packages/shim
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

fix CVE-2023-0464 CVE-2023-3817

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Huaxin Lu 2023-10-28 10:04:32 +08:00
parent 860c9ef80a
commit 6712794d9b
3 changed files with 280 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

216
backport-CVE-2023-0464.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
From ed19b0008b5802505a6ccb05e5bac05baf90c418 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
rom: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy
constraints
A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this
vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
exponential use of computational resources, leading to a
denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on affected systems.
Fixes CVE-2023-0464
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
---
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h | 8 +++++-
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | 11 +++++++--
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | 30 ++++++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h
index b5075f9..0ed2349 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_int.h
@@ -161,6 +161,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
};
struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_count;
+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_maximum;
+
/* This is the tree 'level' data */
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
int nlevel;
@@ -209,7 +214,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
const X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data);
void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
index d6c9176..75b3791 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
@@ -111,9 +111,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
const X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data)
{
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+
+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. this mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
+ return NULL;
+
node = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_NODE));
if (!node)
return NULL;
@@ -136,7 +142,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
- if (tree) {
+ if (extra_data) {
if (!tree->extra_data)
tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
if (!tree->extra_data)
@@ -145,6 +151,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
goto node_error;
}
+ tree->node_count++;
if (parent)
parent->nchild++;
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
index 09b8691..fb9a616 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@
#include "pcy_int.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
+#endif
+
/*
* Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
* evaluation.
@@ -225,6 +229,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
if (!tree)
return 0;
+ /* Limit the groeth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
tree->flags = 0;
tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
tree->nlevel = 0;
@@ -247,7 +253,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
- if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))
+ if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1))
goto bad_tree;
for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
@@ -304,7 +310,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
}
static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+ const X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
@@ -313,13 +320,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL))
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0))
return 0;
matched = 1;
}
}
if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0))
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -331,7 +338,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
*/
static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
int i;
X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
@@ -352,7 +360,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
continue;
#endif
/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -382,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1)) {
policy_data_free(data);
return 0;
}
@@ -464,7 +472,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1)) {
policy_data_free(data);
return 0;
}
@@ -473,7 +481,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
}
/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
if (last->anyPolicy) {
- if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
+ if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0))
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -646,7 +654,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
+ node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1);
}
if (!tree->user_policies) {
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
@@ -668,7 +676,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
return 0;
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
--
2.27.0

58
backport-CVE-2023-3817.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From 91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 11:39:41 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
obviously invalid
If |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
q value.
Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
computations.
Fixes CVE-2023-3817
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)
---
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 2001d2e7cb..9ae96991eb 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
{
- int ok = 0;
+ int ok = 0, q_good = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_ULONG l;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
@@ -120,7 +120,14 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
if (t2 == NULL)
goto err;
- if (dh->q) {
+ if (dh->q != NULL) {
+ if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
+ q_good = 1;
+ else
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ if (q_good) {
if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
--
2.33.0

7
shim.spec
View File

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
Name: shim
Version: 15.6
Release: 11
Release: 12
Summary: First-stage UEFI bootloader
ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
License: BSD
@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ Patch17:backport-CVE-2018-0737.patch
Patch18:backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE.patch
Patch19:backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE.patch
Patch20:backport-CVE-2021-23840.patch
Patch21:backport-CVE-2023-0464.patch
Patch22:backport-CVE-2023-3817.patch
# Feature for shim SMx support
Patch9000:Feature-shim-openssl-add-ec-support.patch
@ -175,6 +177,9 @@ make test
/usr/src/debug/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}/*
%changelog
* Sat Oct 28 2023 luhuaxin <luhuaxin1@huawei.com> - 15.6-12
- fix CVE-2023-0464 CVE-2023-3817
* Thu Jul 13 2023 jinlun <jinlun@huawei.com> - 15.6-11
- fix CVE-2018-0737 , CVE-2021-23840