!590 同步上游社区补丁
From: @huyubiao Reviewed-by: @licunlong Signed-off-by: @licunlong
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot
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commit
f9f8f10554
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
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From fa972e8681159a34ffc9c114e4fe3538a7f69046 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 13:04:28 +0900
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Subject: [PATCH] core/exec: do not crash with UtmpMode=user without User=
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setting
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Fixes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264404.
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Replaces #31356.
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(cherry picked from commit d42b81f93f81e45f7a4053c6522ec3a2145ff136)
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(cherry picked from commit cba1060f8854fd9a11dac8e2b02126d2f3bb14ba)
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(cherry picked from commit 74ffb11efc851ecc291766abce8a1052746e715e)
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Conflict:NA
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Reference:https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/fa972e8681159a34ffc9c114e4fe3538a7f69046
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---
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src/core/execute.c | 12 +++++++++++-
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src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c | 1 +
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2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c
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index 5b23be014c..dd524b734a 100644
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--- a/src/core/execute.c
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+++ b/src/core/execute.c
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@@ -4652,6 +4652,16 @@ static int exec_child(
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}
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if (context->utmp_id) {
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+ _cleanup_free_ char *username_alloc = NULL;
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+
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+ if (!username && context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_USER) {
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+ username_alloc = uid_to_name(uid_is_valid(uid) ? uid : saved_uid);
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+ if (!username_alloc) {
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+ *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
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+ return log_oom();
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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const char *line = context->tty_path ?
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(path_startswith(context->tty_path, "/dev/") ?: context->tty_path) :
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NULL;
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@@ -4660,7 +4670,7 @@ static int exec_child(
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context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS :
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context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS :
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USER_PROCESS,
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- username);
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+ username ?: username_alloc);
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}
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if (uid_is_valid(uid)) {
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diff --git a/src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c b/src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c
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index 2fa76cf47a..c93ae927ee 100644
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--- a/src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c
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+++ b/src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c
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@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ int utmp_put_init_process(const char *id, pid_t pid, pid_t sid, const char *line
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int r;
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assert(id);
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+ assert(ut_type != USER_PROCESS || user);
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init_timestamp(&store, 0);
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--
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2.33.0
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@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
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From 7886eea2425fe7773cc012da0b2e266e33d4be12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Ronan Pigott <ronan@rjp.ie>
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Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2024 18:21:24 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] resolved: limit the number of signature validations in a
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transaction
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It has been demonstrated that tolerating an unbounded number of dnssec
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signature validations is a bad idea. It is easy for a maliciously
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crafted DNS reply to contain as many keytag collisions as desired,
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causing us to iterate every dnskey and signature combination in vain.
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The solution is to impose a maximum number of validations we will
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tolerate. While collisions are not hard to craft, I still expect they
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are unlikely in the wild so it should be safe to pick fairly small
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values.
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Here two limits are imposed: one on the maximum number of invalid
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signatures encountered per rrset, and another on the total number of
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validations performed per transaction.
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(cherry picked from commit 67d0ce8843d612a2245d0966197d4f528b911b66)
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(cherry picked from commit 1ebdb19ff194120109b08bbf888bdcc502f83211)
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(cherry picked from commit 2f5edffa8ffd5210165ebe7604f07d23f375fe9a)
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Conflict:NA
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Reference:https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/7886eea2425fe7773cc012da0b2e266e33d4be12
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---
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src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
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src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h | 9 ++++++++-
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src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
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3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
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index fc076856b6..e9ff94847a 100644
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--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
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@@ -1176,6 +1176,7 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
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DnsResourceRecord **ret_rrsig) {
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bool found_rrsig = false, found_invalid = false, found_expired_rrsig = false, found_unsupported_algorithm = false;
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+ unsigned nvalidations = 0;
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DnsResourceRecord *rrsig;
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int r;
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@@ -1221,6 +1222,14 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
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if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY)
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realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME);
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+ /* Have we seen an unreasonable number of invalid signaures? */
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+ if (nvalidations > DNSSEC_INVALID_MAX) {
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+ if (ret_rrsig)
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+ *ret_rrsig = NULL;
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+ *result = DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS;
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+ return (int) nvalidations;
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+ }
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+
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/* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching
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* DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of
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* the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY
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@@ -1230,6 +1239,8 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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+ nvalidations++;
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+
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switch (one_result) {
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case DNSSEC_VALIDATED:
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@@ -1240,7 +1251,7 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
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*ret_rrsig = rrsig;
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*result = one_result;
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- return 0;
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+ return (int) nvalidations;
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case DNSSEC_INVALID:
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/* If the signature is invalid, let's try another
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@@ -1287,7 +1298,7 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
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if (ret_rrsig)
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*ret_rrsig = NULL;
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- return 0;
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+ return (int) nvalidations;
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}
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int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) {
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@@ -2571,6 +2582,7 @@ static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = {
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[DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary",
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[DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch",
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[DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER] = "incompatible-server",
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+ [DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS] = "too-many-validations",
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};
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DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult);
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diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
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index 954bb3ef9d..29b90130a3 100644
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--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
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+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
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@@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ typedef enum DnssecVerdict DnssecVerdict;
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#include "resolved-dns-rr.h"
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enum DnssecResult {
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- /* These five are returned by dnssec_verify_rrset() */
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+ /* These six are returned by dnssec_verify_rrset() */
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DNSSEC_VALIDATED,
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DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD, /* Validated via a wildcard RRSIG, further NSEC/NSEC3 checks necessary */
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DNSSEC_INVALID,
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DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED,
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DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM,
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+ DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS,
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/* These two are added by dnssec_verify_rrset_search() */
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DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE,
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@@ -45,6 +46,12 @@ enum DnssecVerdict {
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/* The longest digest we'll ever generate, of all digest algorithms we support */
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#define DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX (MAX(20, 32))
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+/* The most invalid signatures we will tolerate for a single rrset */
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+#define DNSSEC_INVALID_MAX 5
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+
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+/* The total number of signature validations we will tolerate for a single transaction */
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+#define DNSSEC_VALIDATION_MAX 64
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+
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int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok);
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int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig);
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diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
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index 928c4ae8b2..77bef1c984 100644
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--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
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+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
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@@ -3172,11 +3172,14 @@ static int dnssec_validate_records(
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DnsTransaction *t,
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Phase phase,
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bool *have_nsec,
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+ unsigned *nvalidations,
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DnsAnswer **validated) {
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DnsResourceRecord *rr;
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int r;
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+ assert(nvalidations);
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+
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/* Returns negative on error, 0 if validation failed, 1 to restart validation, 2 when finished. */
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DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->answer) {
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@@ -3218,6 +3221,7 @@ static int dnssec_validate_records(
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&rrsig);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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+ *nvalidations += r;
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log_debug("Looking at %s: %s", strna(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)), dnssec_result_to_string(result));
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@@ -3415,7 +3419,8 @@ static int dnssec_validate_records(
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DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED,
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DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE))
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manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_BOGUS, rr->key);
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- else /* DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY or DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM */
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+ else /* DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY, DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM,
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+ or DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS */
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manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE, rr->key);
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/* This is a primary response to our question, and it failed validation.
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@@ -3508,13 +3513,21 @@ int dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(DnsTransaction *t) {
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return r;
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phase = DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY;
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- for (;;) {
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+ for (unsigned nvalidations = 0;;) {
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bool have_nsec = false;
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- r = dnssec_validate_records(t, phase, &have_nsec, &validated);
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+ r = dnssec_validate_records(t, phase, &have_nsec, &nvalidations, &validated);
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if (r <= 0)
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return r;
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+ if (nvalidations > DNSSEC_VALIDATION_MAX) {
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+ /* This reply requires an onerous number of signature validations to verify. Let's
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+ * not waste our time trying, as this shouldn't happen for well-behaved domains
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+ * anyway. */
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+ t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS;
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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/* Try again as long as we managed to achieve something */
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if (r == 1)
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continue;
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--
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2.33.0
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
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From 156e519d990a5662c719a1cbe80c6a02a2b9115f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Ronan Pigott <ronan@rjp.ie>
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Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2024 00:23:32 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] resolved: reduce the maximum nsec3 iterations to 100
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According to RFC9267, the 2500 value is not helpful, and in fact it can
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be harmful to permit a large number of iterations. Combined with limits
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on the number of signature validations, I expect this will mitigate the
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impact of maliciously crafted domains designed to cause excessive
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cryptographic work.
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(cherry picked from commit eba291124bc11f03732d1fc468db3bfac069f9cb)
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(cherry picked from commit 572692f0bdd6a3fabe3dd4a3e8e5565cc69b5e14)
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(cherry picked from commit 9899281c59a91f19c8b39362d203e997d2faf233)
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Conflict:NA
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Reference:https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/156e519d990a5662c719a1cbe80c6a02a2b9115f
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---
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src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | 5 +++--
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
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index e9ff94847a..d48d8a9297 100644
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--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
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@@ -27,8 +27,9 @@ DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(EC_KEY*, EC_KEY_free, NULL);
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/* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */
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#define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE)
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-/* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. RFC5155 says 2500 shall be the maximum useful value */
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-#define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 2500
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+/* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. RFC5155 says 2500 shall be the maximum useful value, but
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+ * RFC9276 § 3.2 says that we should reduce the acceptable iteration count */
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+#define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 100
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/*
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* The DNSSEC Chain of trust:
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--
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2.33.0
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10
systemd.spec
10
systemd.spec
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
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Name: systemd
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Url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd
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Version: 249
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Release: 74
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Release: 75
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License: MIT and LGPLv2+ and GPLv2+
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Summary: System and Service Manager
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@ -637,6 +637,9 @@ Patch6588: backport-busctl-avoid-asserting-on-NULL-message.patch
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Patch6589: backport-resolve-don-t-add-sockets-to-the-graveyard-on-shutdo.patch
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Patch6590: backport-sd-journal-check-sd-event-state-before-setting-up-po.patch
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Patch6591: backport-shutdown-get-only-active-md-arrays.patch
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Patch6592: backport-core-exec-do-not-crash-with-UtmpMode-user-without-Us.patch
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Patch6593: backport-resolved-limit-the-number-of-signature-validations-i.patch
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Patch6594: backport-resolved-reduce-the-maximum-nsec3-iterations-to-100.patch
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Patch9001: update-rtc-with-system-clock-when-shutdown.patch
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Patch9002: udev-add-actions-while-rename-netif-failed.patch
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@ -2141,6 +2144,11 @@ grep -q -E '^KEYMAP="?fi-latin[19]"?' /etc/vconsole.conf 2>/dev/null &&
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%{_libdir}/security/pam_systemd.so
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%changelog
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* Wed Mar 27 2024 huyubiao <huyubiao@huawei.com> - 249-75
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- DESC:add backport-core-exec-do-not-crash-with-UtmpMode-user-without-Us.patch
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backport-resolved-limit-the-number-of-signature-validations-i.patch
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backport-resolved-reduce-the-maximum-nsec3-iterations-to-100.patch
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* Sat Mar 16 2024 huyubiao <huyubiao@huawei.com> - 249-74
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- fix mdadm blocking caused by incorrect stop of inactive MD devices during shutdown
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