/bug78863.phpt | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ext/spl/tests/bug78863.phpt
diff --git a/ext/spl/spl_directory.c b/ext/spl/spl_directory.c
index 91ea2e0265..56e809b1c7 100644
--- a/ext/spl/spl_directory.c
+++ b/ext/spl/spl_directory.c
@@ -701,10 +701,10 @@ void spl_filesystem_object_construct(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, zend_long cto
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(ctor_flags, DIT_CTOR_FLAGS)) {
flags = SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_PATHNAME|SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO;
- parsed = zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|l", &path, &len, &flags);
+ parsed = zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p|l", &path, &len, &flags);
} else {
flags = SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_PATHNAME|SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_SELF;
- parsed = zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &path, &len);
+ parsed = zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &path, &len);
}
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(ctor_flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS)) {
flags |= SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS;
diff --git a/ext/spl/tests/bug78863.phpt b/ext/spl/tests/bug78863.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc88d98dee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/spl/tests/bug78863.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug #78863 (DirectoryIterator class silently truncates after a null byte)
+--FILE--
+<?php
+$dir = __DIR__ . '/bug78863';
+mkdir($dir);
+touch("$dir/bad");
+mkdir("$dir/sub");
+touch("$dir/sub/good");
+
+$it = new DirectoryIterator(__DIR__ . "/bug78863\0/sub");
+foreach ($it as $fileinfo) {
+ if (!$fileinfo->isDot()) {
+ var_dump($fileinfo->getFilename());
+ }
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+Fatal error: Uncaught UnexpectedValueException: DirectoryIterator::__construct() expects parameter 1 to be a valid path, string given in %s:%d
+Stack trace:
+#0 %s(%d): DirectoryIterator->__construct('%s')
+#1 {main}
+ thrown in %s on line %d
+--CLEAN--
+<?php
+$dir = __DIR__ . '/bug78863';
+unlink("$dir/sub/good");
+rmdir("$dir/sub");
+unlink("$dir/bad");
+rmdir($dir);
+?>
--
2.19.1

51
CVE-2019-11046.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From eb23c6008753b1cdc5359dead3a096dce46c9018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Christoph M. Becker" <cmbecker69@gmx.de>
Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2019 12:26:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix #78878: Buffer underflow in bc_shift_addsub
We must not rely on `isdigit()` to detect digits, since we only support
decimal ASCII digits in the following processing.
---
ext/bcmath/libbcmath/src/str2num.c | 4 ++--
ext/bcmath/tests/bug78878.phpt | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ext/bcmath/tests/bug78878.phpt
diff --git a/ext/bcmath/libbcmath/src/str2num.c b/ext/bcmath/libbcmath/src/str2num.c
index f38d341570..03aec15930 100644
--- a/ext/bcmath/libbcmath/src/str2num.c
+++ b/ext/bcmath/libbcmath/src/str2num.c
@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ bc_str2num (bc_num *num, char *str, int scale)
zero_int = FALSE;
if ( (*ptr == '+') || (*ptr == '-')) ptr++; /* Sign */
while (*ptr == '0') ptr++; /* Skip leading zeros. */
- while (isdigit((int)*ptr)) ptr++, digits++; /* digits */
+ while (*ptr >= '0' && *ptr <= '9') ptr++, digits++; /* digits */
if (*ptr == '.') ptr++; /* decimal point */
- while (isdigit((int)*ptr)) ptr++, strscale++; /* digits */
+ while (*ptr >= '0' && *ptr <= '9') ptr++, strscale++; /* digits */
if ((*ptr != '\0') || (digits+strscale == 0))
{
*num = bc_copy_num (BCG(_zero_));
diff --git a/ext/bcmath/tests/bug78878.phpt b/ext/bcmath/tests/bug78878.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2c9d72b946
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/bcmath/tests/bug78878.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug #78878 (Buffer underflow in bc_shift_addsub)
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php
+if (!extension_loaded('bcmath')) die('skip bcmath extension not available');
+?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+print @bcmul("\xB26483605105519922841849335928742092", bcpowmod(2, 65535, -4e-4));
+?>
+--EXPECT--
+bc math warning: non-zero scale in modulus
+0
--
2.19.1

50
CVE-2019-11047.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From d348cfb96f2543565691010ade5e0346338be5a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 00:10:39 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fixed bug #78910
---
ext/exif/exif.c | 3 ++-
ext/exif/tests/bug78910.phpt | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug78910.phpt
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index f961f44a46c..c0be05922fb 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -3154,7 +3154,8 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char * valu
continue;
if (maker_note->model && (!ImageInfo->model || strcmp(maker_note->model, ImageInfo->model)))
continue;
- if (maker_note->id_string && strncmp(maker_note->id_string, value_ptr, maker_note->id_string_len))
+ if (maker_note->id_string && value_len >= maker_note->id_string_len
+ && strncmp(maker_note->id_string, value_ptr, maker_note->id_string_len))
continue;
break;
}
diff --git a/ext/exif/tests/bug78910.phpt b/ext/exif/tests/bug78910.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f5b1c32c1bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/exif/tests/bug78910.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug #78910: Heap-buffer-overflow READ in exif (OSS-Fuzz #19044)
+--FILE--
+<?php
+
+var_dump(exif_read_data(''));
+
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+Notice: exif_read_data(): Read from TIFF: tag(0x927C, MakerNote ): Illegal format code 0x2020, switching to BYTE in %s on line %d
+
+Warning: exif_read_data(): Process tag(x927C=MakerNote ): Illegal format code 0x2020, suppose BYTE in %s on line %d
+
+Warning: exif_read_data(): IFD data too short: 0x0000 offset 0x000C in %s on line %d
+
+Warning: exif_read_data(): Invalid TIFF file in %s on line %d
+bool(false)
--
2.11.0

48
CVE-2019-11050.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
From c14eb8de974fc8a4d74f3515424c293bc7a40fba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 01:14:38 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #78793
---
ext/exif/exif.c | 5 +++--
ext/exif/tests/bug78793.phpt | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug78793.phpt
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index c0be05922f..7fe055f381 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -3235,8 +3235,9 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char * valu
}
for (de=0;de<NumDirEntries;de++) {
- if (!exif_process_IFD_TAG(ImageInfo, dir_start + 2 + 12 * de,
- offset_base, data_len, displacement, section_index, 0, maker_note->tag_table)) {
+ size_t offset = 2 + 12 * de;
+ if (!exif_process_IFD_TAG(ImageInfo, dir_start + offset,
+ offset_base, data_len - offset, displacement, section_index, 0, maker_note->tag_table)) {
return FALSE;
}
}
diff --git a/ext/exif/tests/bug78793.phpt b/ext/exif/tests/bug78793.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..033f255ace
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/exif/tests/bug78793.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug #78793: Use-after-free in exif parsing under memory sanitizer
+--FILE--
+<?php
+$f = "ext/exif/tests/bug77950.tiff";
+for ($i = 0; $i < 10; $i++) {
+ @exif_read_data($f);
+}
+?>
+===DONE===
+--EXPECT--
+===DONE===
--
2.19.1

14
CVE-2019-9021.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
diff --git a/ext/phar/phar.c b/ext/phar/phar.c
index 4d5988eaa9..812720a011 100644
--- a/ext/phar/phar.c
+++ b/ext/phar/phar.c
@@ -2026,7 +2026,7 @@ next_extension:
}
while (pos != filename && (*(pos - 1) == '/' || *(pos - 1) == '\0')) {
- pos = memchr(pos + 1, '.', filename_len - (pos - filename) + 1);
+ pos = memchr(pos + 1, '.', filename_len - (pos - filename) - 1);
if (!pos) {
return FAILURE;
}

37
CVE-2019-9022.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 8d3dfabef459fe7815e8ea2fd68753fd17859d7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2018 20:39:08 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix #77369 - memcpy with negative length via crafted DNS
response
---
ext/standard/dns.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ext/standard/dns.c b/ext/standard/dns.c
index 8e102f8..b5fbcb9 100644
--- a/ext/standard/dns.c
+++ b/ext/standard/dns.c
@@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ static u_char *php_parserr(u_char *cp, u_char *end, querybuf *answer, int type_t
GETLONG(ttl, cp);
GETSHORT(dlen, cp);
CHECKCP(dlen);
+ if (dlen == 0) {
+ /* No data in the response - nothing to do */
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (type_to_fetch != T_ANY && type != type_to_fetch) {
cp += dlen;
return cp;
@@ -549,6 +553,9 @@ static u_char *php_parserr(u_char *cp, u_char *end, querybuf *answer, int type_t
CHECKCP(n);
add_assoc_stringl(subarray, "tag", (char*)cp, n);
cp += n;
+ if ( (size_t) dlen < ((size_t)n) + 2 ) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
n = dlen - n - 2;
CHECKCP(n);
add_assoc_stringl(subarray, "value", (char*)cp, n);
--
2.1.4

91
CVE-2019-9023.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
From 9a96e864885ccc3b19d360ba410a562eb7c5dc45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: gwx620998 <gulining1@huawei.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 03:34:11 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2019-9023
Signed-off-by: gwx620998 <gulining1@huawei.com>
---
ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regcomp.c | 3 +++
ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regparse.c | 2 ++
ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/unicode.c | 1 +
ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/utf32_be.c | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regcomp.c b/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regcomp.c
index 0e9a9ab..cf914cc 100644
--- a/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regcomp.c
+++ b/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regcomp.c
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ compile_length_string_node(Node* node, regex_t* reg)
for (; p < sn->end; ) {
len = enclen(enc, p);
+ if (p + len > sn->end) len = sn->end - p;
if (len == prev_len) {
slen++;
}
@@ -524,6 +525,7 @@ compile_string_node(Node* node, regex_t* reg)
for (; p < end; ) {
len = enclen(enc, p);
+ if (p + len > end) len = end - p;
if (len == prev_len) {
slen++;
}
@@ -3436,6 +3438,7 @@ expand_case_fold_string(Node* node, regex_t* reg)
}
len = enclen(reg->enc, p);
+ if (p + len > end) len = end - p;
if (n == 0) {
if (IS_NULL(snode)) {
diff --git a/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regparse.c b/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regparse.c
index 8153513..9393b9d 100644
--- a/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regparse.c
+++ b/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/regparse.c
@@ -3594,6 +3594,7 @@ fetch_token(OnigToken* tok, UChar** src, UChar* end, ScanEnv* env)
}
else { /* string */
p = tok->backp + enclen(enc, tok->backp);
+ if (p > end) p = end;
}
}
break;
@@ -3763,6 +3764,7 @@ fetch_token(OnigToken* tok, UChar** src, UChar* end, ScanEnv* env)
out:
#endif
*src = p;
+ if (*src > end) *src = end;
return tok->type;
}
diff --git a/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/unicode.c b/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/unicode.c
index 8812ca2..cbdc42f 100644
--- a/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/unicode.c
+++ b/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/unicode.c
@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ onigenc_unicode_mbc_case_fold(OnigEncoding enc,
code = ONIGENC_MBC_TO_CODE(enc, p, end);
len = enclen(enc, p);
+ if (*pp + len > end) len = end - *pp;
*pp += len;
#ifdef USE_UNICODE_CASE_FOLD_TURKISH_AZERI
diff --git a/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/utf32_be.c b/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/utf32_be.c
index d0c7f39..4cf6fed 100644
--- a/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/utf32_be.c
+++ b/ext/mbstring/oniguruma/src/utf32_be.c
@@ -65,8 +65,9 @@ utf32be_is_mbc_newline(const UChar* p, const UChar* end)
}
static OnigCodePoint
-utf32be_mbc_to_code(const UChar* p, const UChar* end ARG_UNUSED)
+utf32be_mbc_to_code(const UChar* p, const UChar* end)
{
+ if (p + 4 > end) return (OnigCodePoint ) NULL;
return (OnigCodePoint )(((p[0] * 256 + p[1]) * 256 + p[2]) * 256 + p[3]);
}
--
1.8.3.1

23
CVE-2019-9024.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
From 1cc2182bcc81e185c14837e659d12b268cb99d63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 17:15:20 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #77380 (Global out of bounds read in xmlrpc base64
code)
---
diff --git a/ext/xmlrpc/libxmlrpc/base64.c b/ext/xmlrpc/libxmlrpc/base64.c
index 5ebdf31..a4fa193 100644
--- a/ext/xmlrpc/libxmlrpc/base64.c
+++ b/ext/xmlrpc/libxmlrpc/base64.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ void base64_decode_xmlrpc(struct buffer_st *bfr, const char *source, int length)
return;
}
- if (dtable[c] & 0x80) {
+ if (dtable[(unsigned char)c] & 0x80) {
/*
fprintf(stderr, "Offset %i length %i\n", offset, length);
fprintf(stderr, "character '%c:%x:%c' in input file.\n", c, c, dtable[c]);
--
2.1.4

85
CVE-2019-9637.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
From 40f6425978917209cb0c2c3be05a25c65c9a900e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: gwx620998 <gulining1@huawei.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 07:14:35 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2019-9637
Signed-off-by: gwx620998 <gulining1@huawei.com>
---
main/streams/plain_wrapper.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/main/streams/plain_wrapper.c b/main/streams/plain_wrapper.c
index 9b36d00..cb9e642 100644
--- a/main/streams/plain_wrapper.c
+++ b/main/streams/plain_wrapper.c
@@ -1168,34 +1168,50 @@ static int php_plain_files_rename(php_stream_wrapper *wrapper, const char *url_f
# ifdef EXDEV
if (errno == EXDEV) {
zend_stat_t sb;
+# if !defined(ZTS) && !defined(TSRM_WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE)
+ /* not sure what to do in ZTS case, umask is not thread-safe */
+ int oldmask = umask(077);
+# endif
+ int success = 0;
if (php_copy_file(url_from, url_to) == SUCCESS) {
if (VCWD_STAT(url_from, &sb) == 0) {
+ success = 1;
# ifndef TSRM_WIN32
- if (VCWD_CHMOD(url_to, sb.st_mode)) {
- if (errno == EPERM) {
- php_error_docref2(NULL, url_from, url_to, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
- VCWD_UNLINK(url_from);
- return 1;
- }
+ /*
+ * Try to set user and permission info on the target.
+ * If we're not root, then some of these may fail.
+ * We try chown first, to set proper group info, relying
+ * on the system environment to have proper umask to not allow
+ * access to the file in the meantime.
+ */
+ if (VCWD_CHOWN(url_to, sb.st_uid, sb.st_gid)) {
php_error_docref2(NULL, url_from, url_to, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
- return 0;
+ if (errno != EPERM) {
+ success = 0;
+ }
}
- if (VCWD_CHOWN(url_to, sb.st_uid, sb.st_gid)) {
- if (errno == EPERM) {
+ if (success) {
+ if (VCWD_CHMOD(url_to, sb.st_mode)) {
php_error_docref2(NULL, url_from, url_to, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
- VCWD_UNLINK(url_from);
- return 1;
+ if (errno != EPERM) {
+ success = 0;
+ }
}
- php_error_docref2(NULL, url_from, url_to, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
- return 0;
}
# endif
- VCWD_UNLINK(url_from);
- return 1;
+ if (success) {
+ VCWD_UNLINK(url_from);
+ }
+ } else {
+ php_error_docref2(NULL, url_from, url_to, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
}
+ } else {
+ php_error_docref2(NULL, url_from, url_to, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
}
- php_error_docref2(NULL, url_from, url_to, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
- return 0;
+# if !defined(ZTS) && !defined(TSRM_WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE)
+ umask(oldmask);
+# endif
+ return success;
}
# endif
#endif
--
1.8.3.1

60
CVE-2019-9638-CVE-2019-9639.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From 7168d3dc576344f7e55fac81d86304d2421ffe93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: gwx620998 <gulining1@huawei.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 07:42:34 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2019-9638
Signed-off-by: gwx620998 <gulining1@huawei.com>
---
ext/exif/exif.c | 5 +++--
ext/exif/tests/bug77563.phpt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug77563.phpt
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index 3a76d8f..d82b5ae 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -3151,8 +3151,8 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char * valu
continue;
break;
}
-
- if (maker_note->offset >= value_len) {
+
+ if (value_len < 2 || maker_note->offset >= value_len - 1) {
/* Do not go past the value end */
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "IFD data too short: 0x%04X offset 0x%04X", value_len, maker_note->offset);
return FALSE;
@@ -3207,6 +3207,7 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char * valu
#endif
default:
case MN_OFFSET_NORMAL:
+ data_len = value_len;
break;
}
diff --git a/ext/exif/tests/bug77563.phpt b/ext/exif/tests/bug77563.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1c5b9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/exif/tests/bug77563.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug 77563 (Uninitialized read in exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE)
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php if (!extension_loaded('exif')) print 'skip exif extension not available';?>
++--FILE--
++<?php
++$s = exif_thumbnail(__DIR__."/bug77563.jpg");
++?>
++DONE
++--EXPECTF--
++Warning: exif_thumbnail(bug77563.jpg): Illegal IFD offset in %s/bug77563.php on line %d
++
++Warning: exif_thumbnail(bug77563.jpg): File structure corrupted in %s/bug77563.php on line %d
++
++Warning: exif_thumbnail(bug77563.jpg): Invalid JPEG file in %s/bug77563.php on line %d
++DONE
--
1.8.3.1

74
CVE-2019-9640.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
From 30d2b94a2e88021b77b07149e1f4438662ca8e5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 13:38:00 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #77540 - Invalid Read on exif_process_SOFn
---
ext/exif/exif.c | 10 ++++++++--
ext/exif/tests/bug77540.jpg | Bin 0 -> 91 bytes
ext/exif/tests/bug77540.phpt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug77540.jpg
create mode 100644 ext/exif/tests/bug77540.phpt
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index 4f2f660..8ed9c85 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -3902,7 +3902,7 @@ static int exif_scan_thumbnail(image_info_type *ImageInfo)
return FALSE;
marker = c;
length = php_jpg_get16(data+pos);
- if (pos+length>=ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size) {
+ if (length > ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size || pos >= ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size - length) {
return FALSE;
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
@@ -3923,6 +3923,10 @@ static int exif_scan_thumbnail(image_info_type *ImageInfo)
case M_SOF14:
case M_SOF15:
/* handle SOFn block */
+ if (length < 8 || ImageInfo->Thumbnail.size - 8 < pos) {
+ /* exif_process_SOFn needs 8 bytes */
+ return FALSE;
+ }
exif_process_SOFn(data+pos, marker, &sof_info);
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.height = sof_info.height;
ImageInfo->Thumbnail.width = sof_info.width;
@@ -4654,7 +4658,9 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(exif_thumbnail)
ZVAL_STRINGL(return_value, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.data, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.size);
if (arg_c >= 3) {
if (!ImageInfo.Thumbnail.width || !ImageInfo.Thumbnail.height) {
- exif_scan_thumbnail(&ImageInfo);
+ if (!exif_scan_thumbnail(&ImageInfo)) {
+ ImageInfo.Thumbnail.width = ImageInfo.Thumbnail.height = 0;
+ }
}
zval_dtor(z_width);
zval_dtor(z_height);
--
diff --git a/ext/exif/tests/bug77540.phpt b/ext/exif/tests/bug77540.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8702e0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/exif/tests/bug77540.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+--TEST--
+Bug 77540 (Invalid Read on exif_process_SOFn)
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php if (!extension_loaded('exif')) print 'skip exif extension not available';?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+$width = $height = 42;
+$s = exif_thumbnail(__DIR__."/bug77540.jpg", $width, $height);
+echo "Width ".$width."\n";
+echo "Height ".$height."\n";
+?>
+DONE
+--EXPECTF--
+Width 0
+Height 0
+DONE
--
2.1.4

146
php-CVE-2018-20783.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
From e7c8e6cde021afd637ea535b0641a1851e57fb2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 14:02:26 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #77143 - add more checks to buffer reads
---
NEWS | 4 ++++
ext/phar/phar.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
ext/phar/tests/bug73768.phpt | 2 +-
ext/phar/tests/bug77143.phar | Bin 0 -> 50 bytes
ext/phar/tests/bug77143.phpt | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 ext/phar/tests/bug77143.phar
create mode 100644 ext/phar/tests/bug77143.phpt
diff -Nur php-7.2.10/NEWS php-7.2.10_bak/NEWS
--- php-7.2.10/NEWS 2018-09-11 15:06:00.000000000 +0800
+++ php-7.2.10_bak/NEWS 2019-04-04 17:41:54.869000000 +0800
@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@
. Fixed bug #76477 (Opcache causes empty return value).
(Nikita, Laruence)
+- Phar:
+ . Fixed bug #77143 (Heap Buffer Overflow (READ: 4) in phar_parse_pharfile).
+ (Stas)
+
- PGSQL:
. Fixed bug #76548 (pg_fetch_result did not fetch the next row). (Anatol)
diff -Nur php-7.2.10/ext/phar/phar.c php-7.2.10_bak/ext/phar/phar.c
--- php-7.2.10/ext/phar/phar.c 2019-04-04 17:39:04.158000000 +0800
+++ php-7.2.10_bak/ext/phar/phar.c 2019-04-04 17:49:51.807000000 +0800
@@ -643,6 +643,18 @@
/* }}}*/
/**
+ * Size of fixed fields in the manifest.
+ * See: http://php.net/manual/en/phar.fileformat.phar.php
+ */
+#define MANIFEST_FIXED_LEN 18
+
+#define SAFE_PHAR_GET_32(buffer, endbuffer, var) \
+ if (UNEXPECTED(buffer + 4 > endbuffer)) { \
+ MAPPHAR_FAIL("internal corruption of phar \"%s\" (truncated manifest header)"); \
+ } \
+ PHAR_GET_32(buffer, var);
+
+/**
* Does not check for a previously opened phar in the cache.
*
* Parse a new one and add it to the cache, returning either SUCCESS or
@@ -725,7 +737,7 @@
savebuf = buffer;
endbuffer = buffer + manifest_len;
- if (manifest_len < 10 || manifest_len != php_stream_read(fp, buffer, manifest_len)) {
+ if (manifest_len < MANIFEST_FIXED_LEN || manifest_len != php_stream_read(fp, buffer, manifest_len)) {
MAPPHAR_FAIL("internal corruption of phar \"%s\" (truncated manifest header)")
}
@@ -750,7 +762,7 @@
return FAILURE;
}
- PHAR_GET_32(buffer, manifest_flags);
+ SAFE_PHAR_GET_32(buffer, endbuffer, manifest_flags);
manifest_flags &= ~PHAR_HDR_COMPRESSION_MASK;
manifest_flags &= ~PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSION_MASK;
@@ -970,13 +982,13 @@
}
/* extract alias */
- PHAR_GET_32(buffer, tmp_len);
+ SAFE_PHAR_GET_32(buffer, endbuffer, tmp_len);
if (buffer + tmp_len > endbuffer) {
MAPPHAR_FAIL("internal corruption of phar \"%s\" (buffer overrun)");
}
- if (manifest_len < 10 + tmp_len) {
+ if (manifest_len < MANIFEST_FIXED_LEN + tmp_len) {
MAPPHAR_FAIL("internal corruption of phar \"%s\" (truncated manifest header)")
}
@@ -1014,7 +1026,7 @@
}
/* we have 5 32-bit items plus 1 byte at least */
- if (manifest_count > ((manifest_len - 10 - tmp_len) / (5 * 4 + 1))) {
+ if (manifest_count > ((manifest_len - MANIFEST_FIXED_LEN - tmp_len) / (5 * 4 + 1))) {
/* prevent serious memory issues */
MAPPHAR_FAIL("internal corruption of phar \"%s\" (too many manifest entries for size of manifest)")
}
@@ -1023,12 +1035,12 @@
mydata->is_persistent = PHAR_G(persist);
/* check whether we have meta data, zero check works regardless of byte order */
- PHAR_GET_32(buffer, len);
+ SAFE_PHAR_GET_32(buffer, endbuffer, len);
if (mydata->is_persistent) {
mydata->metadata_len = len;
- if(!len) {
+ if (!len) {
/* FIXME: not sure why this is needed but removing it breaks tests */
- PHAR_GET_32(buffer, len);
+ SAFE_PHAR_GET_32(buffer, endbuffer, len);
}
}
if(len > (size_t)(endbuffer - buffer)) {
diff -Nur php-7.2.10/ext/phar/tests/bug73768.phpt php-7.2.10_bak/ext/phar/tests/bug73768.phpt
--- php-7.2.10/ext/phar/tests/bug73768.phpt 2018-09-11 15:06:03.000000000 +0800
+++ php-7.2.10_bak/ext/phar/tests/bug73768.phpt 2019-04-04 17:50:51.796000000 +0800
@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@
}
?>
--EXPECTF--
-cannot load phar "%sbug73768.phar" with implicit alias "" under different alias "alias.phar"
+internal corruption of phar "%sbug73768.phar" (truncated manifest header)
diff --git a/ext/phar/tests/bug77143.phpt b/ext/phar/tests/bug77143.phpt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9f80fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ext/phar/tests/bug77143.phpt
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+--TEST--
+PHP bug #77143: Heap Buffer Overflow (READ: 4) in phar_parse_pharfile
+--INI--
+phar.readonly=0
+--SKIPIF--
+<?php if (!extension_loaded("phar")) die("skip"); ?>
+--FILE--
+<?php
+chdir(__DIR__);
+try {
+var_dump(new Phar('bug77143.phar',0,'project.phar'));
+echo "OK\n";
+} catch(UnexpectedValueException $e) {
+ echo $e->getMessage();
+}
+?>
+--EXPECTF--
+internal corruption of phar "%sbug77143.phar" (truncated manifest header)
--
2.1.4

47
php-CVE-2019-9641.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
commit 25aa5f434dfb3337a6617b46224f1b505053d8e9
Author: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
Date: Fri Mar 1 23:25:45 2019 -0800
Fix integer overflows on 32-bits
diff --git a/ext/exif/exif.c b/ext/exif/exif.c
index cbde3effed..b4563927a5 100644
--- a/ext/exif/exif.c
+++ b/ext/exif/exif.c
@@ -3567,10 +3567,10 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_TIFF(image_info_type *ImageInfo, size_t dir_offse
tag_table_type tag_table = exif_get_tag_table(section_index);
if (ImageInfo->ifd_nesting_level > MAX_IFD_NESTING_LEVEL) {
- return FALSE;
- }
+ return FALSE;
+ }
- if (ImageInfo->FileSize >= dir_offset+2) {
+ if (ImageInfo->FileSize >= 2 && ImageInfo->FileSize - 2 >= dir_offset) {
sn = exif_file_sections_add(ImageInfo, M_PSEUDO, 2, NULL);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Read from TIFF: filesize(x%04X), IFD dir(x%04X + x%04X)", ImageInfo->FileSize, dir_offset, 2);
@@ -3578,8 +3578,8 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_TIFF(image_info_type *ImageInfo, size_t dir_offse
php_stream_seek(ImageInfo->infile, dir_offset, SEEK_SET); /* we do not know the order of sections */
php_stream_read(ImageInfo->infile, (char*)ImageInfo->file.list[sn].data, 2);
num_entries = php_ifd_get16u(ImageInfo->file.list[sn].data, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
- dir_size = 2/*num dir entries*/ +12/*length of entry*/*num_entries +4/* offset to next ifd (points to thumbnail or NULL)*/;
- if (ImageInfo->FileSize >= dir_offset+dir_size) {
+ dir_size = 2/*num dir entries*/ +12/*length of entry*/*(size_t)num_entries +4/* offset to next ifd (points to thumbnail or NULL)*/;
+ if (ImageInfo->FileSize >= dir_size && ImageInfo->FileSize - dir_size >= dir_offset) {
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Read from TIFF: filesize(x%04X), IFD dir(x%04X + x%04X), IFD entries(%d)", ImageInfo->FileSize, dir_offset+2, dir_size-2, num_entries);
#endif
@@ -3662,9 +3662,9 @@ static int exif_process_IFD_in_TIFF(image_info_type *ImageInfo, size_t dir_offse
}
}
}
- if (ImageInfo->FileSize >= dir_offset + ImageInfo->file.list[sn].size) {
+ if (ImageInfo->FileSize >= ImageInfo->file.list[sn].size && ImageInfo->FileSize - ImageInfo->file.list[sn].size >= dir_offset) {
if (ifd_size > dir_size) {
- if (dir_offset + ifd_size > ImageInfo->FileSize) {
+ if (ImageInfo->FileSize < ifd_size || dir_offset > ImageInfo->FileSize - ifd_size) {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Error in TIFF: filesize(x%04X) less than size of IFD(x%04X + x%04X)", ImageInfo->FileSize, dir_offset, ifd_size);
return FALSE;
}

26
php.spec
View File

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
Name: php
Version: %{upver}%{?rcver:~%{rcver}}
Release: 1
Release: 2
Summary: PHP scripting language for creating dynamic web sites
License: PHP and Zend and BSD and MIT and ASL 1.0 and NCSA
URL: http://www.php.net/
@ -65,6 +65,27 @@ Patch0014: https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/be50a72715c141befe6f34ece66
Patch0015: https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/c1729272b17a1fe893d1a54e423d3b71470f3ee8.patch
Patch0016: php-5.6.3-datetests.patch
Patch6000: CVE-2019-9021.patch
Patch6001: CVE-2019-9022.patch
Patch6002: CVE-2019-9023.patch
Patch6003: CVE-2019-9024.patch
Patch6004: CVE-2019-9637.patch
Patch6005: CVE-2019-9638-CVE-2019-9639.patch
Patch6006: CVE-2019-9640.patch
Patch6007: php-CVE-2018-20783.patch
Patch6008: php-CVE-2019-9641.patch
Patch6009: CVE-2019-11034.patch
Patch6010: CVE-2019-11035.patch
Patch6011: CVE-2019-11036.patch
Patch6012: CVE-2019-11041.patch
Patch6013: CVE-2019-11042.patch
Patch6014: CVE-2019-11043.patch
Patch6015: CVE-2018-19935.patch
Patch6016: CVE-2019-11045.patch
Patch6017: CVE-2019-11046.patch
Patch6018: CVE-2019-11050.patch
Patch6019: CVE-2019-11047.patch
BuildRequires: bzip2-devel, curl-devel >= 7.9, httpd-devel >= 2.0.46-1, pam-devel, httpd-filesystem, nginx-filesystem
BuildRequires: libstdc++-devel, openssl-devel, sqlite-devel >= 3.6.0, zlib-devel, smtpdaemon, libedit-devel
BuildRequires: pcre-devel >= 6.6, bzip2, perl-interpreter, autoconf, automake, gcc, gcc-c++, libtool, libtool-ltdl-devel
@ -1120,5 +1141,8 @@ systemctl try-restart php-fpm.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || :
%changelog
* Thu Mar 12 2020 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 7.2.10-2
- Add CVE patches
* Fri Feb 14 2020 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 7.2.10-1
- Package init