Compare commits
No commits in common. "9d22bf7ee60c3d29e157f8890d026faa0e9602c4" and "fc052800cf58872fc14cd60fdc5d1bec7b7e31e2" have entirely different histories.
9d22bf7ee6
...
fc052800cf
@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 69d1b3fc29677af8ade8dc15dba83f0589cb63d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:19:12 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] xzgrep: Fix escaping of malicious filenames (ZDI-CAN-16587).
|
||||
|
||||
Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files
|
||||
or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution.
|
||||
|
||||
xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are
|
||||
affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well.
|
||||
This patch works for all of them.
|
||||
|
||||
This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes
|
||||
a fix for zgrep.
|
||||
|
||||
The issue with the old sed script is that with multiple newlines,
|
||||
the N-command will read the second line of input, then the
|
||||
s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end of the
|
||||
file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern space
|
||||
is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get escaped.
|
||||
|
||||
One way to fix this would be to read all lines into the pattern
|
||||
space first. However, the included fix is even simpler: All lines
|
||||
except the last line get a backslash appended at the end. To ensure
|
||||
that shell command substitution doesn't eat a possible trailing
|
||||
newline, a colon is appended to the filename before escaping.
|
||||
The colon is later used to separate the filename from the grep
|
||||
output so it is fine to add it here instead of a few lines later.
|
||||
|
||||
The old code also wasn't POSIX compliant as it used \n in the
|
||||
replacement section of the s-command. Using \<newline> is the
|
||||
POSIX compatible method.
|
||||
|
||||
LC_ALL=C was added to the two critical sed commands. POSIX sed
|
||||
manual recommends it when using sed to manipulate pathnames
|
||||
because in other locales invalid multibyte sequences might
|
||||
cause issues with some sed implementations. In case of GNU sed,
|
||||
these particular sed scripts wouldn't have such problems but some
|
||||
other scripts could have, see:
|
||||
|
||||
info '(sed)Locale Considerations'
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to Jim Meyering and Paul Eggert discussing the different
|
||||
ways to fix this and for coordinating the patch release schedule
|
||||
with gzip.
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/scripts/xzgrep.in | 20 ++++++++++++--------
|
||||
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in
|
||||
index 9db5c3a..f64dddb 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in
|
||||
+++ b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in
|
||||
@@ -179,22 +179,26 @@ for i; do
|
||||
{ test $# -eq 1 || test $no_filename -eq 1; }; then
|
||||
eval "$grep"
|
||||
else
|
||||
+ # Append a colon so that the last character will never be a newline
|
||||
+ # which would otherwise get lost in shell command substitution.
|
||||
+ i="$i:"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ # Escape & \ | and newlines only if such characters are present
|
||||
+ # (speed optimization).
|
||||
case $i in
|
||||
(*'
|
||||
'* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*)
|
||||
- i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" |
|
||||
- sed '
|
||||
- $!N
|
||||
- $s/[&\|]/\\&/g
|
||||
- $s/\n/\\n/g
|
||||
- ');;
|
||||
+ i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/[&\|]/\\&/g; $!s/$/\\/');;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
- sed_script="s|^|$i:|"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ # $i already ends with a colon so don't add it here.
|
||||
+ sed_script="s|^|$i|"
|
||||
|
||||
# Fail if grep or sed fails.
|
||||
r=$(
|
||||
exec 4>&1
|
||||
- (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&-
|
||||
+ (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- |
|
||||
+ LC_ALL=C sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&-
|
||||
) || r=2
|
||||
exit $r
|
||||
fi >&3 5>&-
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.8.3.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 68bda971bb8b666a009331455fcedb4e18d837a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jia Tan <jiat0218@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 21:31:25 +0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] liblzma: Add overflow check for Unpadded size in
|
||||
lzma_index_append().
|
||||
|
||||
This was not a security bug since there was no path to overflow
|
||||
UINT64_MAX in lzma_index_append() or when it calls index_file_size().
|
||||
The bug was discovered by a failing assert() in vli_ceil4() when called
|
||||
from index_file_size() when unpadded_sum (the sum of the compressed size
|
||||
of current Stream and the unpadded_size parameter) exceeds LZMA_VLI_MAX.
|
||||
|
||||
Previously, the unpadded_size parameter was checked to be not greater
|
||||
than UNPADDED_SIZE_MAX, but no check was done once compressed_base was
|
||||
added.
|
||||
|
||||
This could not have caused an integer overflow in index_file_size() when
|
||||
called by lzma_index_append(). The calculation for file_size breaks down
|
||||
into the sum of:
|
||||
|
||||
- Compressed base from all previous Streams
|
||||
- 2 * LZMA_STREAM_HEADER_SIZE (size of the current Streams header and
|
||||
footer)
|
||||
- stream_padding (can be set by lzma_index_stream_padding())
|
||||
- Compressed base from the current Stream
|
||||
- Unpadded size (parameter to lzma_index_append())
|
||||
|
||||
The sum of everything except for Unpadded size must be less than
|
||||
LZMA_VLI_MAX. This is guarenteed by overflow checks in the functions
|
||||
that can set these values including lzma_index_stream_padding(),
|
||||
lzma_index_append(), and lzma_index_cat(). The maximum value for
|
||||
Unpadded size is enforced by lzma_index_append() to be less than or
|
||||
equal UNPADDED_SIZE_MAX. Thus, the sum cannot exceed UINT64_MAX since
|
||||
LZMA_VLI_MAX is half of UINT64_MAX.
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to Joona Kannisto for reporting this.
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/liblzma/common/index.c | 6 ++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/liblzma/common/index.c b/src/liblzma/common/index.c
|
||||
index a41e8f3..8c8ad46 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/liblzma/common/index.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/liblzma/common/index.c
|
||||
@@ -656,6 +656,12 @@ lzma_index_append(lzma_index *i, const lzma_allocator *allocator,
|
||||
const uint32_t index_list_size_add = lzma_vli_size(unpadded_size)
|
||||
+ lzma_vli_size(uncompressed_size);
|
||||
|
||||
+ // Check that the new unpadded sum will not overflow. This is
|
||||
+ // checked again in index_file_size(), but the unpadded sum is
|
||||
+ // passed to vli_ceil4() which expects a valid lzma_vli value.
|
||||
+ if (compressed_base + unpadded_size > UNPADDED_SIZE_MAX)
|
||||
+ return LZMA_DATA_ERROR;
|
||||
+
|
||||
// Check that the file size will stay within limits.
|
||||
if (index_file_size(s->node.compressed_base,
|
||||
compressed_base + unpadded_size, s->record_count + 1,
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.23.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/usr/libexec/grepconf.sh -c
|
||||
if ( $status == 1 ) exit
|
||||
alias xzgrep 'xzgrep --color=auto'
|
||||
alias xzfgrep 'xzfgrep --color=auto'
|
||||
alias xzegrep 'xzegrep --color=auto'
|
||||
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/usr/libexec/grepconf.sh -c || return
|
||||
alias xzgrep='xzgrep --color=auto' 2>/dev/null
|
||||
alias xzegrep='xzegrep --color=auto' 2>/dev/null
|
||||
alias xzfgrep='xzfgrep --color=auto' 2>/dev/null
|
||||
101
liblzma-Avoid-memcpy-NULL-foo-0-because-it-is-undefi.patch
Normal file
101
liblzma-Avoid-memcpy-NULL-foo-0-because-it-is-undefi.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
|
||||
From 2a22de439ec63da1927b640eda309296a1e8dce5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 13 May 2019 20:05:17 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 14/14] liblzma: Avoid memcpy(NULL, foo, 0) because it is
|
||||
undefined behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
I should have always known this but I didn't. Here is an example
|
||||
as a reminder to myself:
|
||||
|
||||
int mycopy(void *dest, void *src, size_t n)
|
||||
{
|
||||
memcpy(dest, src, n);
|
||||
return dest == NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
In the example, a compiler may assume that dest != NULL because
|
||||
passing NULL to memcpy() would be undefined behavior. Testing
|
||||
with GCC 8.2.1, mycopy(NULL, NULL, 0) returns 1 with -O0 and -O1.
|
||||
With -O2 the return value is 0 because the compiler infers that
|
||||
dest cannot be NULL because it was already used with memcpy()
|
||||
and thus the test for NULL gets optimized out.
|
||||
|
||||
In liblzma, if a null-pointer was passed to memcpy(), there were
|
||||
no checks for NULL *after* the memcpy() call, so I cautiously
|
||||
suspect that it shouldn't have caused bad behavior in practice,
|
||||
but it's hard to be sure, and the problematic cases had to be
|
||||
fixed anyway.
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to Jeffrey Walton.
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/liblzma/common/common.c | 6 +++++-
|
||||
src/liblzma/lz/lz_decoder.c | 12 +++++++++---
|
||||
src/liblzma/simple/simple_coder.c | 10 +++++++++-
|
||||
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/liblzma/common/common.c b/src/liblzma/common/common.c
|
||||
index 1399b92..18453ae 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/liblzma/common/common.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/liblzma/common/common.c
|
||||
@@ -99,7 +99,11 @@ lzma_bufcpy(const uint8_t *restrict in, size_t *restrict in_pos,
|
||||
const size_t out_avail = out_size - *out_pos;
|
||||
const size_t copy_size = my_min(in_avail, out_avail);
|
||||
|
||||
- memcpy(out + *out_pos, in + *in_pos, copy_size);
|
||||
+ // Call memcpy() only if there is something to copy. If there is
|
||||
+ // nothing to copy, in or out might be NULL and then the memcpy()
|
||||
+ // call would trigger undefined behavior.
|
||||
+ if (copy_size > 0)
|
||||
+ memcpy(out + *out_pos, in + *in_pos, copy_size);
|
||||
|
||||
*in_pos += copy_size;
|
||||
*out_pos += copy_size;
|
||||
diff --git a/src/liblzma/lz/lz_decoder.c b/src/liblzma/lz/lz_decoder.c
|
||||
index bb21d0d..6c9024e 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/liblzma/lz/lz_decoder.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/liblzma/lz/lz_decoder.c
|
||||
@@ -91,11 +91,17 @@ decode_buffer(lzma_coder *coder,
|
||||
in, in_pos, in_size);
|
||||
|
||||
// Copy the decoded data from the dictionary to the out[]
|
||||
- // buffer.
|
||||
+ // buffer. Do it conditionally because out can be NULL
|
||||
+ // (in which case copy_size is always 0). Calling memcpy()
|
||||
+ // with a null-pointer is undefined even if the third
|
||||
+ // argument is 0.
|
||||
const size_t copy_size = coder->dict.pos - dict_start;
|
||||
assert(copy_size <= out_size - *out_pos);
|
||||
- memcpy(out + *out_pos, coder->dict.buf + dict_start,
|
||||
- copy_size);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (copy_size > 0)
|
||||
+ memcpy(out + *out_pos, coder->dict.buf + dict_start,
|
||||
+ copy_size);
|
||||
+
|
||||
*out_pos += copy_size;
|
||||
|
||||
// Reset the dictionary if so requested by coder->lz.code().
|
||||
diff --git a/src/liblzma/simple/simple_coder.c b/src/liblzma/simple/simple_coder.c
|
||||
index 13ebabc..4f499be 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/liblzma/simple/simple_coder.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/liblzma/simple/simple_coder.c
|
||||
@@ -118,7 +118,15 @@ simple_code(void *coder_ptr, const lzma_allocator *allocator,
|
||||
// coder->pos and coder->size yet. This way the coder can be
|
||||
// restarted if the next filter in the chain returns e.g.
|
||||
// LZMA_MEM_ERROR.
|
||||
- memcpy(out + *out_pos, coder->buffer + coder->pos, buf_avail);
|
||||
+ //
|
||||
+ // Do the memcpy() conditionally because out can be NULL
|
||||
+ // (in which case buf_avail is always 0). Calling memcpy()
|
||||
+ // with a null-pointer is undefined even if the third
|
||||
+ // argument is 0.
|
||||
+ if (buf_avail > 0)
|
||||
+ memcpy(out + *out_pos, coder->buffer + coder->pos,
|
||||
+ buf_avail);
|
||||
+
|
||||
*out_pos += buf_avail;
|
||||
|
||||
// Copy/Encode/Decode more data to out[].
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.8.3.1
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
xz-5.2.4.tar.xz
Normal file
BIN
xz-5.2.4.tar.xz
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
BIN
xz-5.2.5.tar.xz
BIN
xz-5.2.5.tar.xz
Binary file not shown.
42
xz.spec
42
xz.spec
@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
|
||||
Name: xz
|
||||
Version: 5.2.5
|
||||
Release: 4
|
||||
Version: 5.2.4
|
||||
Release: 10
|
||||
Summary: A free general-purpose data compreession software with LZMA2 algorithm
|
||||
License: Public Domain, LGPLv2.1 and GPLv2+
|
||||
URL: http://tukaani.org/xz
|
||||
Source0: http://tukaani.org/%{name}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
|
||||
Source1: colorxzgrep.sh
|
||||
Source2: colorxzgrep.csh
|
||||
|
||||
Patch6000: backport-CVE-2022-1271.patch
|
||||
Patch6001: backport-liblzma-Add-overflow-check-for-Unpadded-size-in-lzma.patch
|
||||
Patch0: liblzma-Avoid-memcpy-NULL-foo-0-because-it-is-undefi.patch
|
||||
|
||||
BuildRequires: perl-interpreter gcc
|
||||
|
||||
@ -68,12 +65,6 @@ sed -i 's|^runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH|runpath_var=DIE_RPATH_DIE|g' libtool
|
||||
%install
|
||||
%make_install
|
||||
|
||||
# config color alias for xz*grep
|
||||
%global profiledir %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d
|
||||
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{profiledir}
|
||||
install -p -m 644 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{profiledir}
|
||||
install -p -m 644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{profiledir}
|
||||
|
||||
%find_lang %name
|
||||
|
||||
%check
|
||||
@ -84,7 +75,6 @@ LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$PWD/src/liblzma/.libs make check
|
||||
%doc %{_pkgdocdir}
|
||||
%license %{_pkgdocdir}/COPYING*
|
||||
%{_bindir}/*xz*
|
||||
%{profiledir}/*
|
||||
|
||||
%exclude %_pkgdocdir/examples*
|
||||
%exclude %{_libdir}/*.la
|
||||
@ -108,34 +98,8 @@ LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$PWD/src/liblzma/.libs make check
|
||||
%files help
|
||||
%{_mandir}/man1/*lz*
|
||||
%{_mandir}/man1/*xz*
|
||||
%{_mandir}/de/man1/*lz*
|
||||
%{_mandir}/de/man1/*xz*
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Wed May 22 2024 kouwenqi <kouwenqi@kylinos.cn> - 5.2.5-4
|
||||
- Type:enhancement
|
||||
- CVE:NA
|
||||
- SUG:NA
|
||||
- DESC:Add overflow check for Unpadded size in lzma_index_append
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Sep 23 2022 wangjiang <wangjiang37@h-partners.com> - 5.2.5-3
|
||||
- Type:enhancement
|
||||
- CVE:NA
|
||||
- SUG:NA
|
||||
- DESC:config color alias for xz*grep
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Apr 15 2022 liudabo <liudabo1@h-partners.com> - 5.2.5-2
|
||||
- Type:CVE
|
||||
- ID:CVE-2022-1271
|
||||
- SUG:NA
|
||||
- DESC:Fix CVE-2022-1271
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Jul 23 2020 shixuantong <shixuantong@huawei.com> - 5.2.5-1
|
||||
- Type:NA
|
||||
- ID:NA
|
||||
- SUG:NA
|
||||
- DESC:update to 5.2.5-1
|
||||
|
||||
* Sat Mar 21 2020 shenyangyang<shenyangyang4@huawei.com> - 5.2.4-10
|
||||
- Type:enhancement
|
||||
- ID:NA
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user