!24 fix CVE-2020-18770

From: @licihua 
Reviewed-by: @overweight 
Signed-off-by: @overweight

CVE-2018-16548-1.patch

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From b6ce8a1ca9442f89fae3482921fadc928ecbbb05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: jmoellers <josef.moellers@suse.com>
-Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 11:32:04 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Avoid memory leak from __zzip_parse_root_directory().
-
-(cherry picked from commit 9411bde3e4a70a81ff3ffd256b71927b2d90dcbb)
-https://github.com/gdraheim/zziplib/commit/9411bde3e4a70a81ff3ffd256b71927b2d90dcbb
-Signed-off-by: Yufa Fang <fangyufa1@huawei.com>
----
- zzip/zip.c    |  36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/zzip/zip.c b/zzip/zip.c
-index 14e2e06..8318463 100644
---- a/zzip/zip.c
-+++ b/zzip/zip.c
-@@ -472,9 +472,15 @@ __zzip_parse_root_directory(int fd,
-         } else
-         {
-             if (io->fd.seeks(fd, zz_rootseek + zz_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0)
-+	    {
-+	    	free(hdr0);
-                 return ZZIP_DIR_SEEK;
-+	    }
-             if (io->fd.read(fd, &dirent, sizeof(dirent)) < __sizeof(dirent))
-+	    {
-+	    	free(hdr0);
-                 return ZZIP_DIR_READ;
-+	    }
-             d = &dirent;
-         }
- 
-@@ -574,12 +580,38 @@ __zzip_parse_root_directory(int fd,
- 
-         if (hdr_return)
-             *hdr_return = hdr0;
-+	else
-+	{
-+	    /* If it is not assigned to *hdr_return, it will never be free()'d */
-+	    free(hdr0);
-+	    /* Make sure we don't free it again in case of error */
-+	    hdr0 = NULL;
-+	}
-     }                           /* else zero (sane) entries */
- #  ifndef ZZIP_ALLOW_MODULO_ENTRIES
--    return (entries != zz_entries ? ZZIP_CORRUPTED : 0);
-+    if (entries != zz_entries)
-+    {
-+	/* If it was assigned to *hdr_return, undo assignment */
-+	if (p_reclen && hdr_return)
-+	    *hdr_return = NULL;
-+	/* Free it, if it was not already free()'d */
-+	if (hdr0 != NULL)
-+	    free(hdr0);
-+	return ZZIP_CORRUPTED;
-+    }
- #  else
--    return ((entries & (unsigned)0xFFFF) != zz_entries ? ZZIP_CORRUPTED : 0);
-+    if (((entries & (unsigned)0xFFFF) != zz_entries)
-+    {
-+	/* If it was assigned to *hdr_return, undo assignment */
-+	if (p_reclen && hdr_return)
-+	    *hdr_return = NULL;
-+	/* Free it, if it was not already free()'d */
-+	if (hdr0 != NULL)
-+	    free(hdr0);
-+	return ZZIP_CORRUPTED;
-+    }
- #  endif
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
- /* ------------------------- high-level interface ------------------------- */
--- 
-2.19.1
-

CVE-2018-16548-2.patch

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From e8d90fe7525c177f0c28f6843f2a25da2e6e5045 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: jmoellers <josef.moellers@suse.com>
-Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 11:49:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Avoid memory leak from __zzip_parse_root_directory().
-
-(cherry picked from commit d2e5d5c53212e54a97ad64b793a4389193fec687)
-https://github.com/gdraheim/zziplib/commit/d2e5d5c53212e54a97ad64b793a4389193fec687
-Signed-off-by: Yufa Fang <fangyufa1@huawei.com>
----
- zzip/zip.c | 25 ++-----------------------
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/zzip/zip.c b/zzip/zip.c
-index 8318463..79fd9ad 100644
---- a/zzip/zip.c
-+++ b/zzip/zip.c
-@@ -584,34 +584,13 @@ __zzip_parse_root_directory(int fd,
- 	{
- 	    /* If it is not assigned to *hdr_return, it will never be free()'d */
- 	    free(hdr0);
--	    /* Make sure we don't free it again in case of error */
--	    hdr0 = NULL;
- 	}
-     }                           /* else zero (sane) entries */
- #  ifndef ZZIP_ALLOW_MODULO_ENTRIES
--    if (entries != zz_entries)
--    {
--	/* If it was assigned to *hdr_return, undo assignment */
--	if (p_reclen && hdr_return)
--	    *hdr_return = NULL;
--	/* Free it, if it was not already free()'d */
--	if (hdr0 != NULL)
--	    free(hdr0);
--	return ZZIP_CORRUPTED;
--    }
-+    return (entries != zz_entries) ? ZZIP_CORRUPTED : 0;
- #  else
--    if (((entries & (unsigned)0xFFFF) != zz_entries)
--    {
--	/* If it was assigned to *hdr_return, undo assignment */
--	if (p_reclen && hdr_return)
--	    *hdr_return = NULL;
--	/* Free it, if it was not already free()'d */
--	if (hdr0 != NULL)
--	    free(hdr0);
--	return ZZIP_CORRUPTED;
--    }
-+    return ((entries & (unsigned)0xFFFF) != zz_entries) ? ZZIP_CORRUPTED : 0;
- #  endif
--    return 0;
- }
- 
- /* ------------------------- high-level interface ------------------------- */
--- 
-2.19.1
-

CVE-2018-16548-3.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From a37ce0d441050356efc5fcaa48e1cdcf21a6b8e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: jmoellers <josef.moellers@suse.com>
-Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 13:55:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] One more free() to avoid memory leak.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 0e1dadb05c1473b9df2d7b8f298dab801778ef99)
-https://github.com/gdraheim/zziplib/commit/0e1dadb05c1473b9df2d7b8f298dab801778ef99
-Signed-off-by: Yufa Fang <fangyufa1@huawei.com>
----
- zzip/zip.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/zzip/zip.c b/zzip/zip.c
-index 79fd9ad..f97a40a 100644
---- a/zzip/zip.c
-+++ b/zzip/zip.c
-@@ -586,6 +586,8 @@ __zzip_parse_root_directory(int fd,
- 	    free(hdr0);
- 	}
-     }                           /* else zero (sane) entries */
-+    else
-+        free(hdr0);
- #  ifndef ZZIP_ALLOW_MODULO_ENTRIES
-     return (entries != zz_entries) ? ZZIP_CORRUPTED : 0;
- #  else
--- 
-2.19.1
-

CVE-2018-17828.patch

@@ -1,345 +0,0 @@
-From 81dfa6b3e08f6934885ba5c98939587d6850d08e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Josef Moellers <jmoellers@suse.de>
-Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2018 14:21:48 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix issue #62: Remove any "../" components from pathnames of
- extracted files. [CVE-2018-17828]
-
-https://github.com/gdraheim/zziplib/commit/f609ae8971f3c0ce64d38276b778001d0bbfc84b
----
- bins/unzzipcat-big.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- bins/unzzipcat-mem.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- bins/unzzipcat-mix.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- bins/unzzipcat-zip.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 4 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-big.c b/bins/unzzipcat-big.c
-index 982d262..88c4d65 100644
---- a/bins/unzzipcat-big.c
-+++ b/bins/unzzipcat-big.c
-@@ -53,6 +53,48 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(FILE* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
-     }
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * NAME: remove_dotdotslash
-+ * PURPOSE: To remove any "../" components from the given pathname
-+ * ARGUMENTS: path: path name with maybe "../" components
-+ * RETURNS: Nothing, "path" is modified in-place
-+ * NOTE: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it!
-+ *	Also, "path" is not used after creating it.
-+ *	So modifying "path" in-place is safe to do.
-+ */
-+static inline void
-+remove_dotdotslash(char *path)
-+{
-+    /* Note: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! */
-+    char *dotdotslash;
-+    int warned = 0;
-+
-+    dotdotslash = path;
-+    while ((dotdotslash = strstr(dotdotslash, "../")) != NULL)
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * Remove only if at the beginning of the pathname ("../path/name")
-+         * or when preceded by a slash ("path/../name"),
-+         * otherwise not ("path../name..")!
-+         */
-+        if (dotdotslash == path || dotdotslash[-1] == '/')
-+        {
-+            char *src, *dst;
-+            if (!warned)
-+            {
-+                /* Note: the first time through the pathname is still intact */
-+                fprintf(stderr, "Removing \"../\" path component(s) in %s\n", path);
-+                warned = 1;
-+            }
-+            /* We cannot use strcpy(), as there "The strings may not overlap" */
-+            for (src = dotdotslash+3, dst=dotdotslash; (*dst = *src) != '\0'; src++, dst++)
-+                ;
-+        }
-+        else
-+            dotdotslash +=3;	/* skip this instance to prevent infinite loop */
-+    }
-+}
-+
- static void makedirs(const char* name)
- {
-       char* p = strrchr(name, '/');
-@@ -70,6 +112,16 @@ static void makedirs(const char* name)
- 
- static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs)
- {
-+   char *name_stripped;
-+   FILE *fp;
-+   int mustfree = 0;
-+
-+   if ((name_stripped = strdup(name)) != NULL)
-+   {
-+       remove_dotdotslash(name_stripped);
-+       name = name_stripped;
-+       mustfree = 1;
-+   }
-    if (subdirs)
-    {
-       char* p = strrchr(name, '/');
-@@ -79,7 +131,10 @@ static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs)
-           free (dir_name);
-       }
-    }
--   return fopen(name, mode);      
-+   fp = fopen(name, mode);
-+   if (mustfree)
-+       free(name_stripped);
-+    return fp;
- }
- 
- 
-diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c b/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c
-index 9bc966b..793bde8 100644
---- a/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c
-+++ b/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c
-@@ -58,6 +58,48 @@ static void unzzip_mem_disk_cat_file(ZZIP_MEM_DISK* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
-     }
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * NAME: remove_dotdotslash
-+ * PURPOSE: To remove any "../" components from the given pathname
-+ * ARGUMENTS: path: path name with maybe "../" components
-+ * RETURNS: Nothing, "path" is modified in-place
-+ * NOTE: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it!
-+ *	Also, "path" is not used after creating it.
-+ *	So modifying "path" in-place is safe to do.
-+ */
-+static inline void
-+remove_dotdotslash(char *path)
-+{
-+    /* Note: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! */
-+    char *dotdotslash;
-+    int warned = 0;
-+
-+    dotdotslash = path;
-+    while ((dotdotslash = strstr(dotdotslash, "../")) != NULL)
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * Remove only if at the beginning of the pathname ("../path/name")
-+         * or when preceded by a slash ("path/../name"),
-+         * otherwise not ("path../name..")!
-+         */
-+        if (dotdotslash == path || dotdotslash[-1] == '/')
-+        {
-+            char *src, *dst;
-+            if (!warned)
-+            {
-+                /* Note: the first time through the pathname is still intact */
-+                fprintf(stderr, "Removing \"../\" path component(s) in %s\n", path);
-+                warned = 1;
-+            }
-+            /* We cannot use strcpy(), as there "The strings may not overlap" */
-+            for (src = dotdotslash+3, dst=dotdotslash; (*dst = *src) != '\0'; src++, dst++)
-+                ;
-+        }
-+        else
-+            dotdotslash +=3;	/* skip this instance to prevent infinite loop */
-+    }
-+}
-+
- static void makedirs(const char* name)
- {
-       char* p = strrchr(name, '/');
-@@ -75,6 +117,16 @@ static void makedirs(const char* name)
- 
- static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs)
- {
-+   char *name_stripped;
-+   FILE *fp;
-+   int mustfree = 0;
-+
-+   if ((name_stripped = strdup(name)) != NULL)
-+   {
-+       remove_dotdotslash(name_stripped);
-+       name = name_stripped;
-+       mustfree = 1;
-+   }
-    if (subdirs)
-    {
-       char* p = strrchr(name, '/');
-@@ -84,7 +136,10 @@ static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs)
-           free (dir_name);
-       }
-    }
--   return fopen(name, mode);      
-+   fp = fopen(name, mode);
-+   if (mustfree)
-+       free(name_stripped);
-+    return fp;
- }
- 
- static int unzzip_cat (int argc, char ** argv, int extract)
-diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c b/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c
-index 91c2f00..73b6ed6 100644
---- a/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c
-+++ b/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c
-@@ -69,6 +69,48 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(ZZIP_DIR* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
-     }
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * NAME: remove_dotdotslash
-+ * PURPOSE: To remove any "../" components from the given pathname
-+ * ARGUMENTS: path: path name with maybe "../" components
-+ * RETURNS: Nothing, "path" is modified in-place
-+ * NOTE: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it!
-+ *	Also, "path" is not used after creating it.
-+ *	So modifying "path" in-place is safe to do.
-+ */
-+static inline void
-+remove_dotdotslash(char *path)
-+{
-+    /* Note: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! */
-+    char *dotdotslash;
-+    int warned = 0;
-+
-+    dotdotslash = path;
-+    while ((dotdotslash = strstr(dotdotslash, "../")) != NULL)
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * Remove only if at the beginning of the pathname ("../path/name")
-+         * or when preceded by a slash ("path/../name"),
-+         * otherwise not ("path../name..")!
-+         */
-+        if (dotdotslash == path || dotdotslash[-1] == '/')
-+        {
-+            char *src, *dst;
-+            if (!warned)
-+            {
-+                /* Note: the first time through the pathname is still intact */
-+                fprintf(stderr, "Removing \"../\" path component(s) in %s\n", path);
-+                warned = 1;
-+            }
-+            /* We cannot use strcpy(), as there "The strings may not overlap" */
-+            for (src = dotdotslash+3, dst=dotdotslash; (*dst = *src) != '\0'; src++, dst++)
-+                ;
-+        }
-+        else
-+            dotdotslash +=3;	/* skip this instance to prevent infinite loop */
-+    }
-+}
-+
- static void makedirs(const char* name)
- {
-       char* p = strrchr(name, '/');
-@@ -86,6 +128,16 @@ static void makedirs(const char* name)
- 
- static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs)
- {
-+   char *name_stripped;
-+   FILE *fp;
-+   int mustfree = 0;
-+
-+   if ((name_stripped = strdup(name)) != NULL)
-+   {
-+       remove_dotdotslash(name_stripped);
-+       name = name_stripped;
-+       mustfree = 1;
-+   }
-    if (subdirs)
-    {
-       char* p = strrchr(name, '/');
-@@ -95,7 +147,10 @@ static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs)
-           free (dir_name);
-       }
-    }
--   return fopen(name, mode);      
-+   fp = fopen(name, mode);
-+   if (mustfree)
-+       free(name_stripped);
-+    return fp;
- }
- 
- static int unzzip_cat (int argc, char ** argv, int extract)
-diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c b/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c
-index 2810f85..7f7f3fa 100644
---- a/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c
-+++ b/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c
-@@ -69,6 +69,48 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(ZZIP_DIR* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
-     }
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * NAME: remove_dotdotslash
-+ * PURPOSE: To remove any "../" components from the given pathname
-+ * ARGUMENTS: path: path name with maybe "../" components
-+ * RETURNS: Nothing, "path" is modified in-place
-+ * NOTE: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it!
-+ *	Also, "path" is not used after creating it.
-+ *	So modifying "path" in-place is safe to do.
-+ */
-+static inline void
-+remove_dotdotslash(char *path)
-+{
-+    /* Note: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! */
-+    char *dotdotslash;
-+    int warned = 0;
-+
-+    dotdotslash = path;
-+    while ((dotdotslash = strstr(dotdotslash, "../")) != NULL)
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * Remove only if at the beginning of the pathname ("../path/name")
-+         * or when preceded by a slash ("path/../name"),
-+         * otherwise not ("path../name..")!
-+         */
-+        if (dotdotslash == path || dotdotslash[-1] == '/')
-+        {
-+            char *src, *dst;
-+            if (!warned)
-+            {
-+                /* Note: the first time through the pathname is still intact */
-+                fprintf(stderr, "Removing \"../\" path component(s) in %s\n", path);
-+                warned = 1;
-+            }
-+            /* We cannot use strcpy(), as there "The strings may not overlap" */
-+            for (src = dotdotslash+3, dst=dotdotslash; (*dst = *src) != '\0'; src++, dst++)
-+                ;
-+        }
-+        else
-+            dotdotslash +=3;	/* skip this instance to prevent infinite loop */
-+    }
-+}
-+
- static void makedirs(const char* name)
- {
-       char* p = strrchr(name, '/');
-@@ -86,6 +128,16 @@ static void makedirs(const char* name)
- 
- static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs)
- {
-+   char *name_stripped;
-+   FILE *fp;
-+   int mustfree = 0;
-+
-+   if ((name_stripped = strdup(name)) != NULL)
-+   {
-+       remove_dotdotslash(name_stripped);
-+       name = name_stripped;
-+       mustfree = 1;
-+   }
-    if (subdirs)
-    {
-       char* p = strrchr(name, '/');
-@@ -95,7 +147,10 @@ static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs)
-           free (dir_name);
-       }
-    }
--   return fopen(name, mode);
-+   fp = fopen(name, mode);
-+   if (mustfree)
-+       free(name_stripped);
-+    return fp;
- }
- 
- static int unzzip_cat (int argc, char ** argv, int extract)
--- 
-2.19.1
-

backport-0001-CVE-2020-18442.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From ac9ae39ef419e9f0f83da1e583314d8c7cda34a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Draheim <guidod@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:48:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 01/35] #68 ssize_t return value of zzip_file_read is a signed
+ value being possibly -1
+
+---
+ bins/unzzipcat-zip.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c b/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c
+index dd78c2b..385aeaf 100644
+--- a/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c
++++ b/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(ZZIP_DIR* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1024]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_file_read (file, buffer, 1024))) 
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_file_read (file, buffer, 1024))) 
+ 	{
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, 1, len, out);
+ 	}
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

backport-0002-CVE-2020-18442.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 7e786544084548da7fcfcd9090d3c4e7f5777f7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Draheim <guidod@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:50:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 02/35] #68 return value of zzip_mem_disk_fread is signed
+
+---
+ bins/unzip-mem.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bins/unzip-mem.c b/bins/unzip-mem.c
+index cc009f8..50eb5a6 100644
+--- a/bins/unzip-mem.c
++++ b/bins/unzip-mem.c
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static void zzip_mem_entry_pipe(ZZIP_MEM_DISK* disk,
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1024]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_mem_disk_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_mem_disk_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, len, 1, out);
+ 	
+ 	zzip_mem_disk_fclose (file);
+@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void zzip_mem_entry_test(ZZIP_MEM_DISK* disk,
+     {
+ 	unsigned long crc = crc32 (0L, NULL, 0);
+ 	unsigned char buffer[1024]; int len; 
+-	while ((len = zzip_mem_disk_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file))) {
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_mem_disk_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file))) {
+ 	    crc = crc32 (crc, buffer, len);
+ 	}
+ 	
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

backport-0003-CVE-2020-18442.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From d453977f59ca59c61bf59dec28dd724498828f2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Draheim <guidod@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:51:12 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 03/35] #68 return value of zzip_entry_fread is signed
+
+---
+ bins/unzzipcat-big.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-big.c b/bins/unzzipcat-big.c
+index 111ef47..ecebe11 100644
+--- a/bins/unzzipcat-big.c
++++ b/bins/unzzipcat-big.c
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static void unzzip_big_entry_fprint(ZZIP_ENTRY* entry, FILE* out)
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1024]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_entry_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_entry_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
+ 	{
+ 	    DBG2("entry read %i", len);
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, len, 1, out);
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(FILE* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1024]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_entry_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_entry_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, len, 1, out);
+ 	
+ 	zzip_entry_fclose (file);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

backport-0004-CVE-2020-18442.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 0a9db9ded9d15fbdb63bf5cf451920d0a368c00e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Draheim <guidod@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:51:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 04/35] #68 return value of zzip_mem_disk_fread is signed
+
+---
+ bins/unzzipcat-mem.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c b/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c
+index 6bd79b7..1b5bc22 100644
+--- a/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c
++++ b/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static void unzzip_mem_entry_fprint(ZZIP_MEM_DISK* disk,
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1024]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_mem_disk_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_mem_disk_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, len, 1, out);
+ 	
+ 	zzip_mem_disk_fclose (file);
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static void unzzip_mem_disk_cat_file(ZZIP_MEM_DISK* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1025]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_mem_disk_fread (buffer, 1, 1024, file))) 
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_mem_disk_fread (buffer, 1, 1024, file))) 
+ 	{
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, 1, len, out);
+ 	}
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

backport-0005-CVE-2020-18442.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From a34a96fbda1e58fbec5c79f4c0b5063e031ce11d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Draheim <guidod@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:52:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 05/35] #68 return value of zzip_fread is signed
+
+---
+ bins/unzzipcat-mix.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c b/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c
+index e18987d..8f3d0b8 100644
+--- a/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c
++++ b/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(ZZIP_DIR* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1024]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_fread (buffer, 1, 1024, file))) 
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_fread (buffer, 1, 1024, file))) 
+ 	{
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, 1, len, out);
+ 	}
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

backport-0006-CVE-2020-18442.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From fa1f78abe1b08544061204019016809664f2618c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Draheim <guidod@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:53:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 06/35] #68 return value of zzip_entry_fread is signed
+
+---
+ bins/unzzipshow.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bins/unzzipshow.c b/bins/unzzipshow.c
+index 9d8c2ed..5672d3b 100644
+--- a/bins/unzzipshow.c
++++ b/bins/unzzipshow.c
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static void zzip_entry_fprint(ZZIP_ENTRY* entry, FILE* out)
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1024]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_entry_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_entry_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, len, 1, out);
+ 
+ 	zzip_entry_fclose (file);
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static void zzip_cat_file(FILE* disk, char* name, FILE* out)
+     if (file) 
+     {
+ 	char buffer[1024]; int len;
+-	while ((len = zzip_entry_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
++	while (0 < (len = zzip_entry_fread (buffer, 1024, 1, file)))
+ 	    fwrite (buffer, len, 1, out);
+ 	
+ 	zzip_entry_fclose (file);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

backport-0007-CVE-2020-18442.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From f7a6fa9f0c29aecb4c2299568ed2e6094c34aca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Guido Draheim <guidod@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:55:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 07/35] #68 return value of posix read(2) is signed
+
+---
+ bins/zzipmake-zip.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bins/zzipmake-zip.c b/bins/zzipmake-zip.c
+index 8e09c31..b37877c 100644
+--- a/bins/zzipmake-zip.c
++++ b/bins/zzipmake-zip.c
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int rezzip_make (int argc, char ** argv)
+ 		continue;
+ 	    }
+ 
+-	    while ((n = read (input, buf, 16)))
++	    while (0 < (n = read (input, buf, 16)))
+ 	    {
+ 		zzip_write (output, buf, n);
+ 	    }
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

backport-CVE-2020-18770.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 99462cac1c6581bce36fe17fd1f430cbe114f0af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Valentin Lefebvre <valentin.lefebvre@suse.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 12:04:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] mmappend.c: pre-check header trailer magic
+
+* Avoid potential ASAN:SIGSEGV invalid memory access by pre-check the header
+  trailer magic.
+* CVE-2020-18770
+
+Signed-off-by: Valentin Lefebvre <valentin.lefebvre@suse.com>
+
+---
+ zzip/mmapped.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/zzip/mmapped.c b/zzip/mmapped.c
+index 8af18f4..49990e6 100644
+--- a/zzip/mmapped.c
++++ b/zzip/mmapped.c
+@@ -269,7 +269,9 @@ zzip_disk_entry_to_file_header(ZZIP_DISK * disk, struct zzip_disk_entry *entry)
+         return 0;
+     }
+     ___  struct zzip_file_header *file_header = (void *) ptr;
+-    if (zzip_file_header_get_magic(file_header) != ZZIP_FILE_HEADER_MAGIC)
++    if (file_header != 'P' || /* quick pre-check for trailer magic */
++        zzip_file_header_get_magic(file_header) != ZZIP_FILE_HEADER_MAGIC)
++ 
+     {
+         errno = EBADMSG;
+         return 0;
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

zziplib-0.13.71-sw.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -Naur zziplib-0.13.71.org/configure zziplib-0.13.71.sw/configure
+--- zziplib-0.13.71.org/configure	2022-02-28 06:07:23.580000000 +0000
++++ zziplib-0.13.71.sw/configure	2022-02-28 06:08:52.270000000 +0000
+@@ -14802,7 +14802,7 @@
+   $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+ else
+   if test "$cross_compiling" = "yes"; then
+-  case "$host_cpu" in alpha*|arm*|bfin*|hp*|mips*|sh*|sparc*|ia64|nv1)
++  case "$host_cpu" in sw_64*|alpha*|arm*|bfin*|hp*|mips*|sh*|sparc*|ia64|nv1)
+     ax_cv_have_aligned_access_required="yes"
+   ;; esac
+ else
+diff -Naur zziplib-0.13.71.org/m4/ax_check_aligned_access_required.m4 zziplib-0.13.71.sw/m4/ax_check_aligned_access_required.m4
+--- zziplib-0.13.71.org/m4/ax_check_aligned_access_required.m4	2022-02-28 06:07:23.590000000 +0000
++++ zziplib-0.13.71.sw/m4/ax_check_aligned_access_required.m4	2022-02-28 06:08:21.470000000 +0000
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
+ [AC_CACHE_CHECK([if pointers to integers require aligned access],
+   [ax_cv_have_aligned_access_required],
+ [if test "$cross_compiling" = "yes"; then
+-  case "$host_cpu" in alpha*|arm*|bfin*|hp*|mips*|sh*|sparc*|ia64|nv1)
++  case "$host_cpu" in sw_64*|alpha*|arm*|bfin*|hp*|mips*|sh*|sparc*|ia64|nv1)
+     ax_cv_have_aligned_access_required="yes"
+   ;; esac
+ else

zziplib.spec

@@ -1,21 +1,26 @@
 %define disable_rpath \
-sed -i 's|^hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=.*|hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=""|g' */libtool \
+sed -i 's|^hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=.*|hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=""|g' libtool \
-sed -i 's|^runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH|runpath_var=DIE_RPATH_DIE|g' */libtool
+sed -i 's|^runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH|runpath_var=DIE_RPATH_DIE|g' libtool
 
 Name:            zziplib
-Version:         0.13.69
+Version:         0.13.71
 Release:         5
 Summary:         Lightweight library for zip compression
 License:         LGPLv2+ or MPLv1.1
 URL:             http://zziplib.sourceforge.net
 Source0:         https://github.com/gdraheim/zziplib/archive/v%{version}.tar.gz
 
-Patch6000:       CVE-2018-16548-1.patch
+Patch6000:       backport-0001-CVE-2020-18442.patch
-Patch6001:       CVE-2018-16548-2.patch
+Patch6001:       backport-0002-CVE-2020-18442.patch
-Patch6002:       CVE-2018-16548-3.patch
+Patch6002:       backport-0003-CVE-2020-18442.patch
-Patch6003:       CVE-2018-17828.patch
+Patch6003:       backport-0004-CVE-2020-18442.patch
+Patch6004:       backport-0005-CVE-2020-18442.patch
+Patch6005:       backport-0006-CVE-2020-18442.patch
+Patch6006:       backport-0007-CVE-2020-18442.patch
+Patch6007:       zziplib-0.13.71-sw.patch
+Patch6008:	 backport-CVE-2020-18770.patch
 
-BuildRequires:   perl-interpreter python2 python2-rpm-macros zip xmlto
+BuildRequires:   perl-interpreter  zip xmlto
 BuildRequires:   zlib-devel SDL-devel pkgconfig autoconf automake gcc make
 
 Provides:        zziplib-utils
@@ -47,23 +52,27 @@ This package includes help documentation and manuals related to zziplib.
 
 %prep
 %setup -q
+sed -i -e 's:docs ::g' Makefile.am
 %patch6000 -p1
 %patch6001 -p1
 %patch6002 -p1
 %patch6003 -p1
-
+%patch6004 -p1
-find . -name '*.py' | xargs sed -i 's@#! /usr/bin/python@#! %__python2@g;s@#! /usr/bin/env python@#! %__python2@g'
+%patch6005 -p1
+%patch6006 -p1
+%patch6007 -p1
+%patch6008 -p1
 
 %build
-export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fno-strict-aliasing"
-export PYTHON=%__python2
 %configure --disable-static --enable-sdl --enable-frame-pointer --enable-builddir=_builddir
+# remove rpath
 %disable_rpath
-
 %make_build
 
 %install
 %make_install
+rm -rf docs/Make* docs/zziplib-manpages.ar
+find %{buildroot} -type f -name "*.la" -delete -print
 
 %post -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
@@ -86,6 +95,21 @@ export PYTHON=%__python2
 %{_mandir}/man3/*
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Sep 27 2023 licihua <licihua@huawei.com> - 0.13.71-5
+- fix CVE-2020-18770
+
+* Wed Oct 26 2022 wuzx<wuzx1226@qq.com> - 0.13.71-4
+- Add sw64 architecture
+
+* Sat Sep 04 2021 shixuantong <shixuantong@huawei.com> - 0.13.71-3
+- remove rpath
+
+* Fri Jun 25 2021 shixuantong <shixuantong@huawei.com> - 0.13.71-2
+- fix CVE-2020-18442
+
+* Tue Nov 3 2020 tianwei <tianwei12@huawei.com> - 0.13.71-1
+- update to 0.13.71 and remove python2
+
 * Fri Feb 14 2020 chengquan <chengquan3@huawei.com> - 0.13.36-5
 - Add necessary BuildRequires