0f07972996
Signed-off-by: lvgenggeng <lvgenggeng@uniontech.com> (cherry picked from commit 353d0a2d6b6b6264e7373fb7e69869e4cd981918)
66 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
66 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
From 04e2f280cc4a0766bedcc7b9eb56449ceecc2ad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Kevin Hendricks <kevin.b.hendricks@icloud.com>
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Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 11:47:42 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 1/1] further harden against malicious epubs and produce error
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message
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---
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src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
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1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp b/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
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index 501f49f8e..2f5c25f40 100644
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--- a/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
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+++ b/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
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@@ -425,12 +425,41 @@ void ImportEPUB::ExtractContainer()
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// If there is no file name then we can't do anything with it.
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if (!qfile_name.isEmpty()) {
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- // for security reasons we need the file path to always be inside the
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- // target folder and not outside, so we will remove all relative upward
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- // paths segments ".." from the file path before prepending the target
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- // folder to create the final target path
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- qfile_name = qfile_name.replace("../","");
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- cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.replace("../","");
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+ // for security reasons against maliciously crafted zip archives
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+ // we need the file path to always be inside the target folder
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+ // and not outside, so we will remove all illegal backslashes
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+ // and all relative upward paths segments "/../" from the zip's local
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+ // file name/path before prepending the target folder to create
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+ // the final path
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+
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+ QString original_path = qfile_name;
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+ bool evil_or_corrupt_epub = false;
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+
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+ if (qfile_name.contains("\\")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
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+ qfile_name = "/" + qfile_name.replace("\\","");
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+
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+ if (qfile_name.contains("/../")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
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+ qfile_name = qfile_name.replace("/../","/");
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+
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+ while(qfile_name.startsWith("/")) {
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+ qfile_name = qfile_name.remove(0,1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (cp437_file_name.contains("\\")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
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+ cp437_file_name = "/" + cp437_file_name.replace("\\","");
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+
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+ if (cp437_file_name.contains("/../")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
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+ cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.replace("/../","/");
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+
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+ while(cp437_file_name.startsWith("/")) {
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+ cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.remove(0,1);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (evil_or_corrupt_epub) {
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+ unzCloseCurrentFile(zfile);
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+ unzClose(zfile);
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+ throw (EPUBLoadParseError(QString(QObject::tr("Possible evil or corrupt epub file name: %1")).arg(original_path).toStdString()));
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+ }
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// We use the dir object to create the path in the temporary directory.
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// Unfortunately, we need a dir ojbect to do this as it's not a static function.
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--
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2.20.1
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