shim/backport-CVE-2023-5678.patch
2023-12-18 20:37:28 +08:00

122 lines
4.8 KiB
Diff

From 246b05d1f3d4b4b5d131bf2fc345d1e894fc3f32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lanming1120 <lanming1120@126.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2023 19:53:02 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
---
Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h | 7 +++++--
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 13 +++++++++++++
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_err.c | 2 ++
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 12 ++++++++++++
4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h
index 6488879..890f007 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -162,14 +162,15 @@ struct dh_st {
/* #define DH_GENERATOR_3 3 */
# define DH_GENERATOR_5 5
-/* DH_check error codes */
+/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
# define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME 0x01
# define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME 0x02
# define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR 0x04
# define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR 0x08
# define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME 0x10
-# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20
+# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE 0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE 0x40
+# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 0x100
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
@@ -389,7 +390,9 @@ void ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
# define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE 100
# define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR 105
# define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR 113
+# define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE 130
# define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR 114
+# define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY 128
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 9f3b174..30b2d6c 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -162,6 +162,19 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
+
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
index b890cca..7615558 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY), "COMPUTE_KEY"},
{ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP), "DHparams_print_fp"},
{ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS), "DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY), "DH_check_pub_key"},
{ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT), "DH_CMS_DECRYPT"},
{ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY), "DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY"},
{ERR_FUNC(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO), "DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO"},
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE), "no private value"},
{ERR_REASON(DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR), "parameter encoding error"},
{ERR_REASON(DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
{ERR_REASON(DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
{0, NULL}
};
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index f235e0d..d66de13 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -134,6 +134,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+ if (dh->q != NULL
+ && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
@@ -218,6 +224,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
+ if (dh->q != NULL
+ && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
--
2.27.0