!126 [sync] PR-125: 同步社区补丁

From: @openeuler-sync-bot 
Reviewed-by: @HuaxinLuGitee 
Signed-off-by: @HuaxinLuGitee

backort-useradd-Fix-buffer-overflow-when-using-a-prefix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From eaebea55a495a56317ed85e959b3599f73c6bdf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Michael <fedora.dm0@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2022 18:51:33 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] useradd: Fix buffer overflow when using a prefix
+
+The buffer length did not count the string's trailing null byte.
+
+Signed-off-by: David Michael <fedora.dm0@gmail.com>
+
+Conflict: if(prefix[0]) There is no space after it.
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/f6f8bcd2a57c06983296485cc028ebdf467ebfd7
+
+---
+ src/useradd.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
+index 39a744ee0..7ea0a9c4d 100644
+--- a/src/useradd.c
++++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -2372,7 +2372,7 @@ static void create_mail (void)
+ 		if (NULL == spool) {
+ 			spool = "/var/mail";
+ 		}
+-		file = alloca (strlen (prefix) + strlen (spool) + strlen (user_name) + 2);
++		file = alloca (strlen (prefix) + strlen (spool) + strlen (user_name) + 3);
+ 		if(prefix[0])
+ 			sprintf (file, "%s/%s/%s", prefix, spool, user_name);
+ 		else

backport-Added-documentation-around-CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From aff4989d1acf3afc718813144658c295d8d10f20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Zaugg <andy.zaugg@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 20:41:50 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Added documentation around CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL
+
+Adding documentation aroud the parameter CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL in the
+/etc/default/useradd file
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/aff4989d1acf3afc718813144658c295d8d10f20
+
+---
+ man/login.defs.d/MAIL_DIR.xml | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/man/login.defs.d/MAIL_DIR.xml b/man/login.defs.d/MAIL_DIR.xml
+index 60b82d6b1..b5adb888b 100644
+--- a/man/login.defs.d/MAIL_DIR.xml
++++ b/man/login.defs.d/MAIL_DIR.xml
+@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
+       The mail spool directory. This is needed to manipulate the mailbox
+       when its corresponding user account is modified or deleted. If not
+       specified, a compile-time default is used.
++      The parameter CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL in <filename>/etc/default/useradd</filename>
++      determines whether the mail spool should be created.
+     </para>
+   </listitem>
+ </varlistentry><varlistentry>

backport-Address-minor-compiler-warnings.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 6cbec2d0aa29d6d25e9eed007ded4e79eb637519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 17:57:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Address minor compiler warnings
+
+    copydir.c:666:44: warning: unsigned conversion from 'int' to '__mode_t' {aka 'unsigned int'} changes value from '-4096' to '4294963200' [-Wsign-conversion]
+      666 |         if (   (mknod (dst, statp->st_mode & ~07777, statp->st_rdev) != 0)
+          |                                            ^
+
+    copydir.c:116:1: warning: missing initializer for field 'quote' of 'struct error_context' [-Wmissing-field-initializers]
+      116 | };
+          | ^
+    In file included from copydir.c:27:
+    /usr/include/attr/error_context.h:30:23: note: 'quote' declared here
+       30 |         const char *(*quote) (struct error_context *, const char *);
+          |                       ^~~~~
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/6cbec2d0aa29d6d25e9eed007ded4e79eb637519
+
+---
+ libmisc/copydir.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/copydir.c b/libmisc/copydir.c
+index 95042187b..e753d7cf0 100644
+--- a/libmisc/copydir.c
++++ b/libmisc/copydir.c
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void error_acl (unused struct error_context *ctx, const char *fmt, ...)
+ }
+ 
+ static struct error_context ctx = {
+-	error_acl
++	error_acl, NULL, NULL
+ };
+ #endif				/* WITH_ACL || WITH_ATTR */
+ 
+@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static int copy_special (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+ 
+-	if (   (mknod (dst, statp->st_mode & ~07777, statp->st_rdev) != 0)
++	if (   (mknod (dst, statp->st_mode & ~07777U, statp->st_rdev) != 0)
+ 	    || (chown_if_needed (dst, statp,
+ 	                         old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
+ #ifdef WITH_ACL

backport-Avoid-races-in-chown_tree.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+From e9ae247cb14f977d8881f481488843b10665dba8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 17:57:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid races in chown_tree()
+
+Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
+redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
+privileged files.
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e9ae247cb14f977d8881f481488843b10665dba8
+
+---
+ libmisc/chowndir.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++----------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/chowndir.c b/libmisc/chowndir.c
+index 0edc3b609..d31618a56 100644
+--- a/libmisc/chowndir.c
++++ b/libmisc/chowndir.c
+@@ -17,45 +17,28 @@
+ #include "defines.h"
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+-/*
+- * chown_tree - change ownership of files in a directory tree
+- *
+- *	chown_dir() walks a directory tree and changes the ownership
+- *	of all files owned by the provided user ID.
+- *
+- *	Only files owned (resp. group-owned) by old_uid (resp. by old_gid)
+- *	will have their ownership (resp. group-ownership) modified, unless
+- *	old_uid (resp. old_gid) is set to -1.
+- *
+- *	new_uid and new_gid can be set to -1 to indicate that no owner or
+- *	group-owner shall be changed.
+- */
+-int chown_tree (const char *root,
++#include <unistd.h>
++
++static int chown_tree_at (int at_fd,
++                const char *path,
+                 uid_t old_uid,
+                 uid_t new_uid,
+                 gid_t old_gid,
+                 gid_t new_gid)
+ {
+-	char *new_name;
+-	size_t new_name_len;
+-	int rc = 0;
+-	struct DIRECT *ent;
+-	struct stat sb;
+ 	DIR *dir;
++	const struct DIRECT *ent;
++	struct stat dir_sb;
++	int dir_fd, rc = 0;
+ 
+-	new_name = malloc (1024);
+-	if (NULL == new_name) {
++	dir_fd = openat (at_fd, path, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (dir_fd < 0) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+-	new_name_len = 1024;
+ 
+-	/*
+-	 * Make certain the directory exists.  This routine is called
+-	 * directly by the invoker, or recursively.
+-	 */
+-
+-	if (access (root, F_OK) != 0) {
+-		free (new_name);
++	dir = fdopendir (dir_fd);
++	if (!dir) {
++		(void) close (dir_fd);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -65,68 +48,34 @@ int chown_tree (const char *root,
+ 	 * recursively.  If not, it is checked to see if an ownership
+ 	 * shall be changed.
+ 	 */
+-
+-	dir = opendir (root);
+-	if (NULL == dir) {
+-		free (new_name);
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-
+ 	while ((ent = readdir (dir))) {
+-		size_t ent_name_len;
+ 		uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
+ 		gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
++		struct stat ent_sb;
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Skip the "." and ".." entries
+ 		 */
+-
+ 		if (   (strcmp (ent->d_name, ".") == 0)
+ 		    || (strcmp (ent->d_name, "..") == 0)) {
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		/*
+-		 * Make the filename for both the source and the
+-		 * destination files.
+-		 */
+-
+-		ent_name_len = strlen (root) + strlen (ent->d_name) + 2;
+-		if (ent_name_len > new_name_len) {
+-			/*@only@*/char *tmp = realloc (new_name, ent_name_len);
+-			if (NULL == tmp) {
+-				rc = -1;
+-				break;
+-			}
+-			new_name = tmp;
+-			new_name_len = ent_name_len;
+-		}
+-
+-		(void) snprintf (new_name, new_name_len, "%s/%s", root, ent->d_name);
+-
+-		/* Don't follow symbolic links! */
+-		if (LSTAT (new_name, &sb) == -1) {
+-			continue;
++		rc = fstatat (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, &ent_sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
++		if (rc < 0) {
++			break;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (S_ISDIR (sb.st_mode) && !S_ISLNK (sb.st_mode)) {
+-
++		if (S_ISDIR (ent_sb.st_mode)) {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Do the entire subdirectory.
+ 			 */
+-
+-			rc = chown_tree (new_name, old_uid, new_uid,
+-			                 old_gid, new_gid);
++			rc = chown_tree_at (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
+ 			if (0 != rc) {
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+-#ifndef HAVE_LCHOWN
+-		/* don't use chown (follows symbolic links!) */
+-		if (S_ISLNK (sb.st_mode)) {
+-			continue;
+-		}
+-#endif
++
+ 		/*
+ 		 * By default, the IDs are not changed (-1).
+ 		 *
+@@ -136,43 +85,62 @@ int chown_tree (const char *root,
+ 		 * If the file is not group-owned by the group, the
+ 		 * group-owner is not changed.
+ 		 */
+-		if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (sb.st_uid == old_uid)) {
++		if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (ent_sb.st_uid == old_uid)) {
+ 			tmpuid = new_uid;
+ 		}
+-		if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (sb.st_gid == old_gid)) {
++		if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (ent_sb.st_gid == old_gid)) {
+ 			tmpgid = new_gid;
+ 		}
+ 		if (((uid_t) -1 != tmpuid) || ((gid_t) -1 != tmpgid)) {
+-			rc = LCHOWN (new_name, tmpuid, tmpgid);
++			rc = fchownat (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, tmpuid, tmpgid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+ 			if (0 != rc) {
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	free (new_name);
+-	(void) closedir (dir);
+-
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Now do the root of the tree
+ 	 */
+-
+-	if ((0 == rc) && (stat (root, &sb) == 0)) {
++	if ((0 == rc) && (fstat (dirfd(dir), &dir_sb) == 0)) {
+ 		uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
+ 		gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
+-		if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (sb.st_uid == old_uid)) {
++		if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (dir_sb.st_uid == old_uid)) {
+ 			tmpuid = new_uid;
+ 		}
+-		if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (sb.st_gid == old_gid)) {
++		if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (dir_sb.st_gid == old_gid)) {
+ 			tmpgid = new_gid;
+ 		}
+ 		if (((uid_t) -1 != tmpuid) || ((gid_t) -1 != tmpgid)) {
+-			rc = LCHOWN (root, tmpuid, tmpgid);
++			rc = fchown (dirfd(dir), tmpuid, tmpgid);
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+ 		rc = -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	(void) closedir (dir);
++
+ 	return rc;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * chown_tree - change ownership of files in a directory tree
++ *
++ *	chown_dir() walks a directory tree and changes the ownership
++ *	of all files owned by the provided user ID.
++ *
++ *	Only files owned (resp. group-owned) by old_uid (resp. by old_gid)
++ *	will have their ownership (resp. group-ownership) modified, unless
++ *	old_uid (resp. old_gid) is set to -1.
++ *
++ *	new_uid and new_gid can be set to -1 to indicate that no owner or
++ *	group-owner shall be changed.
++ */
++int chown_tree (const char *root,
++                uid_t old_uid,
++                uid_t new_uid,
++                gid_t old_gid,
++                gid_t new_gid)
++{
++	return chown_tree_at (AT_FDCWD, root, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
++}

backport-Avoid-races-in-copy_tree.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,657 @@
+From faeab50e710131816b261de66141524898c2c487 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 17:57:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid races in copy_tree()
+
+Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
+redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
+privileged files.
+
+Introduce a path_info struct with the full path and dirfd and name
+information for *at() functions, since the full path is needed for link
+resolution, SELinux label lookup and ACL attributes.
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/faeab50e710131816b261de66141524898c2c487
+
+---
+ libmisc/copydir.c | 330 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 218 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/copydir.c b/libmisc/copydir.c
+index e753d7cf0..5605f6fe0 100644
+--- a/libmisc/copydir.c
++++ b/libmisc/copydir.c
+@@ -47,40 +47,43 @@ struct link_name {
+ };
+ static /*@exposed@*/struct link_name *links;
+ 
+-static int copy_entry (const char *src, const char *dst,
++struct path_info {
++	const char *full_path;
++	int dirfd;
++	const char *name;
++};
++
++static int copy_entry (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                        bool reset_selinux,
+                        uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                        gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+-static int copy_dir (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_dir (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                      bool reset_selinux,
+-                     const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
++                     const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
+                      uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                      gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+ static /*@null@*/char *readlink_malloc (const char *filename);
+-static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_symlink (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                          unused bool reset_selinux,
+-                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
++                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
+                          uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                          gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+-static int copy_hardlink (const char *dst,
++static int copy_hardlink (const struct path_info *dst,
+                           unused bool reset_selinux,
+                           struct link_name *lp);
+-static int copy_special (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_special (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                          bool reset_selinux,
+-                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
++                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
+                          uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                          gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+-static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_file (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                       bool reset_selinux,
+-                      const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
++                      const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
+                       uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                       gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+-static int chown_if_needed (const char *dst, const struct stat *statp,
++static int chownat_if_needed (const struct path_info *dst, const struct stat *statp,
+                             uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                             gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+-static int lchown_if_needed (const char *dst, const struct stat *statp,
+-                             uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+-                             gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+ static int fchown_if_needed (int fdst, const struct stat *statp,
+                              uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                              gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+@@ -116,6 +119,57 @@ static struct error_context ctx = {
+ };
+ #endif				/* WITH_ACL || WITH_ATTR */
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_ACL
++static int perm_copy_path(const struct path_info *src,
++						  const struct path_info *dst,
++						  struct error_context *errctx)
++{
++	int src_fd, dst_fd, ret;
++
++	src_fd = openat(src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (src_fd < 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	dst_fd = openat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (dst_fd < 0) {
++		(void) close (src_fd);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	ret = perm_copy_fd(src->full_path, src_fd, dst->full_path, dst_fd, errctx);
++	(void) close (src_fd);
++	(void) close (dst_fd);
++	return ret;
++}
++#endif				/* WITH_ACL */
++
++#ifdef WITH_ATTR
++static int attr_copy_path(const struct path_info *src,
++						  const struct path_info *dst,
++						  int (*callback) (const char *, struct error_context *),
++						  struct error_context *errctx)
++{
++	int src_fd, dst_fd, ret;
++
++	src_fd = openat(src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (src_fd < 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	dst_fd = openat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (dst_fd < 0) {
++		(void) close (src_fd);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	ret = attr_copy_fd(src->full_path, src_fd, dst->full_path, dst_fd, callback, errctx);
++	(void) close (src_fd);
++	(void) close (dst_fd);
++	return ret;
++}
++#endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
++
+ /*
+  * remove_link - delete a link from the linked list
+  */
+@@ -188,51 +242,36 @@ static /*@exposed@*/ /*@null@*/struct link_name *check_link (const char *name, c
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * copy_tree - copy files in a directory tree
+- *
+- *	copy_tree() walks a directory tree and copies ordinary files
+- *	as it goes.
+- *
+- *	When reset_selinux is enabled, extended attributes (and thus
+- *	SELinux attributes) are not copied.
+- *
+- *	old_uid and new_uid are used to set the ownership of the copied
+- *	files. Unless old_uid is set to -1, only the files owned by
+- *	old_uid have their ownership changed to new_uid. In addition, if
+- *	new_uid is set to -1, no ownership will be changed.
+- *
+- *	The same logic applies for the group-ownership and
+- *	old_gid/new_gid.
+- */
+-int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
++static int copy_tree_impl (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                bool copy_root, bool reset_selinux,
+                uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
+ {
+-	int err = 0;
++	int dst_fd, src_fd, err = 0;
+ 	bool set_orig = false;
+-	struct DIRECT *ent;
++	const struct DIRECT *ent;
+ 	DIR *dir;
+ 
+ 	if (copy_root) {
+ 		struct stat sb;
+-		if (access (dst_root, F_OK) == 0) {
++
++		if (   fstatat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, &sb, 0) == 0
++		    || errno != ENOENT) {
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (lstat (src_root, &sb) == -1) {
++		if (fstatat (src->dirfd, src->name, &sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1) {
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		if (!S_ISDIR (sb.st_mode)) {
+ 			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+ 			         "%s: %s is not a directory",
+-			         Prog, src_root);
++			         Prog, src->full_path);
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		return copy_entry (src_root, dst_root, reset_selinux,
++		return copy_entry (src, dst, reset_selinux,
+ 		                   old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -242,8 +281,14 @@ int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
+ 	 * target is created.  It assumes the target directory exists.
+ 	 */
+ 
+-	if (   (access (src_root, F_OK) != 0)
+-	    || (access (dst_root, F_OK) != 0)) {
++	src_fd = openat (src->dirfd, src->name, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (src_fd < 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	dst_fd = openat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (dst_fd < 0) {
++		(void) close (src_fd);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -254,14 +299,16 @@ int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
+ 	 * regular files (and directories ...) are copied, and no file
+ 	 * is made set-ID.
+ 	 */
+-	dir = opendir (src_root);
++	dir = fdopendir (src_fd);
+ 	if (NULL == dir) {
++		(void) close (src_fd);
++		(void) close (dst_fd);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (src_orig == NULL) {
+-		src_orig = src_root;
+-		dst_orig = dst_root;
++		src_orig = src->full_path;
++		dst_orig = dst->full_path;
+ 		set_orig = true;
+ 	}
+ 	while ((0 == err) && (ent = readdir (dir)) != NULL) {
+@@ -274,8 +321,8 @@ int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
+ 			char *dst_name;
+ 			size_t src_len = strlen (ent->d_name) + 2;
+ 			size_t dst_len = strlen (ent->d_name) + 2;
+-			src_len += strlen (src_root);
+-			dst_len += strlen (dst_root);
++			src_len += strlen (src->full_path);
++			dst_len += strlen (dst->full_path);
+ 
+ 			src_name = (char *) malloc (src_len);
+ 			dst_name = (char *) malloc (dst_len);
+@@ -287,12 +334,22 @@ int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
+ 				 * Build the filename for both the source and
+ 				 * the destination files.
+ 				 */
++				struct path_info src_entry, dst_entry;
++
+ 				(void) snprintf (src_name, src_len, "%s/%s",
+-				                 src_root, ent->d_name);
++				                 src->full_path, ent->d_name);
+ 				(void) snprintf (dst_name, dst_len, "%s/%s",
+-				                 dst_root, ent->d_name);
++				                 dst->full_path, ent->d_name);
++
++				src_entry.full_path = src_name;
++				src_entry.dirfd = dirfd(dir);
++				src_entry.name = ent->d_name;
+ 
+-				err = copy_entry (src_name, dst_name,
++				dst_entry.full_path = dst_name;
++				dst_entry.dirfd = dst_fd;
++				dst_entry.name = ent->d_name;
++
++				err = copy_entry (&src_entry, &dst_entry,
+ 				                  reset_selinux,
+ 				                  old_uid, new_uid,
+ 				                  old_gid, new_gid);
+@@ -306,6 +363,7 @@ int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	(void) closedir (dir);
++	(void) close (dst_fd);
+ 
+ 	if (set_orig) {
+ 		src_orig = NULL;
+@@ -352,7 +410,7 @@ int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
+  *	old_gid) will be modified, unless old_uid (resp. old_gid) is set
+  *	to -1.
+  */
+-static int copy_entry (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_entry (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                        bool reset_selinux,
+                        uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                        gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
+@@ -360,32 +418,32 @@ static int copy_entry (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	int err = 0;
+ 	struct stat sb;
+ 	struct link_name *lp;
+-	struct timeval mt[2];
++	struct timespec mt[2];
+ 
+-	if (lstat (src, &sb) == -1) {
++	if (fstatat(src->dirfd, src->name, &sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1) {
+ 		/* If we cannot stat the file, do not care. */
+ 	} else {
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIM
+ 		mt[0].tv_sec  = sb.st_atim.tv_sec;
+-		mt[0].tv_usec = sb.st_atim.tv_nsec / 1000;
++		mt[0].tv_nsec = sb.st_atim.tv_nsec;
+ #else				/* !HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIM */
+ 		mt[0].tv_sec  = sb.st_atime;
+ # ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIMENSEC
+-		mt[0].tv_usec = sb.st_atimensec / 1000;
++		mt[0].tv_nsec = sb.st_atimensec;
+ # else				/* !HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIMENSEC */
+-		mt[0].tv_usec = 0;
++		mt[0].tv_nsec = 0;
+ # endif				/* !HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIMENSEC */
+ #endif				/* !HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIM */
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
+ 		mt[1].tv_sec  = sb.st_mtim.tv_sec;
+-		mt[1].tv_usec = sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec / 1000;
++		mt[1].tv_nsec = sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec;
+ #else				/* !HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM */
+ 		mt[1].tv_sec  = sb.st_mtime;
+ # ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIMENSEC
+-		mt[1].tv_usec = sb.st_mtimensec / 1000;
++		mt[1].tv_nsec = sb.st_mtimensec;
+ # else				/* !HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIMENSEC */
+-		mt[1].tv_usec = 0;
++		mt[1].tv_nsec = 0;
+ # endif				/* !HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIMENSEC */
+ #endif				/* !HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM */
+ 
+@@ -407,7 +465,7 @@ static int copy_entry (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 		 * See if this is a previously copied link
+ 		 */
+ 
+-		else if ((lp = check_link (src, &sb)) != NULL) {
++		else if ((lp = check_link (src->full_path, &sb)) != NULL) {
+ 			err = copy_hardlink (dst, reset_selinux, lp);
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -446,9 +504,9 @@ static int copy_entry (const char *src, const char *dst,
+  *
+  *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
+  */
+-static int copy_dir (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_dir (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                      bool reset_selinux,
+-                     const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
++                     const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
+                      uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                      gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
+ {
+@@ -460,15 +518,15 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, S_IFDIR) != 0) {
++	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFDIR) != 0) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+-	if (   (mkdir (dst, statp->st_mode) != 0)
+-	    || (chown_if_needed (dst, statp,
++	if (   (mkdirat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode) != 0)
++	    || (chownat_if_needed (dst, statp,
+ 	                         old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
+ #ifdef WITH_ACL
+-	    || (   (perm_copy_file (src, dst, &ctx) != 0)
++	    || (   (perm_copy_path (src, dst, &ctx) != 0)
+ 	        && (errno != 0))
+ #else				/* !WITH_ACL */
+ 	    || (chmod (dst, statp->st_mode) != 0)
+@@ -482,12 +540,12 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	 * additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
+ 	 */
+ 	    || (   !reset_selinux
+-	        && (attr_copy_file (src, dst, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
++	        && (attr_copy_path (src, dst, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
+ 	        && (errno != 0))
+ #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
+-	    || (copy_tree (src, dst, false, reset_selinux,
++	    || (copy_tree_impl (src, dst, false, reset_selinux,
+ 	                   old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
+-	    || (utimes (dst, mt) != 0)) {
++	    || (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)) {
+ 		err = -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -540,9 +598,9 @@ static /*@null@*/char *readlink_malloc (const char *filename)
+  *
+  *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
+  */
+-static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_symlink (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                          unused bool reset_selinux,
+-                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
++                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
+                          uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                          gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
+ {
+@@ -560,7 +618,7 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	 * destination directory name.
+ 	 */
+ 
+-	oldlink = readlink_malloc (src);
++	oldlink = readlink_malloc (src->full_path);
+ 	if (NULL == oldlink) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -580,13 +638,13 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, S_IFLNK) != 0) {
++	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFLNK) != 0) {
+ 		free (oldlink);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+-	if (   (symlink (oldlink, dst) != 0)
+-	    || (lchown_if_needed (dst, statp,
++	if (   (symlinkat (oldlink, dst->dirfd, dst->name) != 0)
++	    || (chownat_if_needed (dst, statp,
+ 	                          old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)) {
+ 		/* FIXME: there are no modes on symlinks, right?
+ 		 *        ACL could be copied, but this would be much more
+@@ -600,14 +658,9 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	}
+ 	free (oldlink);
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_LUTIMES
+-	/* 2007-10-18: We don't care about
+-	 *  exit status of lutimes because
+-	 *  it returns ENOSYS on many system
+-	 *  - not implemented
+-	 */
+-	(void) lutimes (dst, mt);
+-#endif				/* HAVE_LUTIMES */
++	if (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -619,13 +672,13 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
+  *
+  *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
+  */
+-static int copy_hardlink (const char *dst,
++static int copy_hardlink (const struct path_info *dst,
+                           unused bool reset_selinux,
+                           struct link_name *lp)
+ {
+ 	/* FIXME: selinux, ACL, Extended Attributes needed? */
+ 
+-	if (link (lp->ln_name, dst) != 0) {
++	if (linkat (AT_FDCWD, lp->ln_name, dst->dirfd, dst->name, 0) != 0) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -649,28 +702,28 @@ static int copy_hardlink (const char *dst,
+  *
+  *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
+  */
+-static int copy_special (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_special (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                          bool reset_selinux,
+-                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
++                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
+                          uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                          gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
+ {
+ 	int err = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, statp->st_mode & S_IFMT) != 0) {
++	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, statp->st_mode & S_IFMT) != 0) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+ 
+-	if (   (mknod (dst, statp->st_mode & ~07777U, statp->st_rdev) != 0)
+-	    || (chown_if_needed (dst, statp,
++	if (   (mknodat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode & ~07777U, statp->st_rdev) != 0)
++	    || (chownat_if_needed (dst, statp,
+ 	                         old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
+ #ifdef WITH_ACL
+-	    || (   (perm_copy_file (src, dst, &ctx) != 0)
++	    || (   (perm_copy_path (src, dst, &ctx) != 0)
+ 	        && (errno != 0))
+ #else				/* !WITH_ACL */
+-	    || (chmod (dst, statp->st_mode & 07777) != 0)
++	    || (fchmodat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
+ #endif				/* !WITH_ACL */
+ #ifdef WITH_ATTR
+ 	/*
+@@ -681,10 +734,10 @@ static int copy_special (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	 * additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
+ 	 */
+ 	    || (   !reset_selinux
+-	        && (attr_copy_file (src, dst, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
++	        && (attr_copy_path (src, dst, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
+ 	        && (errno != 0))
+ #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
+-	    || (utimes (dst, mt) != 0)) {
++		|| (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)) {
+ 		err = -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -737,9 +790,9 @@ static ssize_t full_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count) {
+  *
+  *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
+  */
+-static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
++static int copy_file (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
+                       bool reset_selinux,
+-                      const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
++                      const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
+                       uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                       gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
+ {
+@@ -747,22 +800,22 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	int ifd;
+ 	int ofd;
+ 
+-	ifd = open (src, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW);
++	ifd = openat (src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
+ 	if (ifd < 0) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, S_IFREG) != 0) {
++	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFREG) != 0) {
+ 		(void) close (ifd);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+-	ofd = open (dst, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, statp->st_mode & 07777);
++	ofd = openat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, statp->st_mode & 07777);
+ 	if (   (ofd < 0)
+ 	    || (fchown_if_needed (ofd, statp,
+ 	                          old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
+ #ifdef WITH_ACL
+-	    || (   (perm_copy_fd (src, ifd, dst, ofd, &ctx) != 0)
++	    || (   (perm_copy_fd (src->full_path, ifd, dst->full_path, ofd, &ctx) != 0)
+ 	        && (errno != 0))
+ #else				/* !WITH_ACL */
+ 	    || (fchmod (ofd, statp->st_mode & 07777) != 0)
+@@ -776,7 +829,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	 * additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
+ 	 */
+ 	    || (   !reset_selinux
+-	        && (attr_copy_fd (src, ifd, dst, ofd, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
++	        && (attr_copy_fd (src->full_path, ifd, dst->full_path, ofd, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
+ 	        && (errno != 0))
+ #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
+ 	   ) {
+@@ -812,23 +865,13 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	(void) close (ifd);
+-
+-#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
+-	if (futimes (ofd, mt) != 0) {
+-		(void) close (ofd);
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-#endif				/* HAVE_FUTIMES */
+-
+ 	if (close (ofd) != 0) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-#ifndef HAVE_FUTIMES
+-	if (utimes(dst, mt) != 0) {
++	if (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+-#endif				/* !HAVE_FUTIMES */
+ 
+ 	return err;
+ }
+@@ -863,7 +906,70 @@ static int chown_function ## _if_needed (type_dst dst,                 \
+ 	return chown_function (dst, tmpuid, tmpgid);                   \
+ }
+ 
+-def_chown_if_needed (chown, const char *)
+-def_chown_if_needed (lchown, const char *)
+ def_chown_if_needed (fchown, int)
+ 
++static int chownat_if_needed (const struct path_info *dst,
++							  const struct stat *statp,
++                              uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
++                              gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
++{
++	uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
++	gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
++
++	/* Use new_uid if old_uid is set to -1 or if the file was
++	 * owned by the user. */
++	if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (statp->st_uid == old_uid)) {
++		tmpuid = new_uid;
++	}
++	/* Otherwise, or if new_uid was set to -1, we keep the same
++	 * owner. */
++	if ((uid_t) -1 == tmpuid) {
++		tmpuid = statp->st_uid;
++	}
++
++	if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (statp->st_gid == old_gid)) {
++		tmpgid = new_gid;
++	}
++	if ((gid_t) -1 == tmpgid) {
++		tmpgid = statp->st_gid;
++	}
++
++	return fchownat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, tmpuid, tmpgid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
++}
++
++/*
++ * copy_tree - copy files in a directory tree
++ *
++ *	copy_tree() walks a directory tree and copies ordinary files
++ *	as it goes.
++ *
++ *	When reset_selinux is enabled, extended attributes (and thus
++ *	SELinux attributes) are not copied.
++ *
++ *	old_uid and new_uid are used to set the ownership of the copied
++ *	files. Unless old_uid is set to -1, only the files owned by
++ *	old_uid have their ownership changed to new_uid. In addition, if
++ *	new_uid is set to -1, no ownership will be changed.
++ *
++ *	The same logic applies for the group-ownership and
++ *	old_gid/new_gid.
++ */
++int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
++               bool copy_root, bool reset_selinux,
++               uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
++               gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
++{
++	const struct path_info src = {
++		.full_path = src_root,
++		.dirfd = AT_FDCWD,
++		.name = src_root
++	};
++	const struct path_info dst = {
++		.full_path = dst_root,
++		.dirfd = AT_FDCWD,
++		.name = dst_root
++	};
++
++	return copy_tree_impl(&src, &dst, copy_root, reset_selinux,
++						  old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
++}

backport-Avoid-races-in-remove_tree.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From f6f8bcd2a57c06983296485cc028ebdf467ebfd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 17:57:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid races in remove_tree()
+
+Use *at() functions to pin the directory operating in to avoid being
+redirected by unprivileged users replacing parts of paths by symlinks to
+privileged files.
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/f6f8bcd2a57c06983296485cc028ebdf467ebfd7
+
+---
+ libmisc/remove_tree.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/remove_tree.c b/libmisc/remove_tree.c
+index 04bc7fc4a..3d76b95e0 100644
+--- a/libmisc/remove_tree.c
++++ b/libmisc/remove_tree.c
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+ 
+ #ident "$Id$"
+ 
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -21,90 +22,80 @@
+ #include "prototypes.h"
+ #include "defines.h"
+ 
+-/*
+- * remove_tree - delete a directory tree
+- *
+- *	remove_tree() walks a directory tree and deletes all the files
+- *	and directories.
+- *	At the end, it deletes the root directory itself.
+- */
+-
+-int remove_tree (const char *root, bool remove_root)
++static int remove_tree_at (int at_fd, const char *path, bool remove_root)
+ {
+-	char *new_name = NULL;
+-	int err = 0;
+-	struct DIRECT *ent;
+-	struct stat sb;
+ 	DIR *dir;
++	const struct DIRECT *ent;
++	int dir_fd, rc = 0;
+ 
+-	/*
+-	 * Open the source directory and read each entry.  Every file
+-	 * entry in the directory is copied with the UID and GID set
+-	 * to the provided values.  As an added security feature only
+-	 * regular files (and directories ...) are copied, and no file
+-	 * is made set-ID.
+-	 */
+-	dir = opendir (root);
+-	if (NULL == dir) {
++	dir_fd = openat (at_fd, path, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (dir_fd < 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	dir = fdopendir (dir_fd);
++	if (!dir) {
++		(void) close (dir_fd);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Open the source directory and delete each entry.
++	 */
+ 	while ((ent = readdir (dir))) {
+-		size_t new_len = strlen (root) + strlen (ent->d_name) + 2;
++		struct stat ent_sb;
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Skip the "." and ".." entries
+ 		 */
+-
+ 		if (strcmp (ent->d_name, ".") == 0 ||
+ 		    strcmp (ent->d_name, "..") == 0) {
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		/*
+-		 * Make the filename for the current entry.
+-		 */
+-
+-		free (new_name);
+-		new_name = (char *) malloc (new_len);
+-		if (NULL == new_name) {
+-			err = -1;
++		rc = fstatat (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, &ent_sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
++		if (rc < 0) {
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+-		(void) snprintf (new_name, new_len, "%s/%s", root, ent->d_name);
+-		if (LSTAT (new_name, &sb) == -1) {
+-			continue;
+-		}
+ 
+-		if (S_ISDIR (sb.st_mode)) {
++		if (S_ISDIR (ent_sb.st_mode)) {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Recursively delete this directory.
+ 			 */
+-			if (remove_tree (new_name, true) != 0) {
+-				err = -1;
++			if (remove_tree_at (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, true) != 0) {
++				rc = -1;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 		} else {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Delete the file.
+ 			 */
+-			if (unlink (new_name) != 0) {
+-				err = -1;
++			if (unlinkat (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, 0) != 0) {
++				rc = -1;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (NULL != new_name) {
+-		free (new_name);
+-	}
++
+ 	(void) closedir (dir);
+ 
+-	if (remove_root && (0 == err)) {
+-		if (rmdir (root) != 0) {
+-			err = -1;
++	if (remove_root && (0 == rc)) {
++		if (unlinkat (at_fd, path, AT_REMOVEDIR) != 0) {
++			rc = -1;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return err;
++	return rc;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * remove_tree - delete a directory tree
++ *
++ *	remove_tree() walks a directory tree and deletes all the files
++ *	and directories.
++ *	At the end, it deletes the root directory itself.
++ */
++int remove_tree (const char *root, bool remove_root)
++{
++	return remove_tree_at (AT_FDCWD, root, remove_root);
++}

backport-CVE-2013-4235.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From b4472167c2f5057d56686d3349a9b55fc508efe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: ed neville <ed@s5h.net>
+Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2021 22:40:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Adding nofollow to opens
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/b4472167c2f5057d56686d3349a9b55fc508efe6
+
+---
+ libmisc/copydir.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/copydir.c b/libmisc/copydir.c
+index f2130bcac..a296d925d 100644
+--- a/libmisc/copydir.c
++++ b/libmisc/copydir.c
+@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	char buf[1024];
+ 	ssize_t cnt;
+ 
+-	ifd = open (src, O_RDONLY);
++	ifd = open (src, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW);
+ 	if (ifd < 0) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+-	ofd = open (dst, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, statp->st_mode & 07777);
++	ofd = open (dst, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_NOFOLLOW, statp->st_mode & 07777);
+ 	if (   (ofd < 0)
+ 	    || (fchown_if_needed (ofd, statp,
+ 	                          old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)

backport-Check-if-crypt_method-null-before-dereferencing.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From b422e3c31691412f0a5404d09f7b328477e23c48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Skyler Ferrante <sjf5462@rit.edu>
+Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 15:00:12 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Check if crypt_method null before dereferencing
+
+Make sure crypto_method set before sha-rounds. Only affects newusers.
+---
+ src/newusers.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/newusers.c b/src/newusers.c
+index ae2224fc..d6b7c3c3 100644
+--- a/src/newusers.c
++++ b/src/newusers.c
+@@ -662,6 +662,13 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		case 's':
+ 			sflg = true;
+                         bad_s = 0;
++
++			if (!crypt_method){
++				fprintf(stderr,
++						_("%s: Provide '--crypt-method'\n"),
++						Prog);
++				usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
++			}
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT)
+ 			if (  (   ((0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA256")) || (0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA512")))
+ 			       && (0 == getlong(optarg, &sha_rounds)))) {
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-Fail-if-regular-file-pre-exists-in-copy_tree.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 1d281273b149f2bb992d893d8ca9ffffddc95cc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 17:57:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fail if regular file pre-exists in copy_tree()
+
+Similar to the default behavior of mkdir(2), symlink(2), link(2) and
+mknod(2).
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/1d281273b149f2bb992d893d8ca9ffffddc95cc8
+
+---
+ libmisc/copydir.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/copydir.c b/libmisc/copydir.c
+index 648f562a1..90895cfb0 100644
+--- a/libmisc/copydir.c
++++ b/libmisc/copydir.c
+@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+-	ofd = open (dst, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_NOFOLLOW, statp->st_mode & 07777);
++	ofd = open (dst, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, statp->st_mode & 07777);
+ 	if (   (ofd < 0)
+ 	    || (fchown_if_needed (ofd, statp,
+ 	                          old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)

backport-Fix-parentheses-in-configure.ac.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 049f9a7f6b320c728a6274299041e360381d7cd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Zaugg <andy.zaugg@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 21:51:10 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix parentheses in configure.ac
+
+Resolving issue https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues/419
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/049f9a7f6b320c728a6274299041e360381d7cd5
+
+---
+ configure.ac | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 994836bda..6cbb6bd27 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ if test "$with_sssd" = "yes"; then
+ 	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for sssd support])])
+ fi
+ 
+-AS_IF([test "$with_su" != "no"], AC_DEFINE(WITH_SU, 1, [Build with su])])
++AS_IF([test "$with_su" != "no"], AC_DEFINE(WITH_SU, 1, [Build with su]))
+ AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SU], [test "x$with_su" != "xno"])
+ 
+ dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for

backport-Fix-yescrypt-support.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 29da702491eea314b915ea9c7a83c9af80cf5797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bernd Kuhls <bernd@kuhls.net>
+Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2023 10:55:03 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix yescrypt support
+ 
+Fixes build error:
+newusers.c: In function 'update_passwd':
+newusers.c:433:21: error: 'sflg' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'rflg'?
+ 
+introduced by
+https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/5cd04d03f94622c12220d4a6352824af081b8531
+which forgot to define sflg for these configure options:
+ 
+--without-sha-crypt --without-bcrypt --with-yescrypt
+ 
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/29da702491eea314b915ea9c7a83c9af80cf5797
+Conflict: NA
+---
+ src/newusers.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ 
+diff --git a/src/newusers.c b/src/newusers.c
+index 7cb8434b..08f79798 100644
+--- a/src/newusers.c
++++ b/src/newusers.c
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static bool rflg = false;	/* create a system account */
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ static /*@null@*//*@observer@*/char *crypt_method = NULL;
+ #define cflg (NULL != crypt_method)
+-#if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_SM3_CRYPT)
++#if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_SM3_CRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ static bool sflg = false;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-Handle-malformed-lines-in-hushlogins-file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 63a96706b1205f91c4a57de21ac56e996d270ff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Fri, 29 Oct 2021 19:44:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Handle malformed lines in hushlogins file.
+
+If a line in hushlogins file, e.g. /etc/hushlogins, starts with
+'\0', then current code performs an out of boundary write.
+If the line lacks a newline at the end, then another character is
+overridden.
+
+With strcspn both cases are solved.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/63a96706b1205f91c4a57de21ac56e996d270ff1
+
+---
+ libmisc/hushed.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/hushed.c b/libmisc/hushed.c
+index b71b99ce2..3c3adafca 100644
+--- a/libmisc/hushed.c
++++ b/libmisc/hushed.c
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ bool hushed (const char *username)
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 	for (found = false; !found && (fgets (buf, (int) sizeof buf, fp) == buf);) {
+-		buf[strlen (buf) - 1] = '\0';
++		buf[strcspn (buf, "\n")] = '\0';
+ 		found = (strcmp (buf, pw->pw_shell) == 0) ||
+ 		        (strcmp (buf, pw->pw_name) == 0);
+ 	}

backport-Improve-child-error-handling.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 624d57c08caceed306212d24c2147f6273f3fc4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2021 12:01:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Improve child error handling
+
+Always set SIGCHLD handler to default, even if the caller of vipw has
+set SIGCHLD to ignore. If SIGCHLD is ignored no zombie processes would
+be created, which in turn could mean that kill is called with an already
+recycled pid.
+
+Proof of Concept:
+
+1. Compile nochld:
+ --
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ int main(void) {
+ char *argv[] = { "vipw", NULL };
+ signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
+ execvp("vipw", argv);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ --
+2. Run nochld
+3. Suspend child vi, which suspends vipw too:
+`kill -STOP childpid`
+4. Kill vi:
+`kill -9 childpid`
+5. You can see with ps that childpid is no zombie but disappeared
+6. Bring vipw back into foreground
+`fg`
+
+The kill call sends SIGCONT to "childpid" which in turn could have been
+already recycled for another process.
+
+This is definitely not a vulnerability. It would take super user
+operations, at which point an attacker would have already elevated
+permissions.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/624d57c08caceed306212d24c2147f6273f3fc4b
+
+---
+ src/vipw.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/vipw.c b/src/vipw.c
+index 94185c3df..1a69ef285 100644
+--- a/src/vipw.c
++++ b/src/vipw.c
+@@ -349,6 +349,9 @@ vipwedit (const char *file, int (*file_lock) (void), int (*file_unlock) (void))
+ 		sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &mask, &omask);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* set SIGCHLD to default for waitpid */
++	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
++
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		pid = waitpid (pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
+ 		if ((pid != -1) && (WIFSTOPPED (status) != 0)) {

backport-More-robust-file-content-copy-in-copy_tree.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From f606314f0c22fb5d13e5af17a70860d57559e808 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 17:57:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] More robust file content copy in copy_tree()
+
+Bail out on read(2) failure, continue on EINTR, support short writes and
+increase chunk size.
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/f606314f0c22fb5d13e5af17a70860d57559e808
+
+---
+ libmisc/copydir.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/copydir.c b/libmisc/copydir.c
+index 90895cfb0..95042187b 100644
+--- a/libmisc/copydir.c
++++ b/libmisc/copydir.c
+@@ -691,6 +691,42 @@ static int copy_special (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * full_write - write entire buffer
++ *
++ * Write up to count bytes from the buffer starting at buf to the
++ * file referred to by the file descriptor fd.
++ * Retry in case of a short write.
++ *
++ * Returns the number of bytes written on success, -1 on error.
++ */
++static ssize_t full_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count) {
++	ssize_t written = 0;
++
++	while (count > 0) {
++		ssize_t res;
++
++		res = write(fd, buf, count);
++		if (res < 0) {
++			if (errno == EINTR) {
++				continue;
++			}
++
++			return res;
++		}
++
++		if (res == 0) {
++			break;
++		}
++
++		written += res;
++		buf = (const unsigned char*)buf + res;
++		count -= (size_t)res;
++	}
++
++	return written;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * copy_file - copy a file
+  *
+@@ -710,8 +746,6 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	int err = 0;
+ 	int ifd;
+ 	int ofd;
+-	char buf[1024];
+-	ssize_t cnt;
+ 
+ 	ifd = open (src, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW);
+ 	if (ifd < 0) {
+@@ -753,8 +787,24 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	while ((cnt = read (ifd, buf, sizeof buf)) > 0) {
+-		if (write (ofd, buf, (size_t)cnt) != cnt) {
++	while (true) {
++		char buf[8192];
++		ssize_t cnt;
++
++		cnt = read (ifd, buf, sizeof buf);
++		if (cnt < 0) {
++			if (errno == EINTR) {
++				continue;
++			}
++			(void) close (ofd);
++			(void) close (ifd);
++			return -1;
++		}
++		if (cnt == 0) {
++			break;
++		}
++
++		if (full_write (ofd, buf, (size_t)cnt) < 0) {
+ 			(void) close (ofd);
+ 			(void) close (ifd);
+ 			return -1;

backport-Only-free-sgent-if-it-was-initialized.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 117bc66c6f95fa85ca75ecfdb8fbd3615deca0b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
+Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 11:04:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Only free sgent if it was initialized
+
+`sgent` is only initialized in `get_group()` if `is_shadowgrp` is true.
+So we should also only attempt to free it if this is actually the case.
+
+Can otherwise lead to:
+```
+free() double free detected in tcache 2 (gpasswd)
+```
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/117bc66c6f95fa85ca75ecfdb8fbd3615deca0b6
+
+---
+ src/gpasswd.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
+index a43d9a590..04bed83d6 100644
+--- a/src/gpasswd.c
++++ b/src/gpasswd.c
+@@ -1207,11 +1207,13 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
+ 
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+-	if (sgent.sg_adm) {
+-		xfree(sgent.sg_adm);
+-	}
+-	if (sgent.sg_mem) {
+-		xfree(sgent.sg_mem);
++	if (is_shadowgrp) {
++		if (sgent.sg_adm) {
++			xfree(sgent.sg_adm);
++		}
++		if (sgent.sg_mem) {
++			xfree(sgent.sg_mem);
++		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 	if (grent.gr_mem) {

backport-Plug-econf-memory-leaks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 8175b1532e4bb1951264e8a6ee5f484137e5306c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 17:25:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Plug econf memory leaks
+
+You can see the memory leaks with address sanitizer if shadow is
+compiled with `--enable-vendordir=/usr/etc`.
+
+How to reproduce:
+
+1. Prepare a custom shell file as root
+```
+mkdir -p /etc/shells.d
+echo /bin/myshell > /etc/shells.d/custom
+```
+
+2. Run chsh as regular user
+```
+chsh
+```
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+---
+ lib/getdef.c | 2 ++
+ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/getdef.c b/lib/getdef.c
+index a2a7e484..763d847a 100644
+--- a/lib/getdef.c
++++ b/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -522,6 +522,8 @@ static void def_load (void)
+ 		 * syslog. The tools will just use their default values.
+ 		 */
+ 		(void)putdef_str (keys[i], value);
++
++		free(value);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	econf_free (keys);
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-Require-symlink-support.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From dab764d0195fc16d1d39330eee8a33e8917826d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 17:57:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Require symlink support
+
+Require lstat(2), lchown(2), S_IFLNK and S_ISLNK from POSIX.1-2001.
+
+Already unconditionally used in lib/tcbfuncs.c and lib/run_part.c.
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/dab764d0195fc16d1d39330eee8a33e8917826d8
+
+---
+ configure.ac      |  2 +-
+ lib/commonio.c    |  2 --
+ lib/defines.h     | 16 ----------------
+ libmisc/copydir.c | 10 ++--------
+ 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index b9a2263bb..7e954c29c 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
+ 
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random_buf l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes getgroups \
+ 	gethostname getentropy getrandom getspnam gettimeofday getusershell \
+-	getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat lutimes memcpy memset \
++	getutent initgroups lckpwdf lutimes memcpy memset \
+ 	setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr getpwnam_r \
+ 	getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r getaddrinfo ruserok \
+ 	dlopen)
+diff --git a/lib/commonio.c b/lib/commonio.c
+index 9e0fde600..80288d644 100644
+--- a/lib/commonio.c
++++ b/lib/commonio.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ int lrename (const char *old, const char *new)
+ 	int res;
+ 	char *r = NULL;
+ 
+-#if defined(S_ISLNK)
+ #ifndef __GLIBC__
+ 	char resolved_path[PATH_MAX];
+ #endif				/* !__GLIBC__ */
+@@ -82,7 +81,6 @@ int lrename (const char *old, const char *new)
+ 			new = r;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-#endif				/* S_ISLNK */
+ 
+ 	res = rename (old, new);
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/defines.h b/lib/defines.h
+index 4a2b90c9e..ee33aa0da 100644
+--- a/lib/defines.h
++++ b/lib/defines.h
+@@ -205,22 +205,6 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ 
+-#ifndef S_ISLNK
+-#define S_ISLNK(x) (0)
+-#endif
+-
+-#if HAVE_LCHOWN
+-#define LCHOWN lchown
+-#else
+-#define LCHOWN chown
+-#endif
+-
+-#if HAVE_LSTAT
+-#define LSTAT lstat
+-#else
+-#define LSTAT stat
+-#endif
+-
+ #if HAVE_TERMIOS_H
+ # include <termios.h>
+ # define STTY(fd, termio) tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, termio)
+diff --git a/libmisc/copydir.c b/libmisc/copydir.c
+index 2929151db..648f562a1 100644
+--- a/libmisc/copydir.c
++++ b/libmisc/copydir.c
+@@ -56,14 +56,12 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, const char *dst,
+                      const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
+                      uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                      gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+-#ifdef	S_IFLNK
+ static /*@null@*/char *readlink_malloc (const char *filename);
+ static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
+                          unused bool reset_selinux,
+                          const struct stat *statp, const struct timeval mt[],
+                          uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
+                          gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
+-#endif				/* S_IFLNK */
+ static int copy_hardlink (const char *dst,
+                           unused bool reset_selinux,
+                           struct link_name *lp);
+@@ -223,7 +221,7 @@ int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (LSTAT (src_root, &sb) == -1) {
++		if (lstat (src_root, &sb) == -1) {
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -364,7 +362,7 @@ static int copy_entry (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	struct link_name *lp;
+ 	struct timeval mt[2];
+ 
+-	if (LSTAT (src, &sb) == -1) {
++	if (lstat (src, &sb) == -1) {
+ 		/* If we cannot stat the file, do not care. */
+ 	} else {
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIM
+@@ -396,7 +394,6 @@ static int copy_entry (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 			                old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
+ 		}
+ 
+-#ifdef	S_IFLNK
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Copy any symbolic links
+ 		 */
+@@ -405,7 +402,6 @@ static int copy_entry (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 			err = copy_symlink (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
+ 			                    old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
+ 		}
+-#endif				/* S_IFLNK */
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * See if this is a previously copied link
+@@ -498,7 +494,6 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+-#ifdef	S_IFLNK
+ /*
+  * readlink_malloc - wrapper for readlink
+  *
+@@ -616,7 +611,6 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+-#endif				/* S_IFLNK */
+ 
+ /*
+  * copy_hardlink - copy a hardlink

backport-chgpasswd-fix-segfault-in-command-line-options.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 53a17c1742a4b5fcf9280fd6dd85fc77588535c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeffrey Bencteux <jeffbencteux@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 15:12:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] chgpasswd: fix segfault in command-line options
+
+Using the --sha-rounds option without first giving a crypt method via the --crypt-method option results in comparisons with a NULL pointer and thus make chgpasswd segfault:
+
+$ chgpasswd -s 1
+zsh: segmentation fault  chgpasswd -s 1
+
+Current patch add a sanity check before these comparisons to ensure there is a defined encryption method.
+---
+ src/chgpasswd.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/chgpasswd.c b/src/chgpasswd.c
+index fe4055d8..7b773e2f 100644
+--- a/src/chgpasswd.c
++++ b/src/chgpasswd.c
+@@ -186,6 +186,13 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		case 's':
+ 			sflg = true;
+                         bad_s = 0;
++
++			if (!crypt_method) {
++				fprintf (stderr,
++				         _("%s: no crypt method defined\n"),
++				         Prog);
++				usage (E_USAGE);
++			}
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT)
+ 			if (  (   ((0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA256")) || (0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA512")))
+ 			       && (0 == getlong(optarg, &sha_rounds)))) {
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-chpasswd-add-IS_CRYPT_METHOD.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From 9cdb5251b6c30487a7d935a1a7827f493249479d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: juyin <zhuyan34@huawei.com>
+Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2022 11:48:51 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] chpasswd: add IS_CRYPT_METHOD
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ 
+Use macro IS_CRYPT_METHOD instead of ’strcmp(crypt_method, xx)==0’ to make the code more cleanup
+ 
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/9cdb5251b6c30487a7d935a1a7827f493249479d
+Conflict: This patch is adapted to SM3.The pre-optimization of the get_salt function is not incorporated. Therefore, the modification related to the get_salt function is not incorporated in this patch.
+---
+ src/chpasswd.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+ 
+diff --git a/src/chpasswd.c b/src/chpasswd.c
+index 3b30c01..cc00180 100644
+--- a/src/chpasswd.c
++++ b/src/chpasswd.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
+ /*@-exitarg@*/
+ #include "exitcodes.h"
+ 
++#define IS_CRYPT_METHOD(str) ((crypt_method != NULL && strcmp(crypt_method, str) == 0) ? true : false)
++
+ /*
+  * Global variables
+  */
+@@ -208,26 +210,26 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			sflg = true;
+                         bad_s = 0;
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT)
+-			if (  (   ((0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA256")) || (0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA512")))
+-			       && (0 == getlong(optarg, &sha_rounds)))) {
++			if ((IS_CRYPT_METHOD("SHA256") || IS_CRYPT_METHOD("SHA512"))
++			    && (0 == getlong(optarg, &sha_rounds))) {                            
+                             bad_s = 1;
+                         }
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
+ #if defined(USE_BCRYPT)
+-                        if ((   (0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "BCRYPT"))
+-			       && (0 == getlong(optarg, &bcrypt_rounds)))) {
++                        if (IS_CRYPT_METHOD("BCRYPT")
++			    && (0 == getlong(optarg, &bcrypt_rounds))) {
+                             bad_s = 1;
+                         }
+ #endif				/* USE_BCRYPT */
+ #if defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+-                        if ((   (0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "YESCRYPT"))
+-			       && (0 == getlong(optarg, &yescrypt_cost)))) {
++                        if (IS_CRYPT_METHOD("YESCRYPT")
++			    && (0 == getlong(optarg, &yescrypt_cost))) {
+                             bad_s = 1;
+                         }
+ #endif				/* USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #if defined(USE_SM3_CRYPT)
+-                        if ((   (0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SM3"))
+-			       && (0 == getlong(optarg, &sm3_rounds)))) {
++                        if (IS_CRYPT_METHOD("SM3")
++			    && (0 == getlong(optarg, &sm3_rounds))) {
+                             bad_s = 1;
+                         }
+ #endif				/* USE_SM3_CRYPT */
+@@ -275,21 +277,21 @@ static void check_flags (void)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (cflg) {
+-		if (   (0 != strcmp (crypt_method, "DES"))
+-		    && (0 != strcmp (crypt_method, "MD5"))
+-		    && (0 != strcmp (crypt_method, "NONE"))
++		if ((!IS_CRYPT_METHOD("DES"))
++		    &&(!IS_CRYPT_METHOD("MD5"))
++		    &&(!IS_CRYPT_METHOD("NONE"))
+ #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
+-		    && (0 != strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA256"))
+-		    && (0 != strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA512"))
++		    &&(!IS_CRYPT_METHOD("SHA256"))
++		    &&(!IS_CRYPT_METHOD("SHA512"))
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
+ #ifdef USE_SM3_CRYPT
+-		    && (0 != strcmp (crypt_method, "SM3"))
++		    &&(!IS_CRYPT_METHOD("SM3"))
+ #endif				/* USE_SM3_CRYPT */
+ #ifdef USE_BCRYPT
+-		    && (0 != strcmp (crypt_method, "BCRYPT"))
++		    &&(!IS_CRYPT_METHOD("BCRYPT"))
+ #endif				/* USE_BCRYPT */
+ #ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
+-		    && (0 != strcmp (crypt_method, "YESCRYPT"))
++		    &&(!IS_CRYPT_METHOD("YESCRYPT"))
+ #endif				/* USE_YESCRYPT */
+ 		    ) {
+ 			fprintf (stderr,
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-chsh-Verify-that-login-shell-path-is-absolute.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 7321ceaf69a7028a04056e548d861b291634c2d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 11:58:19 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] chsh: Verify that login shell path is absolute
+
+The getusershell implementation of musl returns every line within the
+/etc/shells file, which even includes comments. Only consider absolute
+paths for login shells.
+
+Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
+---
+ src/chsh.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/chsh.c b/src/chsh.c
+index 639ff630..d6eca6e3 100644
+--- a/src/chsh.c
++++ b/src/chsh.c
+@@ -574,7 +574,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		fail_exit (1);
+ 	}
+ 	if (   !amroot
+-	    && (   is_restricted_shell (loginsh)
++	    && (   loginsh[0] != '/'
++	        || is_restricted_shell (loginsh)
+ 	        || (access (loginsh, X_OK) != 0))) {
+ 		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s is an invalid shell\n"), Prog, loginsh);
+ 		fail_exit (1);
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-def_load-avoid-NULL-deref.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 419cf1f1c4721829c4d68c9e5fee112a5da5890f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Date: Fri, 19 May 2023 14:49:04 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] def_load: avoid NULL deref
+
+If econf_getStringValue() fails, it will return an error and
+set value to NULL.  Look for the error and avoid dereferencing
+value in that case.
+
+Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+---
+ lib/getdef.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/getdef.c b/lib/getdef.c
+index 39cd62d5..8075821b 100644
+--- a/lib/getdef.c
++++ b/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -505,7 +505,12 @@ static void def_load (void)
+ 	for (size_t i = 0; i < key_number; i++) {
+ 		char *value;
+ 
+-		econf_getStringValue(defs_file, NULL, keys[i], &value);
++		error = econf_getStringValue(defs_file, NULL, keys[i], &value);
++		if (error) {
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "failed reading key %zu from econf [%s]",
++				i, econf_errString(error)));
++			exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++		}
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Store the value in def_table.
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+From 65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
+
+How to trigger this password leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
+for confirming the new password).  Each of those 2 password prompts
+uses agetpass() to get the password.  If the second agetpass() fails,
+the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
+'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
+
+agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
+can fail for any of the following reasons:
+
+-  malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
+
+   These are going to be difficult to trigger.  Maybe getting the system
+   to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
+   next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
+   About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
+   ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
+   but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
+   files.
+
+-  The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
+
+   The is plausible with physical access.  However, at that point, a
+   keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
+
+And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
+introduced, which is not going to be easy.
+
+How to read the password after the leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
+password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
+be doable.  Try to find some consistent patterns.
+
+Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
+leaks their password.
+
+Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
+searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
+password.
+
+On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
+> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
+> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
+>
+> -  brk / sbrk
+> -  mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
+> -  mmap /dev/zero
+> -  mmap some other file
+> -  shm_open
+> -  shmget
+>
+> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process.  Using mmap of an
+> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
+> into the memory space on the first use.
+>
+> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
+> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED.  This is rare.
+>
+> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
+> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
+> process.  It isn't leftover from other processes.
+>
+> The avenues available for reading the memory:
+> -  /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
+> -  /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> -  ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> -  causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
+>
+> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
+
+How to fix it?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
+alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
+make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
+allowed to impede this zeroing.
+
+This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
+the string somewhere hidden in the stack.  Those copies won't get zeroed
+by explicit_bzero(3).  However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
+compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
+that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3).  But we all know that
+sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
+this is plausible.  Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
+issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
+text.
+
+Security concerns
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We believe this isn't easy to exploit.  Nevertheless, and since the fix
+is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
+all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
+imagination than us to find a way.
+
+Affected versions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+All.  Bug introduced in shadow 19990709.  That's the second commit in
+the git history.
+
+Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
+Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
+Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
+Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
+Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
+Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+---
+ src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
+index 609fe0a4..3b76ff8e 100644
+--- a/src/gpasswd.c
++++ b/src/gpasswd.c
+@@ -898,6 +898,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
+		strzero (cp);
+ 		cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
+ 		if (NULL == cp) {
++			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ 			exit (1);
+ 		}
+ 
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-lib-btrfs-avoid-NULL-dereference.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 54ab542887994f8b6e5411469d6867e3a2e58800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 21:03:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib/btrfs: avoid NULL-dereference
+
+    btrfs.c:42:13: warning: use of NULL 'cmd' where non-null expected [CWE-476] [-Wanalyzer-null-argument]
+
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/54ab542887994f8b6e5411469d6867e3a2e58800
+
+---
+ libmisc/btrfs.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/btrfs.c b/libmisc/btrfs.c
+index a2563f7c3..03915981c 100644
+--- a/libmisc/btrfs.c
++++ b/libmisc/btrfs.c
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd(const char *subcmd, const char *arg1, const c
+ 		NULL
+ 	};
+ 
+-	if (access(cmd, X_OK)) {
++	if (!cmd || access(cmd, X_OK)) {
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 

backport-lib-check-NULL-before-freeing-passwd-data.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From d594243fbbdabc73fdee50886f6dd11867b5cfab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 16:48:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: check NULL before freeing passwd data
+
+Add an additional NULL check condition in spw_free() and pw_free() to
+avoid freeing an already empty pointer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/d594243fbbdabc73fdee50886f6dd11867b5cfab
+
+---
+ lib/pwmem.c     | 18 ++++++++++--------
+ lib/shadowmem.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/pwmem.c b/lib/pwmem.c
+index 17d2eb219..9f184d5e1 100644
+--- a/lib/pwmem.c
++++ b/lib/pwmem.c
+@@ -93,14 +93,16 @@
+ 
+ void pw_free (/*@out@*/ /*@only@*/struct passwd *pwent)
+ {
+-	free (pwent->pw_name);
+-	if (pwent->pw_passwd) {
+-		memzero (pwent->pw_passwd, strlen (pwent->pw_passwd));
+-		free (pwent->pw_passwd);
++	if (pwent != NULL) {
++		free (pwent->pw_name);
++		if (pwent->pw_passwd) {
++			memzero (pwent->pw_passwd, strlen (pwent->pw_passwd));
++			free (pwent->pw_passwd);
++		}
++		free (pwent->pw_gecos);
++		free (pwent->pw_dir);
++		free (pwent->pw_shell);
++		free (pwent);
+ 	}
+-	free (pwent->pw_gecos);
+-	free (pwent->pw_dir);
+-	free (pwent->pw_shell);
+-	free (pwent);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/shadowmem.c b/lib/shadowmem.c
+index 8989598f8..1d047cc04 100644
+--- a/lib/shadowmem.c
++++ b/lib/shadowmem.c
+@@ -79,11 +79,13 @@
+ 
+ void spw_free (/*@out@*/ /*@only@*/struct spwd *spent)
+ {
+-	free (spent->sp_namp);
+-	if (NULL != spent->sp_pwdp) {
+-		memzero (spent->sp_pwdp, strlen (spent->sp_pwdp));
+-		free (spent->sp_pwdp);
++	if (spent != NULL) {
++		free (spent->sp_namp);
++		if (NULL != spent->sp_pwdp) {
++			memzero (spent->sp_pwdp, strlen (spent->sp_pwdp));
++			free (spent->sp_pwdp);
++		}
++		free (spent);
+ 	}
+-	free (spent);
+ }
+ 

backport-libmisc-minimum-id-check-for-system-accounts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From d324c6776b3a1d4ac22bced543f72dc5dd366927 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 11:21:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] libmisc: minimum id check for system accounts
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The minimum id allocation for system accounts shouldn't be 0 as this is
+reserved for root.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tomáš Mráz <tm@t8m.info>
+Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/d324c6776b3a1d4ac22bced543f72dc5dd366927
+
+---
+ libmisc/find_new_gid.c | 7 +++++++
+ libmisc/find_new_uid.c | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_gid.c b/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
+index 666b61078..65ab5d013 100644
+--- a/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
++++ b/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_group, gid_t *min_id, gid_t *max_id,
+                             (unsigned long) *max_id);
+ 			return EINVAL;
+ 		}
++		/*
++		 * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
++		 * work right with it.
++		 */
++		if (*min_id == 0) {
++			*min_id = (gid_t) 1;
++		}
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Non-system groups */
+ 
+diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_uid.c b/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
+index 322d15ab7..5f7e74b53 100644
+--- a/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
++++ b/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_user, uid_t *min_id, uid_t *max_id,
+                             (unsigned long) *max_id);
+ 			return EINVAL;
+ 		}
++		/*
++		 * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
++		 * work right with it.
++		 */
++		if (*min_id == 0) {
++			*min_id = (uid_t) 1;
++		}
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Non-system users */
+ 

backport-man-po-Makefile.in-switch-from-xml2po-to-itstool.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 02b200c9aa501ad4e1651c553cea1aaf9e5e0f4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Date: Sat, 14 Aug 2021 14:24:03 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] man/po/Makefile.in: switch from xml2po to itstool
+
+xml2po is deprecated.  We've previously replaced xml2po with
+itstool in man/generate_translations.mak, but there was still
+an instance of it that only is exercised for 'make dist'.
+Update that one.  Now 'make dist' succeeds on a ubuntu focal
+or newer host where xml2po is not available.
+
+Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/02b200c9aa501ad4e1651c553cea1aaf9e5e0f4f
+
+---
+ man/po/Makefile.in | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/po/Makefile.in b/man/po/Makefile.in
+index deaa87058..f194957b4 100644
+--- a/man/po/Makefile.in
++++ b/man/po/Makefile.in
+@@ -90,9 +90,17 @@ $(DOMAIN).pot-update: $(XMLFILES) $(srcdir)/XMLFILES remove-potcdate.sed
+ 	@set -e; tmpdir=`pwd`; \
+ 	echo "cd $(top_srcdir)/man"; \
+ 	cd $(top_srcdir)/man; \
+-	echo "xml2po --expand-all-entities -o $$tmpdir/$(DOMAIN).po $(notdir $(XMLFILES))"; \
+-	xml2po --expand-all-entities -o $$tmpdir/$(DOMAIN).po $(notdir $(XMLFILES)); \
+-	cd $$tmpdir
++	files=""; \
++	for file in $(notdir $(XMLFILES)); do \
++		if grep -q SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE $$file ; then \
++			sed -e 's/^<!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->/<!ENTITY % config SYSTEM "config.xml">%config;/' $$file > $$file.out; \
++		else \
++			sed -e 's/^\(<!DOCTYPE .*docbookx.dtd"\)>/\1 [<!ENTITY % config SYSTEM "config.xml">%config;]>/' $$file > $$file.out; \
++		fi; \
++		files="$$files $$file.out"; \
++	done; \
++	itstool -d -o $$tmpdir/$(DOMAIN).po $$files; \
++	cd $$tmpdir; \
+ 	test ! -f $(DOMAIN).po || { \
+ 	  if test -f $(srcdir)/$(DOMAIN).pot; then \
+ 	    sed -f remove-potcdate.sed < $(srcdir)/$(DOMAIN).pot > $(DOMAIN).1po && \

backport-newgrp-fix-potential-string-injection.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 9df4801e0b65073cc8a9031b22a73532ef7fdc2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 14:55:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] newgrp: fix potential string injection
+ 
+Since newgrp is setuid-root, any write() system calls it does in order
+to print error messages will be done as the root user.
+ 
+Unprivileged users can get newgrp to print essentially arbitrary strings
+to any open file in this way by passing those strings as argv[0] when
+calling execve(). For example:
+ 
+    $ setpid() { (exec -a $1$'\n:' newgrp '' 2>/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid & wait) >/dev/null; }
+    $ setpid 31000
+    $ readlink /proc/self
+    31001
+ 
+This is not a vulnerability in newgrp; it is a bug in the Linux kernel.
+ 
+However, this type of bug is not new [1] and it makes sense to try to
+mitigate these types of bugs in userspace where possible.
+ 
+[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/476947/
+ 
+Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
+ 
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/9df4801e0b65073cc8a9031b22a73532ef7fdc2c
+Conflict: NA
+---
+ src/newgrp.c | 13 ++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ 
+diff --git a/src/newgrp.c b/src/newgrp.c
+index babb28e9..f786a96f 100644
+--- a/src/newgrp.c
++++ b/src/newgrp.c
+@@ -417,10 +417,17 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	 * but we do not need to restore the previous process persona and we
+ 	 * don't need to re-exec anything.  -- JWP
+ 	 */
+-	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
++
++	/*
++	 * Ensure that "Prog" is always either "newgrp" or "sg" to avoid
++	 * injecting arbitrary strings into our stderr/stdout, as this can
++	 * be an exploit vector.
++	 */
++	is_newgrp = (strcmp (Basename (argv[0]), "newgrp") == 0);
++	Prog = is_newgrp ? "newgrp" : "sg";
++
+ 	shadow_logfd = stderr;
+-	is_newgrp = (strcmp (Prog, "newgrp") == 0);
+-	OPENLOG (is_newgrp ? "newgrp" : "sg");
++	OPENLOG (Prog);
+ 	argc--;
+ 	argv++;
+ 
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-process_prefix_flag-Drop-privileges.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 812f934e77700afedbf5e929b282f29a47b2d9c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 11:56:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] process_prefix_flag: Drop privileges
+
+Using --prefix in a setuid binary is quite dangerous. An unprivileged
+user could prepare a custom shadow file in home directory. During a data
+race the user could exchange directories with links which could lead to
+exchange of shadow file in system's /etc directory.
+
+This could be used for local privilege escalation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
+---
+ libmisc/prefix_flag.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/prefix_flag.c b/libmisc/prefix_flag.c
+index 56243f2e..d7acb9ca 100644
+--- a/libmisc/prefix_flag.c
++++ b/libmisc/prefix_flag.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,15 @@ extern const char* process_prefix_flag (const char* short_opt, int argc, char **
+ 
+ 
+ 	if (prefix != NULL) {
++		/* Drop privileges */
++		if (   (setregid (getgid (), getgid ()) != 0)
++		    || (setreuid (getuid (), getuid ()) != 0)) {
++			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
++			         _("%s: failed to drop privileges (%s)\n"),
++			         Prog, strerror (errno));
++			exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++		}
++
+ 		if ( prefix[0] == '\0' || !strcmp(prefix, "/"))
+ 			return ""; /* if prefix is "/" then we ignore the flag option */
+ 		/* should we prevent symbolic link from being used as a prefix? */
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-run_parts-for-groupadd-and-groupdel.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 4e1f674c41724dd96ad2c3a0c02ac9f6666697ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: ed neville <ed@s5h.net>
+Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2023 20:23:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run_parts for groupadd and groupdel
+
+run_parts currently exists in useradd and userdel, this commit mirrors
+the functionality with groupadd and groupdel
+
+Hook for group{add,del} to include killing processes that have group
+membership that would no longer exist to avoid membership ID reuse.
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/4e1f674c41724dd96ad2c3a0c02ac9f6666697ba
+
+---
+ .../groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh     | 26 +++++++++++++++++++
+ src/groupadd.c                                | 11 ++++++++
+ src/groupdel.c                                | 11 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh
+
+diff --git a/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh b/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..10db52794
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
++GROUPID=`awk -F: '$1 == "'"${SUBJECT}"'" { print $3 }' /etc/group`
++
++if [ "${GROUPID}" = "" ]; then
++    exit 0
++fi
++
++for status in /proc/*/status; do
++    # either this isn't a process or its already dead since expanding the list
++    [ -f "$status" ] || continue
++
++    tbuf=${status%/status}
++    pid=${tbuf#/proc/}
++    case "$pid" in
++        "$$") continue;;
++        [0-9]*) :;;
++        *) continue
++    esac
++    
++    grep -q '^Groups:.*\b'"${GROUPID}"'\b.*' "/proc/$pid/status" || continue
++
++    kill -9 "$pid" || echo "cannot kill $pid" 1>&2
++done
++
+diff --git a/src/groupadd.c b/src/groupadd.c
+index 311421014..2eda1c680 100644
+--- a/src/groupadd.c
++++ b/src/groupadd.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
+ #include "sgroupio.h"
+ #endif
++#include "run_part.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * exit status values
+@@ -603,6 +604,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	check_perms ();
+ 
++	if (run_parts ("/etc/shadow-maint/groupadd-pre.d", group_name,
++			"groupadd")) {
++		exit(1);
++	}
++
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ 	is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
+ #endif
+@@ -621,6 +627,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	grp_update ();
+ 	close_files ();
++	if (run_parts ("/etc/shadow-maint/groupadd-post.d", group_name,
++			"groupadd")) {
++		exit(1);
++	}
++
+ 
+ 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
+ 	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
+diff --git a/src/groupdel.c b/src/groupdel.c
+index fdccf5e15..bae4367ba 100644
+--- a/src/groupdel.c
++++ b/src/groupdel.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
+ #include "sgroupio.h"
+ #endif
++#include "run_part.h"
+ /*
+  * Global variables
+  */
+@@ -461,6 +462,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		group_busy (group_id);
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (run_parts ("/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d", group_name,
++			"groupdel")) {
++		exit(1);
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Do the hard stuff - open the files, delete the group entries,
+ 	 * then close and update the files.
+@@ -471,6 +477,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	close_files ();
+ 
++	if (run_parts ("/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-post.d", group_name,
++			"groupdel")) {
++		exit(1);
++	}
++
+ 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
+ 	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
+ 

backport-script-to-kill-subjects-processes-from-userdel.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From dcca8653a54b5a03b0234238dbc6388f6b59adc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: ed neville <ed@s5h.net>
+Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 14:29:48 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] script to kill subjects processes from userdel
+ 
+Closes #404
+Closes #317
+ 
+Signed-off-by: ed neville <ed@s5h.net>
+ 
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/dcca8653a54b5a03b0234238dbc6388f6b59adc3
+---
+ .../userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh       | 28 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100755 etc/shadow-maint/userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh
+ 
+diff --git a/etc/shadow-maint/userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh b/etc/shadow-maint/userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..ca481b1b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/etc/shadow-maint/userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
++
++# Check user exists, and if so, send sigkill to processes that the user owns
++
++RUNNING=`ps -eo user | grep -Fx "$SUBJECT" | wc -l`
++
++# if the user does not exist, RUNNING will be 0
++
++if [ "${RUNNING}x" = "0x" ]; then
++  exit 0
++fi
++
++ls -1 /proc | while IFS= read -r PROC; do
++  echo "$PROC" | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' >/dev/null
++  if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
++    continue
++  fi
++  if [ -d "/proc/${PROC}" ]; then
++    USR=`stat -c "%U" /proc/${PROC}`
++    if [ "${USR}" = "${SUBJECT}" ]; then
++      echo "Killing ${SUBJECT} owned ${PROC}"
++      kill -9 "${PROC}"
++    fi
++  fi
++done
++
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-shadow-userdel-add-the-adaptation-to-the-busybox-ps-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 7bced397c9fd66965753e5fc0fd3dfa535ca1c9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: xiongshenglan <xiongshenglan@huawei.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 15:13:06 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] shadow userdel: add the adaptation to the busybox ps in
+ 01-kill_user_procs.sh
+ 
+In some embedded systems, users only use the ps
+provided by the busybox. But the ps provided by
+the busybox does not support the -eo option by
+default. As a result, an error is reported when
+the userdel is used. So add a judgment on ps.
+If there is no ps -eo, traverse the process directly.
+ 
+The error information is as follows:
+ # userdel xsl
+ps: invalid option -- 'e'
+ 
+Signed-off-by: xiongshenglan <xiongshenglan@huawei.com>
+ 
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/7bced397c9fd66965753e5fc0fd3dfa535ca1c9b
+Conflict: NA
+---
+ .../userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh           | 15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+ 
+diff --git a/etc/shadow-maint/userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh b/etc/shadow-maint/userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh
+index ca481b1b..d2d7ef26 100755
+--- a/etc/shadow-maint/userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh
++++ b/etc/shadow-maint/userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh
+@@ -4,14 +4,17 @@ PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
+ 
+ # Check user exists, and if so, send sigkill to processes that the user owns
+ 
+-RUNNING=`ps -eo user | grep -Fx "$SUBJECT" | wc -l`
+-
+-# if the user does not exist, RUNNING will be 0
+-
+-if [ "${RUNNING}x" = "0x" ]; then
+-  exit 0
++ps -eo user >/dev/null 2>&1
++if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
++    RUNNING=`ps -eo user | grep -Fx "$SUBJECT" | wc -l`
++    # if the user does not exist, RUNNING will be 0
++    if [ "${RUNNING}x" = "0x" ]; then
++        exit 0
++    fi
+ fi
+ 
++# If there is no ps -eo, traverse the process directly.
++
+ ls -1 /proc | while IFS= read -r PROC; do
+   echo "$PROC" | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' >/dev/null
+   if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-src-passwd-add-overflow-check.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 2d188a9987789f019dae2d46c50578a474ab2bdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 20:48:54 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] src/passwd.c: Add overflow check
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Link: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/876>
+Co-developed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/2d188a9987789f019dae2d46c50578a474ab2bdd
+Conflict: NA
+---
+ src/passwd.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/passwd.c b/src/passwd.c
+index a24e62dfd..f494a9257 100644
+--- a/src/passwd.c
++++ b/src/passwd.c
+@@ -387,8 +387,9 @@ static void check_password (const struct passwd *pw, const struct spwd *sp)
+ 		long now, ok;
+ 		now = time(NULL) / DAY;
+ 		ok = sp->sp_lstchg;
+-		if (sp->sp_min > 0) {
+-			ok += sp->sp_min;
++		if (   (sp->sp_min > 0)
++		    && __builtin_add_overflow(ok, sp->sp_min, &ok)) {
++			ok = LONG_MAX;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		if (now < ok) {

backport-src-passwd.c-Switch-to-day-precision.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 3b5ba41d3e9dfc3bf058f0f31529c08201265241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 11:54:00 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] src/passwd.c: Switch to day precision
+
+The size of time_t varies across systems, but since data type long is
+more than enough to calculate with days (precision of shadow file),
+use it instead.
+
+Just in case a shadow file contains huge values, check for a possible
+signed integer overflow.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Link: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/876>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/3b5ba41d3e9dfc3bf058f0f31529c08201265241
+Conflict: src/chpasswd.c
+---
+ src/passwd.c | 10 ++++------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/passwd.c b/src/passwd.c
+index 336bbc9..d79767a 100644
+--- a/src/passwd.c
++++ b/src/passwd.c
+@@ -390,7 +390,6 @@ static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw)
+  */
+ static void check_password (const struct passwd *pw, const struct spwd *sp)
+ {
+-	time_t now;
+ 	int exp_status;
+ 
+ 	exp_status = isexpired (pw, sp);
+@@ -410,8 +409,6 @@ static void check_password (const struct passwd *pw, const struct spwd *sp)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	(void) time (&now);
+-
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Expired accounts cannot be changed ever. Passwords which are
+ 	 * locked may not be changed. Passwords where min > max may not be
+@@ -434,10 +431,11 @@ static void check_password (const struct passwd *pw, const struct spwd *sp)
+ 	 * Passwords may only be changed after sp_min time is up.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (sp->sp_lstchg > 0) {
+-		time_t ok;
+-		ok = (time_t) sp->sp_lstchg * SCALE;
++		long now, ok;
++		now = time(NULL) / DAY;
++		ok = sp->sp_lstchg;
+ 		if (sp->sp_min > 0) {
+-			ok += (time_t) sp->sp_min * SCALE;
++			ok += sp->sp_min;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		if (now < ok) {
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

backport-useradd-check-MLS-enablement-before-setting-serange.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 23634d8de7d01ed65bd70e316d4da4fe4d9b370d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: genBTC <genBTC@gmx.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 10:25:51 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] useradd: check MLS enablement before setting serange
+ Resolves: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues/552
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/23634d8de7d01ed65bd70e316d4da4fe4d9b370d
+
+---
+ lib/semanage.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/semanage.c b/lib/semanage.c
+index 54f996238..082a6e8ee 100644
+--- a/lib/semanage.c
++++ b/lib/semanage.c
+@@ -122,12 +122,14 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_handle_t *handle,
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
+-	if (ret != 0) {
+-		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+-		         _("Could not set serange for %s\n"), login_name);
+-		ret = 1;
+-		goto done;
++	if (semanage_mls_enabled(handle)) {
++		ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
++		if (ret != 0) {
++			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
++			         _("Could not set serange for %s\n"), login_name);
++			ret = 1;
++			goto done;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
+@@ -179,13 +181,14 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_handle_t *handle,
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
+-	if (ret != 0) {
+-		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+-		         _("Could not set serange for %s\n"),
+-		         login_name);
+-		ret = 1;
+-		goto done;
++	if (semanage_mls_enabled(handle)) {
++		ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
++		if (ret != 0) {
++			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
++			         _("Could not set serange for %s\n"), login_name);
++			ret = 1;
++			goto done;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);

backport-useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists-for-user.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From e0524e813a3bae2891b33a66f35876841c11cee7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 10:46:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] useradd: check if subid range exists for user
+
+Check if a user already has a subid range before assigning one.
+
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2012929
+
+Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+
+Conflict: NA
+Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/f6f8bcd2a57c06983296485cc028ebdf467ebfd7
+
+---
+ src/useradd.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
+index 7ea0a9c4d..e784d6029 100644
+--- a/src/useradd.c
++++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -2188,14 +2188,14 @@ static void usr_update (unsigned long subuid_count, unsigned long subgid_count)
+ 		fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ 	}
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+-	if (is_sub_uid &&
++	if (is_sub_uid && !local_sub_uid_assigned(user_name) &&
+ 	    (sub_uid_add(user_name, sub_uid_start, subuid_count) == 0)) {
+ 		fprintf (stderr,
+ 		         _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),
+ 		         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ 		fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ 	}
+-	if (is_sub_gid &&
++	if (is_sub_gid && !local_sub_gid_assigned(user_name) &&
+ 	    (sub_gid_add(user_name, sub_gid_start, subgid_count) == 0)) {
+ 		fprintf (stderr,
+ 		         _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),

backport-usermod-fix-off-by-one-issues.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 7a2b302e68a4f3e324b851c7361e40aa20a86a64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 16:18:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] usermod: fix off-by-one issues
+
+Allocate enough memory for the strings, two slashes and the NUL
+terminator.
+
+Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+---
+ src/usermod.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/usermod.c b/src/usermod.c
+index 77d4ef49..db5d37a4 100644
+--- a/src/usermod.c
++++ b/src/usermod.c
+@@ -2048,7 +2048,7 @@ static void move_mailbox (void)
+ 	if (NULL == maildir) {
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	len = strlen (prefix) + strlen (maildir) + strlen (user_name) + 2;
++	len = strlen (prefix) + strlen (maildir) + strlen (user_name) + 3;
+	mailfile = alloca (len);
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -2103,7 +2103,7 @@ static void move_mailbox (void)
+ 	(void) close (fd);
+ 
+ 	if (lflg) {
+-		len = strlen (prefix) + strlen (maildir) + strlen (user_newname) + 2;
++		len = strlen (prefix) + strlen (maildir) + strlen (user_newname) + 3;
+ 		newmailfile = alloca(len);
+ 		if (prefix[0]) {
+ 			(void) snprintf (newmailfile, len, "%s/%s/%s",
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

chpasswd.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# chpasswd(8) completion                  -*- shell-script -*-
+
+_chpasswd()
+{
+    local cur prev words cword split
+    _init_completion -s || return
+
+    case $prev in
+        -c|--crypt)
+            COMPREPLY=( $( compgen -W 'DES MD5 NONE SHA256 SHA512 SM3' \
+                -- "$cur" ) )
+            return
+            ;;
+        -s|--sha-rounds)
+            return
+            ;;
+    esac
+
+    $split && return
+
+    COMPREPLY=( $( compgen -W '$( _parse_help "$1" )' -- "$cur" ) )
+    [[ $COMPREPLY == *= ]] && compopt -o nospace
+} &&
+complete -F _chpasswd chpasswd
+
+# ex: filetype=sh

shadow-Remove-encrypted-passwd-for-useradd-gr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+From 280a8474ad87f44f9620eeac75cbf8a34b5edc2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: xiongshenglan <xiongshenglan@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2023 09:30:16 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] shadow: Remove encrypted passwd for
+ useradd-groupadd-groupmod-usermod
+
+Remove encrypted passwd for useradd/groupadd/groupmod/usermod
+In groupadd/useradd, p parameter does not meet password complexity checks. Do
+not satisfy security requirements.
+
+Signed-off-by: xiongshenglan <xiongshenglan@huawei.com>
+---
+ src/groupadd.c | 4 ++++
+ src/groupmod.c | 4 ++++
+ src/useradd.c  | 4 ++++
+ src/usermod.c  | 4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/groupadd.c b/src/groupadd.c
+index d7f68b1..9b7a521 100644
+--- a/src/groupadd.c
++++ b/src/groupadd.c
+@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status)
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -K, --key KEY=VALUE           override /etc/login.defs defaults\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -o, --non-unique              allow to create groups with duplicate\n"
+ 	                "                                (non-unique) GID\n"), usageout);
++#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_REMOVE_POPTION
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -p, --password PASSWORD       use this encrypted password for the new group\n"), usageout);
++#endif
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --system                  create a system account\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DI        directory prefix\n"), usageout);
+@@ -459,10 +461,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		case 'o':
+ 			oflg = true;
+ 			break;
++#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_REMOVE_POPTION
+ 		case 'p':
+ 			pflg = true;
+ 			group_passwd = optarg;
+ 			break;
++#endif
+ 		case 'r':
+ 			rflg = true;
+ 			break;
+diff --git a/src/groupmod.c b/src/groupmod.c
+index acd6f35..f9dcabd 100644
+--- a/src/groupmod.c
++++ b/src/groupmod.c
+@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -h, --help                    display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -n, --new-name NEW_GROUP      change the name to NEW_GROUP\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -o, --non-unique              allow to use a duplicate (non-unique) GID\n"), usageout);
++#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_REMOVE_POPTION
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -p, --password PASSWORD       change the password to this (encrypted)\n"
+ 	                "                                PASSWORD\n"), usageout);
++#endif
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DIR       prefix directory where are located the /etc/* files\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -U, --users USERS             list of user members of this group\n"), usageout);
+@@ -449,10 +451,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		case 'o':
+ 			oflg = true;
+ 			break;
++#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_REMOVE_POPTION
+ 		case 'p':
+ 			group_passwd = optarg;
+ 			pflg = true;
+ 			break;
++#endif
+ 		case 'R': /* no-op, handled in process_root_flag () */
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'P': /* no-op, handled in process_prefix_flag () */
+diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
+index 89abd5e..e5ba3dd 100644
+--- a/src/useradd.c
++++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -907,7 +907,9 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ 	                "                                the user\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -o, --non-unique              allow to create users with duplicate\n"
+ 	                "                                (non-unique) UID\n"), usageout);
++#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_REMOVE_POPTION
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -p, --password PASSWORD       encrypted password of the new account\n"), usageout);
++#endif
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --system                  create a system account\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DIR       prefix directory where are located the /etc/* files\n"), usageout);
+@@ -1366,6 +1368,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			case 'o':
+ 				oflg = true;
+ 				break;
++#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_REMOVE_POPTION
+ 			case 'p':	/* set encrypted password */
+ 				if (!VALID (optarg)) {
+ 					fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -1375,6 +1378,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 				}
+ 				user_pass = optarg;
+ 				break;
++#endif
+ 			case 'r':
+ 				rflg = true;
+ 				break;
+diff --git a/src/usermod.c b/src/usermod.c
+index ca8db92..509a50b 100644
+--- a/src/usermod.c
++++ b/src/usermod.c
+@@ -435,7 +435,9 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status)
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -m, --move-home               move contents of the home directory to the\n"
+ 	                "                                new location (use only with -d)\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -o, --non-unique              allow using duplicate (non-unique) UID\n"), usageout);
++#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_REMOVE_POPTION
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -p, --password PASSWORD       use encrypted password for the new password\n"), usageout);
++#endif
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DIR       prefix directory where are located the /etc/* files\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -s, --shell SHELL             new login shell for the user account\n"), usageout);
+@@ -1152,10 +1154,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			case 'o':
+ 				oflg = true;
+ 				break;
++#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_REMOVE_POPTION
+ 			case 'p':
+ 				user_pass = optarg;
+ 				pflg = true;
+ 				break;
++#endif
+ 			case 'R': /* no-op, handled in process_root_flag () */
+ 				break;
+ 			case 'P': /* no-op, handled in process_prefix_flag () */
+-- 
+2.12.3
+

shadow.spec

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Name: shadow
 Version: 4.9
-Release: 10
+Release: 15
 Epoch: 2
 License: BSD and GPLv2+
 Summary: Tools for managing accounts and shadow password files
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Source4: shadow-bsd.txt
 Source5: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.txt
 Source6: chpasswd
 Source7: newusers
+Source8: chpasswd.sh
 
 %global includesubiddir %{_includedir}/shadow
 
@@ -37,27 +38,64 @@ Patch17: newgrp-fix-segmentation-fault.patch
 Patch18: groupdel-fix-SIGSEGV-when-passwd-does-not-exist.patch
 Patch19: shadow-add-sm3-crypt-support.patch
 Patch20: backport-useradd-modify-check-ID-range-for-system-users.patch
-Patch21: backport-Add-header-guards.patch
-Patch22: backport-Change-to-strncat.patch
-Patch23: backport-Do-not-return-garbage-in-run_parts.patch
-Patch24: backport-Handle-ERANGE-error-correctly.patch
-Patch25: backport-Initialize-local-variables.patch
-Patch26: backport-Remove-commented-out-code-and-FIXMEs.patch
-Patch27: backport-Remove-redeclared-variable.patch
-Patch28: backport-libmisc-add-check-fopen-return-value-in-read_random_.patch
-Patch29: backport-passwd-erase-password-copy-on-all-error-branches.patch
-Patch30: backport-chpasswd-add-get_salt-for-generating-salt-value.patch
-Patch31: backport-chpasswd-fix-function-problem-with-R-parameter.patch
-Patch32: backport-Fix-off-by-one-mistakes.patch
-Patch33: backport-Fix-typos-in-length-calculations.patch
-Patch34: backport-Correctly-handle-illegal-system-file-in-tz.patch
-Patch35: backport-Explicitly-override-only-newlines.patch
-Patch36: backport-Prevent-out-of-boundary-access.patch
-Patch37: backport-Added-control-character-check.patch 
-Patch38: backport-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
-Patch39: backport-Read-whole-line-in-yes_or_no.patch
-Patch40: backport-commonio-free-removed-database-entries.patch
-Patch41: backport-semanage-disconnect-to-free-libsemanage-internals.patch
+Patch21: backport-man-po-Makefile.in-switch-from-xml2po-to-itstool.patch
+Patch22: backport-Only-free-sgent-if-it-was-initialized.patch
+Patch23: backport-Fix-parentheses-in-configure.ac.patch
+Patch24: backport-Added-documentation-around-CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL.patch
+Patch26: backport-Handle-malformed-lines-in-hushlogins-file.patch
+Patch27: backport-Improve-child-error-handling.patch
+Patch28: backport-lib-check-NULL-before-freeing-passwd-data.patch
+Patch29: backport-CVE-2013-4235.patch
+Patch30: backport-Add-header-guards.patch
+Patch31: backport-Change-to-strncat.patch
+Patch32: backport-Handle-ERANGE-error-correctly.patch
+Patch33: backport-Do-not-return-garbage-in-run_parts.patch
+Patch34: backport-Initialize-local-variables.patch
+Patch35: backport-libmisc-add-check-fopen-return-value-in-read_random_.patch
+Patch36: backport-passwd-erase-password-copy-on-all-error-branches.patch
+Patch37: backport-Remove-commented-out-code-and-FIXMEs.patch
+Patch38: backport-Remove-redeclared-variable.patch
+Patch39: backport-chpasswd-add-get_salt-for-generating-salt-value.patch
+Patch40: backport-chpasswd-fix-function-problem-with-R-parameter.patch
+Patch41: backport-script-to-kill-subjects-processes-from-userdel.patch
+Patch42: backport-Avoid-races-in-chown_tree.patch
+Patch43: backport-Avoid-races-in-remove_tree.patch
+Patch44: backport-Require-symlink-support.patch
+Patch45: backport-Fail-if-regular-file-pre-exists-in-copy_tree.patch
+Patch46: backport-More-robust-file-content-copy-in-copy_tree.patch
+Patch47: backport-Address-minor-compiler-warnings.patch
+Patch48: backport-Avoid-races-in-copy_tree.patch
+Patch49: backport-useradd-check-MLS-enablement-before-setting-serange.patch
+Patch50: backport-libmisc-minimum-id-check-for-system-accounts.patch
+Patch51: backort-useradd-Fix-buffer-overflow-when-using-a-prefix.patch
+Patch52: backport-useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists-for-user.patch
+Patch53: backport-Fix-off-by-one-mistakes.patch
+Patch54: backport-Fix-typos-in-length-calculations.patch
+Patch55: backport-Correctly-handle-illegal-system-file-in-tz.patch
+Patch56: backport-Explicitly-override-only-newlines.patch
+Patch57: backport-Prevent-out-of-boundary-access.patch
+Patch58: backport-Added-control-character-check.patch 
+Patch59: backport-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
+Patch60: backport-Read-whole-line-in-yes_or_no.patch
+Patch61: backport-run_parts-for-groupadd-and-groupdel.patch
+Patch62: backport-commonio-free-removed-database-entries.patch
+Patch63: backport-semanage-disconnect-to-free-libsemanage-internals.patch
+Patch64: backport-process_prefix_flag-Drop-privileges.patch
+Patch65: backport-chsh-Verify-that-login-shell-path-is-absolute.patch
+Patch66: backport-Plug-econf-memory-leaks.patch
+Patch67: backport-def_load-avoid-NULL-deref.patch
+Patch68: backport-Check-if-crypt_method-null-before-dereferencing.patch
+Patch69: backport-usermod-fix-off-by-one-issues.patch
+Patch70: backport-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch
+Patch71: backport-chgpasswd-fix-segfault-in-command-line-options.patch
+Patch72: backport-chpasswd-add-IS_CRYPT_METHOD.patch
+Patch73: backport-Fix-yescrypt-support.patch
+Patch74: backport-newgrp-fix-potential-string-injection.patch
+Patch75: shadow-Remove-encrypted-passwd-for-useradd-gr.patch
+Patch76: backport-shadow-userdel-add-the-adaptation-to-the-busybox-ps-.patch
+Patch77: backport-lib-btrfs-avoid-NULL-dereference.patch
+Patch78: backport-src-passwd.c-Switch-to-day-precision.patch
+Patch79: backport-src-passwd-add-overflow-check.patch 
 
 BuildRequires: gcc, libselinux-devel, audit-libs-devel, libsemanage-devel
 BuildRequires: libacl-devel, libattr-devel
@@ -120,6 +158,8 @@ install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
 install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
 install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/chpasswd
 install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/newusers
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/bash_completion.d
+install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE8} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/bash_completion.d/chpasswd.sh
 
 ln -s useradd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/adduser
 ln -s useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
@@ -214,6 +254,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.la
 %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/chpasswd
 %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/groupmems
 %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/newusers
+%{_sysconfdir}/bash_completion.d/chpasswd.sh
 
 %files subid-devel
 %{_libdir}/libsubid.so.*
@@ -224,6 +265,21 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.la
 %{_mandir}/*/*
 
 %changelog
+* Sun Feb 4 2024 zhengxiaoxiao <zhengxiaoxiao2@huawei.com> - 2:4.9-15
+- backport some patches
+
+* Thu Nov 9 2023 wangqingsan <wangqingsan@huawei.com> - 2:4.9-14
+- backport some patches
+
+* Wed Sep 20 2023 wangyunjia <yunjia.wang@huawei.com> - 2:4.9-13
+- backport some patches
+
+* Tue Aug 22 2023 wangyunjia <yunjia.wang@huawei.com> - 2:4.9-12
+- backport patches from upstream
+
+* Fri Aug 15 2023 xiongshenglan<xiongshenglan@huawei.com> - 2:4.9-11
+- Remove encrypted passwd for useradd-groupadd-groupmod-usermod 
+
 * Mon Jun 19 2023 wangyunjia <yunjia.wang@huawei.com> - 2:4.9-10
 - backport patches from upstream