f68dd54569
CVE-2018-0739 CVE-2019-1563 CVE-2020-1971 CVE-2021-23840 CVE-2021-23841 CVE-2022-0778 CVE-2021-3712 (cherry picked from commit a582068887203f626772052e466343c6ef2d0719)
71 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
71 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
From e21f8cf78a125cd3c8c0d1a1a6c8bb0b901f893f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
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Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2019 00:16:28 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and
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CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
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An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
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second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
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recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
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encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
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decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
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used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
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As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
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key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
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certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
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The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
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CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)
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(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
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---
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crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 12 ++++++++----
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1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
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index 6a463680d7e..63bc88269ff 100644
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--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
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+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
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@@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri,
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}
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static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
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- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
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+ size_t fixlen)
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{
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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unsigned char *ek = NULL;
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@@ -224,7 +225,9 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
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}
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if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
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- ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) {
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+ ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0
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+ || eklen == 0
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+ || (fixlen != 0 && eklen != fixlen)) {
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ret = 0;
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PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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goto err;
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@@ -571,13 +574,14 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
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for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
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ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
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- if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
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+ if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey,
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+ EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher)) < 0)
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goto err;
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ERR_clear_error();
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}
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} else {
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/* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
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- if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
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+ if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey, 0) < 0)
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goto err;
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ERR_clear_error();
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}
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