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!4 [sync] PR-3: 修复CVE-2019-14452

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From: @openeuler-sync-bot 
Reviewed-by: @open123bot 
Signed-off-by: @open123bot
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openeuler-ci-bot 2023-11-16 08:33:26 +00:00 committed by Gitee
commit 42854fd832
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GPG Key ID: 173E9B9CA92EEF8F
4 changed files with 203 additions and 2 deletions
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32
do-not-allow-zip-files-to-have-upward-relative-path-.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 369eebe936e4a8c83cc54662a3412ce8bef189e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Hendricks <kevin.b.hendricks@icloud.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 14:33:01 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] do not allow zip files to have upward relative path
sections
---
src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp b/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
index 722815ad4..501f49f8e 100644
--- a/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
+++ b/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
@@ -424,6 +424,14 @@ void ImportEPUB::ExtractContainer()
// If there is no file name then we can't do anything with it.
if (!qfile_name.isEmpty()) {
+
+ // for security reasons we need the file path to always be inside the
+ // target folder and not outside, so we will remove all relative upward
+ // paths segments ".." from the file path before prepending the target
+ // folder to create the final target path
+ qfile_name = qfile_name.replace("../","");
+ cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.replace("../","");
+
// We use the dir object to create the path in the temporary directory.
// Unfortunately, we need a dir ojbect to do this as it's not a static function.
QDir dir(m_ExtractedFolderPath);
--
2.20.1

65
further-harden-against-malicious-epubs-and-produce-e.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
From 04e2f280cc4a0766bedcc7b9eb56449ceecc2ad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Hendricks <kevin.b.hendricks@icloud.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 11:47:42 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] further harden against malicious epubs and produce error
message
---
src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp b/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
index 501f49f8e..2f5c25f40 100644
--- a/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
+++ b/src/Importers/ImportEPUB.cpp
@@ -425,12 +425,41 @@ void ImportEPUB::ExtractContainer()
// If there is no file name then we can't do anything with it.
if (!qfile_name.isEmpty()) {
- // for security reasons we need the file path to always be inside the
- // target folder and not outside, so we will remove all relative upward
- // paths segments ".." from the file path before prepending the target
- // folder to create the final target path
- qfile_name = qfile_name.replace("../","");
- cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.replace("../","");
+ // for security reasons against maliciously crafted zip archives
+ // we need the file path to always be inside the target folder
+ // and not outside, so we will remove all illegal backslashes
+ // and all relative upward paths segments "/../" from the zip's local
+ // file name/path before prepending the target folder to create
+ // the final path
+
+ QString original_path = qfile_name;
+ bool evil_or_corrupt_epub = false;
+
+ if (qfile_name.contains("\\")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
+ qfile_name = "/" + qfile_name.replace("\\","");
+
+ if (qfile_name.contains("/../")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
+ qfile_name = qfile_name.replace("/../","/");
+
+ while(qfile_name.startsWith("/")) {
+ qfile_name = qfile_name.remove(0,1);
+ }
+
+ if (cp437_file_name.contains("\\")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
+ cp437_file_name = "/" + cp437_file_name.replace("\\","");
+
+ if (cp437_file_name.contains("/../")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
+ cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.replace("/../","/");
+
+ while(cp437_file_name.startsWith("/")) {
+ cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.remove(0,1);
+ }
+
+ if (evil_or_corrupt_epub) {
+ unzCloseCurrentFile(zfile);
+ unzClose(zfile);
+ throw (EPUBLoadParseError(QString(QObject::tr("Possible evil or corrupt epub file name: %1")).arg(original_path).toStdString()));
+ }
// We use the dir object to create the path in the temporary directory.
// Unfortunately, we need a dir ojbect to do this as it's not a static function.
--
2.20.1

94
harden-plugin-unzipping-to-zip-slip-attacks.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
From 0979ba8d10c96ebca330715bfd4494ea0e019a8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Hendricks <kevin.b.hendricks@icloud.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 14:08:44 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] harden plugin unzipping to zip-slip attacks
---
src/Misc/Utility.cpp | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/sigil_exception.h | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/Misc/Utility.cpp b/src/Misc/Utility.cpp
index 81100a75c..853c4035f 100644
--- a/src/Misc/Utility.cpp
+++ b/src/Misc/Utility.cpp
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/************************************************************************
**
+** Copyright (C) 2019 Kevin B. Hendricks, Stratford, Ontario Canada
** Copyright (C) 2009, 2010, 2011 Strahinja Markovic <strahinja.markovic@gmail.com>
**
** This file is part of Sigil.
@@ -715,6 +716,44 @@ bool Utility::UnZip(const QString &zippath, const QString &destpath)
// If there is no file name then we can't do anything with it.
if (!qfile_name.isEmpty()) {
+
+ // for security reasons against maliciously crafted zip archives
+ // we need the file path to always be inside the target folder
+ // and not outside, so we will remove all illegal backslashes
+ // and all relative upward paths segments "/../" from the zip's local
+ // file name/path before prepending the target folder to create
+ // the final path
+
+ QString original_path = qfile_name;
+ bool evil_or_corrupt_epub = false;
+
+ if (qfile_name.contains("\\")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
+ qfile_name = "/" + qfile_name.replace("\\","");
+
+ if (qfile_name.contains("/../")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
+ qfile_name = qfile_name.replace("/../","/");
+
+ while(qfile_name.startsWith("/")) {
+ qfile_name = qfile_name.remove(0,1);
+ }
+
+ if (cp437_file_name.contains("\\")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
+ cp437_file_name = "/" + cp437_file_name.replace("\\","");
+
+ if (cp437_file_name.contains("/../")) evil_or_corrupt_epub = true;
+ cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.replace("/../","/");
+
+ while(cp437_file_name.startsWith("/")) {
+ cp437_file_name = cp437_file_name.remove(0,1);
+ }
+
+ if (evil_or_corrupt_epub) {
+ unzCloseCurrentFile(zfile);
+ unzClose(zfile);
+ // throw (UNZIPLoadParseError(QString(QObject::tr("Possible evil or corrupt zip file name: %1")).arg(original_path).toStdString()));
+ return false;
+ }
+
// We use the dir object to create the path in the temporary directory.
// Unfortunately, we need a dir ojbect to do this as it's not a static function.
// Full file path in the temporary directory.
diff --git a/src/sigil_exception.h b/src/sigil_exception.h
index a6561d5c2..dcc0e0fca 100644
--- a/src/sigil_exception.h
+++ b/src/sigil_exception.h
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/************************************************************************
**
+** Copyright (C) 2019 Kevin B. Hendricks, Stratford, Ontario Canada
** Copyright (C) 2015 John Schember <john@nachtimwald.com>
** Copyright (C) 2009, 2010, 2011 Strahinja Markovic <strahinja.markovic@gmail.com>
**
@@ -132,4 +133,13 @@ public:
EPUBLoadParseError(const std::string &msg) : std::runtime_error(msg) { };
};
+
+/**
+ * Thrown for Invalid EPUB errors while loading and parsing content files.
+ */
+class UNZIPLoadParseError : public std::runtime_error {
+public:
+ UNZIPLoadParseError(const std::string &msg) : std::runtime_error(msg) { };
+};
+
#endif // SG_EXCEPTION_H
--
2.20.1

14
sigil.spec
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Name: sigil
Version: 0.9.14
Release: 1
Release: 2
Summary: WYSIWYG ebook editor
License: GPLv3+
URL: https://sigil-ebook.com/
@ -15,7 +15,11 @@ Patch2: %{name}-0.9.3-global-plugin-support.patch
Patch3: %{name}-0.9.13-minizip2.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2083977
Patch4: %{name}-0.9.14-python311.patch
BuildRequires: make
Patch5: do-not-allow-zip-files-to-have-upward-relative-path-.patch
Patch6: further-harden-against-malicious-epubs-and-produce-e.patch
Patch7: harden-plugin-unzipping-to-zip-slip-attacks.patch
BuildRequires: make
BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: qt5-qtbase-devel
BuildRequires: qt5-qtwebkit-devel
@ -80,6 +84,9 @@ BuildArch: noarch
%patch3 -p1 -b .mz
%endif
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%patch7 -p1
sed -i 's|/lib/sigil|/%{_lib}/sigil|' \
CMakeLists.txt src/CMakeLists.txt \
src/Resource_Files/bash/sigil-sh_install
@ -164,6 +171,9 @@ appstream-util validate-relax --nonet \
%changelog
* Thu Nov 16 2023 lvgenggeng <lvgenggeng@uniontech.com> - 0.9.14-2
- fix CVE-2019-14452
* Fri May 26 2023 wangtaozhi <wangtaozhi@kylinsec.com.cn> - 0.9.14-1
- Package init