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!34 22.03-LTS-Next: fix CVE-2022-28737

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From: @jinlun123123 
Reviewed-by: @huangzq6, @xiezhipeng1, @zhujianwei001 
Signed-off-by: @xiezhipeng1, @zhujianwei001
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot 2022-07-28 09:17:10 +00:00 committed by Gitee
commit 06c8733353
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4 changed files with 372 additions and 1 deletions
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62
backport-0001-CVE-2022-28737.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From e99bdbb827a50cde019393d3ca1e89397db221a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 15:41:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pe: Fix a buffer overflow when SizeOfRawData > VirtualSize
During image loading, the size of the destination buffer for the image
is determined by the SizeOfImage field in the optional header. The start
and end virtual addresses of each section, as determined by each section's
VirtualAddress and VirtualSize fields, are bounds checked against the
allocated buffer. However, the amount of data copied to the destination
buffer is determined by the section's SizeOfRawData filed. If this is
larger than the VirtualSize, then the copy can overflow the destination
buffer.
Fix this by limiting the amount of data to copy to the section's
VirtualSize. In the case where a section has SizeOfRawData > VirtualSize,
the excess data is discarded.
This fixes CVE-2022-28737
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
---
pe.c | 15 +++++++++------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
index 5d0c6b0..1eb3f59 100644
--- a/pe.c
+++ b/pe.c
@@ -1089,6 +1089,7 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
int i;
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
char *base, *end;
+ UINT32 size;
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT context;
unsigned int alignment, alloc_size;
int found_entry_point = 0;
@@ -1274,13 +1275,15 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
- if (Section->SizeOfRawData > 0)
- CopyMem(base, data + Section->PointerToRawData,
- Section->SizeOfRawData);
+ size = Section->Misc.VirtualSize;
+ if (size > Section->SizeOfRawData)
+ size = Section->SizeOfRawData;
- if (Section->SizeOfRawData < Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
- ZeroMem(base + Section->SizeOfRawData,
- Section->Misc.VirtualSize - Section->SizeOfRawData);
+ if (size > 0)
+ CopyMem(base, data + Section->PointerToRawData, size);
+
+ if (size < Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
+ ZeroMem(base + size, Section->Misc.VirtualSize - size);
}
}
--
2.27.0

78
backport-0002-CVE-2022-28737.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From 5a82d7973656c68f006aac1ed462e7bb37075d92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 16:02:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pe: Perform image verification earlier when loading grub
The second stage loader was being verified after loading it into
memory. As an additional hardening measure to avoid performing risky
memcpys using header fields from a potentially specially crafted image,
perform the verification before this so that it can be rejected earlier.
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
---
pe.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
index 1eb3f59..1d120f2 100644
--- a/pe.c
+++ b/pe.c
@@ -1106,7 +1106,31 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
}
/*
- * We only need to verify the binary if we're in secure mode
+ * Perform the image verification before we start copying data around
+ * in order to load it.
+ */
+ if (secure_mode ()) {
+ efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
+ sha1hash);
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ if (verbose)
+ console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
+ else
+ console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
+ } else {
+ if (verbose)
+ console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the hash for the TPM measurement.
+ * XXX: We're computing these twice in secure boot mode when the
+ * buffers already contain the previously computed hashes. Also,
+ * this is only useful for the TPM1.2 case. We should try to fix
+ * this in a follow-up.
*/
efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
sha1hash);
@@ -1287,22 +1311,6 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
}
}
- if (secure_mode ()) {
- efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
- sha1hash);
-
- if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- if (verbose)
- console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
- else
- console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
- return efi_status;
- } else {
- if (verbose)
- console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
- }
- }
-
if (context.NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC) {
perror(L"Image has no relocation entry\n");
FreePool(buffer);
--
2.27.0

225
backport-shim-implement-SBAT-verification-for-the-shim_lock-p.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
From a2da05fcb8972628bec08e4adfc13abbafc319ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 21:29:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] shim: implement SBAT verification for the shim_lock protocol
This implements SBAT verification via the shim_lock protocol
by moving verification inside the existing verify_buffer()
function that is shared by both shim_verify() and handle_image().
The .sbat section is optional for code verified via the shim_lock
protocol, unlike for code that is verified and executed directly
by shim. For executables that don't have a .sbat section,
verification is skipped when using the protocol.
A vendor can enforce SBAT verification for code verified via the
shim_lock protocol by revoking all pre-SBAT binaries via a dbx
update or by using vendor_dbx and then only signing binaries that
have a .sbat section from that point.
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
---
include/pe.h | 2 +-
pe.c | 46 +++++++--------------------------
shim.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/pe.h b/include/pe.h
index 43727f5..b86e1b3 100644
--- a/include/pe.h
+++ b/include/pe.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ read_header(void *data, unsigned int datasize,
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context);
EFI_STATUS
-handle_sbat(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize);
+verify_sbat_section(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize);
EFI_STATUS
handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
index 92c2804..554e77c 100644
--- a/pe.c
+++ b/pe.c
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ read_header(void *data, unsigned int datasize,
}
EFI_STATUS
-handle_sbat(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize)
+verify_sbat_section(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize)
{
unsigned int i;
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
@@ -834,7 +834,12 @@ handle_sbat(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize)
if (SBATBase == NULL || SBATSize == 0) {
dprint(L"No .sbat section data\n");
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ /*
+ * SBAT is mandatory for binaries loaded by shim, but optional
+ * for binaries loaded outside of shim but verified via the
+ * protocol.
+ */
+ return in_protocol ? EFI_SUCCESS : EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
sbat_size = SBATSize + 1;
@@ -980,9 +985,6 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *RelocSection = NULL;
- char *SBATBase = NULL;
- size_t SBATSize = 0;
-
/*
* Copy the executable's sections to their desired offsets
*/
@@ -1027,33 +1029,6 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
RelocBaseEnd == end) {
RelocSection = Section;
}
- } else if (CompareMem(Section->Name, ".sbat\0\0\0", 8) == 0) {
- if (SBATBase || SBATSize) {
- perror(L"Image has multiple SBAT sections\n");
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
- }
-
- if (Section->NumberOfRelocations != 0 ||
- Section->PointerToRelocations != 0) {
- perror(L"SBAT section has relocations\n");
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
- }
-
- /* The virtual size corresponds to the size of the SBAT
- * metadata and isn't necessarily a multiple of the file
- * alignment. The on-disk size is a multiple of the file
- * alignment and is zero padded. Make sure that the
- * on-disk size is at least as large as virtual size,
- * and ignore the section if it isn't. */
- if (Section->SizeOfRawData &&
- Section->SizeOfRawData >= Section->Misc.VirtualSize &&
- base && end) {
- SBATBase = base;
- /* +1 because of size vs last byte location */
- SBATSize = end - base + 1;
- dprint(L"sbat section base:0x%lx size:0x%lx\n",
- SBATBase, SBATSize);
- }
}
if (Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE) {
@@ -1095,11 +1070,8 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
}
if (secure_mode ()) {
- efi_status = handle_sbat(SBATBase, SBATSize);
-
- if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
- efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize,
- &context, sha256hash, sha1hash);
+ efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
+ sha1hash);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
if (verbose)
diff --git a/shim.c b/shim.c
index 604c0db..6d6b1e5 100644
--- a/shim.c
+++ b/shim.c
@@ -559,9 +559,9 @@ verify_one_signature(WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *sig,
* Check that the signature is valid and matches the binary
*/
EFI_STATUS
-verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
- PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context,
- UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
+verify_buffer_authenticode (char *data, int datasize,
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context,
+ UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
{
EFI_STATUS ret_efi_status;
size_t size = datasize;
@@ -695,6 +695,71 @@ verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
return ret_efi_status;
}
+/*
+ * Check that the binary is permitted to load by SBAT.
+ */
+EFI_STATUS
+verify_buffer_sbat (char *data, int datasize,
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context)
+{
+ int i;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
+ char *SBATBase = NULL;
+ size_t SBATSize = 0;
+
+ Section = context->FirstSection;
+ for (i = 0; i < context->NumberOfSections; i++, Section++) {
+ if (CompareMem(Section->Name, ".sbat\0\0\0", 8) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (SBATBase || SBATSize) {
+ perror(L"Image has multiple SBAT sections\n");
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ if (Section->NumberOfRelocations != 0 ||
+ Section->PointerToRelocations != 0) {
+ perror(L"SBAT section has relocations\n");
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ /* The virtual size corresponds to the size of the SBAT
+ * metadata and isn't necessarily a multiple of the file
+ * alignment. The on-disk size is a multiple of the file
+ * alignment and is zero padded. Make sure that the
+ * on-disk size is at least as large as virtual size,
+ * and ignore the section if it isn't. */
+ if (Section->SizeOfRawData &&
+ Section->SizeOfRawData >= Section->Misc.VirtualSize) {
+ SBATBase = ImageAddress(data, datasize,
+ Section->PointerToRawData);
+ SBATSize = Section->SizeOfRawData;
+ dprint(L"sbat section base:0x%lx size:0x%lx\n",
+ SBATBase, SBATSize);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return verify_sbat_section(SBATBase, SBATSize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that the signature is valid and matches the binary and that
+ * the binary is permitted to load by SBAT.
+ */
+EFI_STATUS
+verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context,
+ UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
+{
+ EFI_STATUS efi_status;
+
+ efi_status = verify_buffer_sbat(data, datasize, context);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
+ return efi_status;
+
+ return verify_buffer_authenticode(data, datasize, context, sha256hash, sha1hash);
+}
+
static int
should_use_fallback(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
{
@@ -1542,7 +1607,7 @@ efi_main (EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab)
goto die;
}
- efi_status = handle_sbat(sbat_start, sbat_end - sbat_start - 1);
+ efi_status = verify_sbat_section(sbat_start, sbat_end - sbat_start - 1);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
perror(L"Verifiying shim SBAT data failed: %r\n",
efi_status);
--
2.27.0

8
shim.spec
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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
Name: shim
Version: 15.4
Release: 3
Release: 4
Summary: First-stage UEFI bootloader
ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
License: BSD
@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ Patch0: backport-shim-another-attempt-to-fix-load-options-handling.patch
Patch1: backport-arm-aa64-fix-the-size-of-.rela-sections.patch
Patch2: backport-mok-relax-the-maximum-variable-size-check.patch
Patch3: backport-mok-delete-the-existing-RT-variables-only-when-only_.patch
Patch4: backport-shim-implement-SBAT-verification-for-the-shim_lock-p.patch
Patch5: backport-0001-CVE-2022-28737.patch
Patch6: backport-0002-CVE-2022-28737.patch
BuildRequires: elfutils-libelf-devel openssl-devel openssl git pesign gnu-efi gnu-efi-devel gcc
Requires: dbxtool efi-filesystem mokutil
@ -141,6 +144,9 @@ cd ..
/usr/src/debug/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}/*
%changelog
* Wed Jul 27 2022 jinlun <jinlun@huawei.com> - 15.4-4
- fix CVE-2022-28737
* Tue Jul 5 2022 Hugel <gengqihu1@h-partners.com> - 15.4-3
- fix shim occasionally crashes in _relocate() on AArch64